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A BSTRACT
The aim of this thesis is to analyse the developments 
of Libya's air transport systems and infrastructures by 
analysing the evolution of these spatial organisations. 
Certain underlying factors are examined in order to ex­
plain these developments including the political ele­
ment influencing the changing flows in, and structures 
of, the networks. The Study emphasises the need to ex­
amine similar systems in other developing countries in 
the light of internal political forces, and the impact 
of the policies of the major suppliers of air transport 
technology.
The Preface defines the subject matter ana methodology. 
The Introduction deals with the topic in order to in­
troduce the ideas presented in the subsequent chapters 
of this thesis. The remainder of this thesis is 
divided into six chapters so that each covers a dis­
tinctive aspect of development. Chapter 1 investigates 
air transport in Libya in the pre-independence period 
before 1951, concentrating on the immediate pre- 
Independence years. Chapter 2 examines the impact of 
oil as an indigenous factor enabling the development of 
the Libyan air transport systems and infrastructure.
(i)
The macro planning processes in Libyan air transport 
are considered in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 places the con­
temporary developments in Libya's international and 
domestic air networks in their wider geographical con­
text with special reference to the four North African 
national airlines. Chapter 5 analyses the geographical 
and political aspects of the organisation of the Libyan 
air transport systems with emphasis on the predictions 
for changes in their organisation as a consequence of 
the removal of the administrative centre of the country 
from the historic location of Tripoli. This chapter 
also considers the revival of the strategic s i g ­
nificance of the Libyan airport system.
Chapter 6 considers the aircraft fleet aspect of Libyan 
air transport and throws light on the ability of the US 
Government to single handedly prevent its updating and 
to obstruct efforts towards an efficient system.
(ii)
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Pr e f a c e
'Much transportation pervades almost all political 
discussions, it is very largely placed at the centre of 
interest. Instead politics is the main subject, and 
transportation is incidental to it'.1 This thesis is 
about air transport as its main subject and politics 
explains certain aspects of its development.
Transportation is an indispensable element for any ex­
change economy. For a developing nation transportation 
is development. Air transport is at the core. A large 
and sparsely populated country like Libya needs air 
transport for economic reasons, for political reasons 
and for strategic considerations. The aeroplane came 
to Libya soon after its first use anywhere in the 
world. Libya's history since the Italian occupation in 
1911 witnessed the aeroplane put to use for military 
and civil air transport. Many British-manufactured 
aircraft and their components since World War II were 
partially tested in Libya, particularly for hot weather 
conditions performance and speed records. This con­
tinued well into Independence. Until 1965 Libya had no 
airline of its own. It is of significance that im­
proved economic conditions, and consequently political
1
power, as a consequence of the oil discoveries in 
Libya brought about the national economic development 
plans - and at the same time the creation of a national 
air carrier.
Libyan foreign policies in the 1 9 70 's apparently 
brought about US discontent which gradually grew from 
denial of arms exports in the early 1 970's to a com­
plete economic boycott against Libya in the 1980's. At 
the centre of US sanctions was the much publicised ban 
on the export of civil aircraft and aircraft parts. 
The recent situation excited journalists to the extent 
that recently one was surprised to learn that KLM, a 
member of the International Air Transport Association 
(IATA), dared to train pilots of another IATA member 
(Libyan Arab Airlines) in what he saw as an infringe­
ment of the EEC foreign ministers' pledge to '...do 
everything in their power to ensure that nationals and 
industry do not seek any commercial advantage'  ^ as a 
result of US sanctions against Libya.
The Libyan air transport system recently became the 
concern of leaders of the US and, by implication, many 
European countries. The developments in the Libyan air 
transport system appear at the forefront of the
2
country's political concerns. Today it is a central 
issue to the question of technology transfer. It is a 
central issue to the economic development of the 
country and a central issue in government policy. The 
aircraft Libya needs, to the detriment of the Libyan 
air transport system, a re a visible instrument for 
political battles and struggle for control and the 
countering of this effort. Libya is a small country - 
not in terms of area of course - so is its air 
transport system. This is probably the reason why it 
may be considered a suitable test ground for showing 
political muscle by competing super technologica1 
powers.
This thesis aims to analyse various aspects of the 
developments in the Libyan air transport systems and to 
explain these developments in political terms from a 
geographical perspective. To achieve this aim an 
adequate methodology had to be developed. The centre 
of the matter is the development in the air transport 
systems and networks. Thus the approach generally 
adopted is a systems analysis approach. The components 
of the network development over time are used so as to 
identify varied political and economic situations with 
different network structures and organisation. A com­
3
parative systems analysis approach was adopted when the 
Libyan air transport systems were set in their wider 
geographical area. Wherever useful, tables were ac­
cumulated and figures drawn to help emphasise the no­
tions and ideas put forward. All figures were created, 
drawn and numerated by the author.
The reference material available on the topic is 
sparse. This stems from two important facts. First, 
we have not come across any major work on any aspect of 
the geography of air transport either on Libya or on 
the region as a whole. Secondly, there is a lack of 
major works in any discipline on any aspect of Libyan 
air transport. Thus we had to rely on data and infor­
mation available from:
Works on the region, particularly those that 
handled transportation, mainly road transport. 
Material concerned with history or politics of the 
country generally.
Local newspapers published in English which, for­
tunately and understandably, showed particular in­
terest in air transport in Libya immediately 
before and for a few years after Independence.
Some data c o n c e r n i n g  the n a t i o n a l  airline
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statistics.
Major governmental reports on transport.
Libyan Department of Civil Aviation material which 
gave an insight into the developments in the civil 
aviation infrastructure.
Documents produced by aircraft and engine manufac­
turers on behalf of the national carrier. 
International specialised publications.
Some relative legislative documents.
The diverse interests influencing the quality and ac­
curacy of available sources and the absence of any 
major work on air transport on the region is hoped to 
have been made good through the understanding of the 
air transport industry, particularly from a local 
perspective, through the author's more than twenty five 
years' personal involvement and interest at all levels 
of airline management. That, of course, does not imply 
the completeness of the work, or its freedom from er­
rors in judgement and in its conclusions, for air 
transport is so wide an issue that only a few aspects 
may be mastered, never completely or continually, by 
any single individual - research in this field is even 
more restrictive despite the much evident vacuum, for 
airlines guard information jealously.
5
Footnotes
1. Roy I Wolfe In the preface to his book: 
Transportation and Politics
Van Nostrand, 1963.
2. See Flight International, p.23, 27 June 1987.
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IKTMODUOTIOK
Any recent political map of North Africa shows five 
states on the shores of the Mediterranean - Egypt to 
the East, Morocco to the West with two large states, 
Libya ana Algeria, between them and a sr.,all state, 
Tunisia, squeezed between Libya and Algeria. A 
demographic map shows that the bulk of the population 
in Egypt is concentrated on the Nile Delta, while 
Morocco and Tunisia show their highest population den­
sities in continuous linear distribution patterns con­
centrated in the coastal plains. Algeria's population 
has similar patterns of distribution. In Libya, human 
settlement is concentrated in two main areas, one in 
the East and one in the West separated by the Gulf of 
Surt which cuts the Libyan Mediterranean littoral zone 
in two and penetrates to lower latitudes so that the 
oceanic water mass meets the desert sand seas. To 
pursue the metaphor, population location in Libya thus 
consists of two major islands and a group of scattered 
islands - the oases - in the vast desert which forms 
the national territory.
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The geographic constraints
Libya's geography has played and still plays a dominant 
role in its history and current development. Long dis­
tance transport was always an important factor in 
political developments. The Phoenicians founded 
several of its ports and the Greeks and the Romans 
linked the territory - which formed part of their 
respective empires to Athens and Rome through rela­
tively long lines of maritime communications. The 
utility and wrealth of the two major Libyan 'islands' of 
population were considered to be of great importance, 
as is shown by the splendours of Cyrene and Leptis 
Magna. If these splendid towns have a story to be 
told, it will have to be included in any history of 
transport. For example: '...the earliest ancestors of
railways were the restways of ancient times...at 
several places around the Mediterranean, but most 
notably in Malta and Cyrenaica, are series of restways
cut in the limestone. Some of them, certainly date back
-1
to Neolithic times.'
The sea, whether desert or maritime, provided the means 
of access for most of the invaders of Libya and it was 
the sea which provided Libya with its interaction with
the great empires of the Mediterranean. Islam expanded 
through the desert sand sea from the East in the 
seventh century, after 641 AD. Although the initial 
advance was by land, by 670 AD the Islamic navy in the 
Mediterranean had become strong enough to seize the 
Byzantine coastal fortresses. The subsequent waves oi 
Arab migration by the tribes of the Banu Hilal and the 
Banu Sulaym in the eleventh century also came across 
the Eastern sand seas. Nine centuries later, the 
Italians came back to reinstate Rome's authority over 
Libya. They came with ships, one of which carried nine 
50 horsepower aeroplanes.
In short, all the powers which conquered Libya had 
first to overcome the physical barriers of water and 
sand. Human resistance started only when the actual 
territory of Libya was reached. The tools of war also 
had to rely on sea or land transport. It was only in 
1911 when the Italians came to Libya that things began 
tc change, for the aeroplane was to play a decisive 
role in Libyan history at the forefront of future 
political affairs. It was in Libya - by the Italians 
that the aeroplane was first used in real warfare 
anywhere in the world.^ The aeroplane has since become 
part of the Libyan political landscape as it has
9
elsewhere.
The development of air transport
The name, Libya, now used for the modern state was 
reintroduced by the Italians when they colonised the 
region earlier this century. They also introduced the 
aeroplane, so that it became part of the Libyan 
landscape just as this machine was being evaluated for 
its military potential. When the Wright Brothers flew 
the first heavier-than-air aeroplane on 17 December 
1 903^ Libya was still under Ottoman rule.^ Venturing 
into the air was by no means Libya's immediate concern, 
however. The story that Abbas I bn Fernas who is 
claimed to have been the first man ever to fly
successfully, albeit a very short distance, at Cordoba, 
Andalusia in 887 AD during the reign of Abdulrahman A1 
thani Ibn Al Hakam,^ does not seem to have anchored in 
the Libyan mind, any more than in those of ether
populations who learned of the event, beyond the 
thought that it was just an attempt to imitate birds. 
Such an attitude must have changed,for Libyans at
least, when the Italians landed on the shores of
Tripoli in 1911 and carried out a series of military 
aircraft activities that started the historical
10
record.^ It took less than eight years f r on, the 
achievement of the Wright Brothers in 1903 for the 
population of Libya to come into contact with the 
aeroplane. The role of the aeroplane remained univer­
sally militaristic until after World War 1.^
The early arrival of the aeroplane in Libya as a war 
machine was followed some twenty years later with the 
use of the aeroplane for non-military purposes. In 
1928 Tripoli was connected with the metropolitan 
country by a regular sea-plane service. After the end 
of local resistance to Italian occupation by 1931, a 
local operator, KAA, (NORD AFRICA AVIAZIOKE) operated 
an air service linking the important coastal centres. 
The earlier link represents the initial stage in the 
development of Libya's international air network, while 
the latter initiated the domestic air network. Linking 
Libya to Italy by air was part of a process common to 
all colonial powers. The quick spread of air services 
throughout many regions of the world was stimulated by 
political motives, for each colonial power aimed at 
maintaining links with its own colonial domain using 
this newly-available and time-saving vehicle.
The role of colonial air transport in Libya ended with
1 1
the end of colonial rule. Then the geographic location 
of Libya began to play an important role in the 
realisation of its strategic importance to air 
movements. Prior to this, the smallness of the Italian 
colonial domain in Africa did nothing to emphasise the 
external significance of Libya's location for colonial 
air transport networks beyond its relationship with the 
metropole - Italy. After the Second World War, 
however, things were to change. The British Empire was 
large and dispersed so that Libya's position served to 
strengthen its imperial air links once Britain occupied 
it. However, as far as the local population was 
concerned, air transport in Libya did not have any more 
relevance while Libya was under British military 
occupation, and later British administration, than it 
had had in colonial times. Only fifteen years after 
Libyan Independence in 1951 did the country's in­
digenous population become significantly involved in 
the industry of air transport. That was therefore the 
moment when it also formed its own national airline.
The involvement of Libyans in Libyan air transport only 
became significant once the system was actually 
created, operated and used by then.. Some involvement 
had taken place before the National Airline was formed,
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however. As early as 1953 Libya signed her first air 
services agreement. A privately-owned airline was 
founded in 1952 - but did not survive. Numerous people 
were employed at airports initially run by the British. 
Later however, after Independence, the Civil Aviation 
Department, with assistance from the United Nations, 
began to form an independent administrative body. The 
Civil Aviation Lav.- was issued in 1 956 . In any cas^, 
Libyans themselves had begun to make increasing use of 
aircraft as passengers from immediately prior to 
Independence. None of these developments, however, 
gave Libyans access to the developments in the 
a e r o s p a c e  indu s t r y  and aircraft m a n u f a c t u r i n g .  
Moreover, Libyans made no substantial effort to become 
involved in any aspect of air transport. Only when the 
national airline was formed and aircraft actually had 
to be bought by Libyans did they become directly in­
volved in the aerospace industry and the politics it 
involve s.
This thesis deals with the air transport systems of a 
developing country - Libya. The study itself presup­
poses a question, namely, to what extent is such a 
study n e c e s s a r y ?  There are several answers. 
Primarily, there appears to be no substantial work that
1 3
specifically examines the development of Libya's air 
transport systems from the standpoint of a given 
discipline. Furthermore, this particular study was 
stimulated by the recent difficulties experienced by 
Libya in obtaining aircraft to support the fleet of its 
national air carrier for political reasons. This en­
couraged research into the politics of air transport 
and the effect this consideration has had upon Libya 
as a developing country. Secondly, it is hoped that 
various aspects of the Libyan example discussed in this 
study will encourage further research towards an un­
derstanding of the ramifications and dimensions of the 
political problems of air transport for developing 
countries. Thirdly, works available on Libya's air 
transport are limited to the analyses made by the na­
tional airline and the Department of Civil Aviation 
regarding managerial considerations; to those made by 
various manufacturers from the point of view of 
marketing; and to reports made by selected consultants 
to the government of Libya. As a general rule, the few 
available studies on Libyan transport virtually neglect 
air transport because of its low numeric volume when 
compared to land transport. This thesis aims to en­
courage the view that air transport is so important a 
topic that it deserves extensive research from the
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perspective of many and various related disciplines.
The problem and its analysis
The thesis will analyse the political implications 01 
developments in air links to determine whether or not 
developments in the air transport systems in Libya are 
a consequence of political developments. It aims to 
show that internal and external political determinants 
in Libya shaped the air networks of the past and 
present and will shape them in the future. This is a 
geographical study because it concentrates on c o m ­
parisons between the changing structures of the air 
transport systems inside and outside Libya where 
necessary. It also analyses developments in networks 
in terms of their relative political circumstances and 
causations. However, the time scale used in this 
thesis would make detailed observations of these 
developments an extremely extensive task. As a result, 
it has been necessary for it to restrict the thesis to 
certain aspects of air transport development within 
the time period under consideration with particular em­
phasis on those that have occurred since Independence.
The particular topics that have been chosen are as
1 5
follows. Firstly, developments just before Independence 
are discussed. Secondly, the impact of economic chance 
since the discovery of oil on the air transport systems 
is analysed. Thirdly, a critique is made of analyses ox 
air transport in two consultancy transport reports; 
significantly, the first of these was made at the tir.c 
when revenues from oil became crucial considerations 
for future national development, and the second when 
oil revenues had fallen substantially as a result of 
the current decline in the fortunes of oil exporting 
countries. Fourthly, the contemporary Libyan air net­
work is analysed by means of a comparison with those 
of the Maghreb states. The political element in all 
these networks is generally considered. Fifthly, loca­
tional considerations are analysed so as to explain ex­
ternal interest in the country as well as internal 
political factors that shape the domestic network. 
Finally, and most importantly, the effects of interna­
tional politics on technology transfer are discussed 
with reference to the ways in which the dominance of 
US aerospace manufacturers and the politics of the US 
Government impede the development input required to 
operate an efficient air transport system - a vital 
tool for the process of economic development.
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It is hoped that an analysis of these specific aspects 
of the Libyan air transport systems will stimulate a 
study of Libyan air transport as a whole. The emphasis 
here will be on considering the air transport system in 
Libya under different political circumstances, so as to 
highlight the fact that a developing country which
needs an air transport system as a tool for development 
and political independence is affected in the choices
it makes in this respect by its own political
attitudes, as well as by the response made to it by
other states, in this case the United States. Indeed, 
the particular mode of analysis adopted here is vital 
for, without it, it would prove extremely difficult tc 
give the essential background to the fundamental 
problems the Libyan air transport systems face today. 
Furthermore, an adequate description of such a back­
ground is particularly necessary in the absence of 
other studies in this field. It is hoped that the ad­
vantages implied by a discussion of these various 
aspects will balance the disadvantages of a wider study 
of the mechanism of the political machinery in the US 
that has had a profound effect on the political deci­
sions which have led to the current level of stagnation 
in Libya's air transport development.
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There is a general consensus among those concerned that 
aerospace and air transport are extremely complex 
matters: 'The aerospace industry includes those forms
engaged in research, development and manufacture 
o f ... aerospace systems, including manned and unmarnc-d 
aircraft, missiles, space-launch vehicles, and space­
craft; propulsion, guidance and control units for all 
of the foregoing and ground based equipment essential 
to the testing, operation and maintenance of flight
vehicles'.^ Air transport: 'includes all civil flying
1 1performed by air carriers and general aviation'. The 
complexity stems from the fact that the aerospace in­
dustry involves a concentration of high technology and 
its security implications. The universality of air 
transport as a basic need for an economy only amplifies 
the complexity of the relationship of the aerospace in­
dustry to the air transport systems, so that the 
highest level of technological achievement may become a 
basic need in the least d e v e l o p e d  societies. 
Furthermore, the situation is compounded by the fact 
that the aerospace industry is concentrated in the in­
dustrial world. No doubt, in a world free from 
politics the relationship between air transport systems 
in developing nations and the aerospace industry ought 
to be determined solely through a market-place involv­
1 8
ing willing sellers and buyers. Unfortunately, thc- 
real world is intensely political.
Analysis of as complex a matter as this, therefore, 
must start with the adoption of modified definitions so 
that air transport includes the civil aviation ac­
tivities performed by air carriers and general aviation 
as well as the civil aviation infrastructure. The 
widening of the definition to include the larger con­
cept of air transport systems will obviously make it 
more difficult to further restrict the areas that can 
be considered in each phase of this analysis. 
Nonetheless, as much information as is necessary will 
be included, depending, of course, on the data-base 
available. As a developing country, where the aerospace 
manufacturing industry is totally absent, Libya's con­
cerns are purely those of a consumer, a factor which 
will affect the range of data available.
Air Transport: an international indnstry
Creating and operating an air transport system is a 
difficult task for a developing country. Such a system 
can only be run within universally accepted rules and 
procedures and there is no device in air transport pro­
cedures that takes into consideration the prevailing
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circumstances in a developing country. Airlines in the 
developing world must operate aircraft and maintain 
them at the standards set by the specialised interna­
tional bodies and aircraft manufacturers. These must 
be operated according to precise international rules 
and regulations. Airports must be built and equipped 
with state-of-the-art materials and according to 
universally set standards. These too must be operated 
by applying internationally-recognised regulations and 
practices. Thus airlines, indeed civil aviation in 
general, form part of a universal and advanced techni­
cal and economic activity. Its application in a 
developing region must accord with universally ac­
cepted standards. This fact is widely recognised and, 
in the specific region under consideration, the laws 
that govern air transport systems recognise that these
must function in accordance with such international
1 7standards ana practices.
The formation of a local airline in Libya as early as 
1931 is contemporary with the formation of many of the 
first airlines around the world. The concern over the 
implications of aircraft use became universal almost 
immediately after the innovation was realised. The 
flexibility inherent in aeroplane use and the machine's
20
use of a homogeneous atmosphere outside nations]
delimitation made international regulation an urgent
necessity. The process of international air transport
regulation started as early as 1910. However, the
P aris Convention was only signed by twenty-sir.
countries in 1519. This Convention set the rules a no
principles of aircraft operations ana established the
principle of state sovereignty over the air space above 
1 4its territory , thus creating a third dimension to 
territorial sovereignty. An update of the Paris Con­
vention was the Chicago Convention of 1 944. This
was significant in that it provided the framework for 
the orderly and safe development of international air 
transport through a number of annexes dealing with the 
v a r i o u s  a s p e c t s  of a i r c r a f t  o p e r a t i o n  anc
-1 C
performance. As for the agreements regulating the
air links between the respective governments, the Bel­
inda Agreement reached between Britain and the USA in
1946 became the basic model for air services 
1 f\agreements. D Because of the differing views ana 
interests, the Chicago Convention proposed that an in­
terim organisation, the Provisional International Civil 
Aviation Organisation, should be set up to look after 
members' interests and this was done, although the US 
was not a member. After the Bernraida Ag reeient was
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signed it became possible to go one step further and
form the ICAO ( I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Civil A v i a t i o n
1 7Organisation) in April 1947.
The concern of governments over regularising and con­
trolling air transport since 1919 was mirrored by the 
desire of emerging airlines to organise their own in­
ternational body, the I AT A (International Air Traffic 
Association). This was formed in the same year in 
which the Paris Convention was signed. While the Paris 
Convention aimed to regularise aircraft operation, IATA 
aimed at setting regulations and standards of practice 
for its members. This was to include setting fares and 
tariffs as well as studying regulations and lav/s af­
fecting airline operations and issued by the various
1 8authorities and organisations. Following World War
II, as was the case with governmental organisations,
IATA was reborn as the International Air Transport
1 9Association, in Havana in 1945.
Air Transport: at the forefront of politics
The scope and economic significance of air transport in 
Libya has recently been limited to contributing to na­
tional economic development and particularly to that
22
development associated with the oil industry. The
policies of the Libyan Government and the attitudes it
has adopted towards tourism have restricted the role of
the air transport system to that of a service strictly
concerned with business and administration. The result
has been that developments in air transport have become
closely associated with government business and 
7 npoli tics.
This thesis deals with the development of air transport 
systems within the geographical unit of Libya. 
Consequently, since there is no major stud)' of these 
developments, the thesis will cover the complete period 
since the first aeroplane touched down on Libyan soil 
in 1911 until the present. This does not mean, 
however, that it will focus on the history of this ac­
tivity in Libya, even though chronology helps to iden­
tify discernible trends over time so that this, 
together with the concomitant spatial distribution of 
this activity will help to build an understanding of 
the development of Libya's air transport systems.
Veale has noted that: '...with the passing of time, the
so-called military value of commercial air services 
grew until the European services were commercial in
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name only'.^ In a comment describing the era preced­
ing World War II - which might equally be seen as an 
expression of relief that World War II had also ended - 
Veale hoped that: ’...the aeroplane as a weapon of war
[had] a diminished value . The reality, however,
forty years after the end of World War II is that:
’...civil aviation is, to most aircraft manufacturers 
and states alike, an indivisible part of the larger 
concept of aerospace which is unavoidably influenced by 
defence considerations' . ^  BOAC's flights through 
Tripoli after World War II were largely of a military 
nature particularly until the time economic conditions 
in Libya in the late 1 9 5 0 's altered the scene as a 
result of the discovery of oil. Libya today faces con­
siderable difficulties in obtaining civil aircraft for 
she is accused by the United States of using them for
military ends. Thus air transport remains a mode of
transport which is laden with international politics. 
In the Libyan case these implications directly affect 
the operations of the system itself.
In the geographical area under consideration, politi­
cal control over air transport covers three separate 
periods. The first is that under Italian rule. The 
second occurred when the country was controlled and ad­
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ministered by Britain and France and, finally, the 
third period includes the era since Independence when 
control over air transport has become the respon­
sibility of the Libyans.
The study of the development of the air transport sys­
tems during the pre-Independence era is of significance 
in a number of ways. It provides evidence that an air 
transport system existed in the country almost at the 
same time as elsewhere in the world. Also it 
demonstrates that it was totally alien to the in­
d i g e n o u s  p o p u l a t i o n  until well into the post- 
Independence period. Thus the study of air transport 
in that era must concentrate on three areas: firstly
the significance of air links in political terms; 
secondly the evaluation of the locations of destina­
tions in the network of airlines which served the area 
so that the volume of traffic and the degree of invest­
ment may indicate the importance of these destinations 
for the controlling power; and thirdly and most impor­
tantly the strategic importance of Libyan airports in 
this period, which was considerable, must be evaluated.
The run-up to the period before Libya's Independence 
and the period immediately following it were charac­
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terised by a strong foreign influence and may be viewed 
from two different standpoints. The first is the issue 
of the air transport network structure for which the 
historical evidence available provides the elements 
necessary for its reconstruction and consequently 
provides material for an analysis. The second issue 
follows from the first, for it looks at the political 
significance of developments in the air transport net­
work through time. The emphasis then will be on trying 
to look at the air transport network as a tool of 
political expression. The changes in political power 
in Libya and changes in the political circumstances of 
the colonial era, the subsequent administration under 
the United Nations and Independence all represent 
separate political periods; the issues involved in air 
transport rendering political attitudes highly visible 
in the development of the air network. Air network 
development as a consequence of political development 
is quite natural. The direct association stems from 
the fact that airlines are either government-owned as 
was - and still is - the case with the majority of 
world airlines2  ^ or at least government-controlled - 
that is that governments play a substantial role in 
deciding the routes operated and the regulations 
applied.
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I edepeedtemce
The most important period in Libya's air transport 
development has been the period since Independence. 
The air transport system which operated through and 
within Libya was largely a continuation in character of 
that which existed before Independence in 1951. In the 
second half of the first decade of Independence, two 
important occurrences had their impact on the develop­
ment of Libya's air transport network. The first was 
development in the aerospace industry in the industrial 
world where longer range aircraft were designed. The 
second was the discovery of oil in Libya.
Anthony Sampson has pointed out that: 'It was AEROFLOT
in the Soviet Union which first began regular long­
distance jet flights in 1 956 - a fact often tactfully 
forgotten - with their Tupolev 104 which flew from Mos­
cow to Irkutsk with only one stop'.^ They were over­
taken by BOEING's B707 which first flew for commercial 
airlines in 1 9 5 8 . ^  The spread of the B707 resulted in 
a diminishing role for airports like that of Tripoli in 
long-distance travel. Without the discovery of oil at 
the same time as aircraft such as the B70 7 were 
introduced, Libya's airports would have been restricted
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to the traffic generated by the presence of the allied 
forces and the small Italian community which remained 
in the country after Italy's defeat and its loss of 
Libya. It was the discovery of oil that transformed 
the air transport system from a supportive tool for 
foreign military and political concerns into a factor 
providing a substantial service to Libya's own economy,
(see Chapter 1 ) .
The Imped of oil
A
Transport in general terms is a service to the economy, 
and air transport is also equally a handmaiden of na­
tional politics. Whether air transport itself as an 
econoiTiic activity ought to be cost effective or not ap­
pears to be secondary to the role it plays in 
facilitating political exchange and interaction so that 
its main function is to confer 'utility of p l a c e 1. 
Hence, low profits in air transport with paradoxically 
high growth rates is a universal phenomenon.^ While 
the internal economics of the Libyan air transport sys­
tem is important in management terms, the reflection of 
the Libyan economy on the air transport systems and 
thus on the character and changes occurring in air 
transport systems and networks, as well as on its spa­
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tial structure, is more significant to any geographical 
study. The discovery of oil brought in a breed of 
aircraft ana foreign air transport entrepreneurs who 
were operating for more hours and carrying more pas­
sengers than all scheduled operators to the country. 
Their field of operation was invisible to those outside 
the oil industry - the light aircraft they used revived 
the air strips built for military purposes before and 
during World W7ar II thus emphasising the double role 
air transport has played and can always play - and em­
phasised the notion that the government's limited con­
trol over the oil industry in the early years of 
production was paralleled by a similar weakness in its 
control over the air transport system serving it. As 
government control over the oil sector grew, its con­
trol over the oil field air services grew in response.
The Libyan public air transport system continued to be 
developed for fifteen years after Independence as part 
of the network of foreign airlines. Lost nevly- 
inaependent countries rushed to establish prestige air­
lines immeuiacely after they attained political 
Independence. However Libya's national airline forma­
tion was delayed for, on the one hand, it appeared 
economically pointless to operate a subsidised service
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to serve the allied forces (who almost exclusively 
formed the source of air passenger traffic) against a 
background of extreme national poverty and, on the 
other, there was an acute shortage of adequately edu­
cated nationals who could be spared to run such an 
industry. Moreover, to absorb personnel in such an in­
dustry when the country's economy was still basically 
at subsistence level would have appeared absurd. The 
development of Libya's own air transport system and in­
frastructure is closely associated with the growth of 
oil revenues and the consequent impact of these 
revenues on the Libyan economy, (see Chapter 2).
YSne Flamming Process
There was considerable pessimism over Libya's develop­
ment immediately after Independence. The initial stage 
of oil exploration and production raised more hope than 
fulfilment. The Libyan Government received a survey 
carried out by the International Bank of Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD - the World Bank)2® which looked 
at the air t r a n s p o r t  scene with c o n s i d e r a b l e  
reservations. At the time, such a view was justified 
from immediate economic considerations. However, the 
rapid g r o w t h  of p r e s s u r e  on the t r a n s p o r t
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infrastructure, as prospecting for oil progressed, 
promnted the need for an independent survey on various 
aspects of development including transport. The viev; 
that an air transport system owned by the govern;; ent 
had become an urgent requirement developed in 1965 and 
the independent transport study carried out by Doxiaois
and Associates had to take this sudden development into
■ 29account.^
The process of transport planning has been implemented 
throuah various approaches depending on the ultimate 
purpose of the plan. Functional judgements have 
characterised the development of the air transport 
sector. The difficulty is that it proved practically 
impossible for an outside expert fully to understand 
the problems a functional official meets in his daily 
work. Furthermore, the consultant's incoherent and 
self-interested approach seems to have impeded the 
presentation of a clear and frank set of recommenda­
tions or an appropriate background to problems. If 
Doxiaais's work failed to come up with genuine and 
practical proposals for developing the air transport 
systems, then the study produced two decades later by
■3 A
Fredrick Harris and A s s o c i a t e s f o r  the Secretariat 
(Ministry) of Communications is a model for how confus­
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ing such a study can be in the absence of adequate data 
and levels of organisational cooperation.
Forecasting has been a useful tool for planners. Prob­
ably such usefulness is hampered by the fact that the 
future is not by necessity a continuation of past or 
present trends. If experience and intelligent expecta­
tions were incorporated in forecasting models, the 
forecasting methods involved might be of more practical 
use. Such variables, however, are not measurable and 
consequently judgement forecasts are more realistic in 
the short term. Long term forecasts in a rapidlv 
changing industry and in a volatile economy like that 
of Libya are made more complex by the notion that: 'the
result- of ci systems approach will depend not only on 
the model structure and its ability to represent the 
important system interdependencies, but also on data 
inputs, the speci fication of appropriate objective 
functions, and the pricing, investment and regulatory 
criteria that are included',^  (see Chapter 3).
Maghrebi airlines
Independence for the countries of North Africa was in­
evitably to involve the process of decolonisation. The
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first to become independent was Libya in 1951 and the 
last Algeria in 1962. When the Northern African 
countries took control of their national air carriers, 
they were taking over concerns which had already been 
established by French concerns. Libya alone had to 
start from scratch. Yet, whether by coincidence or 
design, all the airlines of the region were to acquire 
similar characteristics in their networks, route struc­
ture and fleets. A significant bond has been A I L
FRANCE'S technical link with the four airlines and
developments in the aerospace industry in Europe and
the USA. Egypt to the east of this region had a dif­
ferently structured network and fleet. This unity in 
character makes it appropriate to take a close look at 
the air networks of the Maghrebi airlines for the pur­
poses of comparison.
The proposition that there is a similarity in the
character of the Maghrebi airlines' fleets and networks 
initially seems to imply a degree of cooperation be­
tween them so that they function on the basis of sc:.;e 
common theory and purpose. In order that a nor° 
profound analysis may be made of this suggestion, the 
two major assets of each of these airlines - fleets and
networks - are analysed to determine whether the
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similar fleets and the existence of a common technical 
partner is a product of regional unity - both amongst 
uiruines and in the political sphere. A hypothesis of 
ge er^l u..it_. mu. t s.ar, fr^m fiee. co. position L.ric 
aircraft jjopulaiiOii in Caci. of uheae four countries, 
this is a measure of size and ,->ot':>nt*ial Applying scch 
po-en.ia- to _ou~es ^ro^uc-s ti.e volu..,e 01 pocensis^ 
ro.uc^ an. in general terms allows a significant 
measure for comparison of size of potential product and 
levels of productivity.
Levels of productivity may be determined in many forms. 
For example, this nay be done by answering questions 
such as the following. How many hours is each type of 
aircraft (per aircraft) operated on a daily basis? how 
much is the yield per flying hour? what is the total 
tonnage of capacity offered by the airline? that per­
centage of the available capacity is used?
The extent of the network is another general feature 
used for comparison, as is its division into domestic 
anc international components. A more realistic method 
of comparison is provided, however, by relating this 
information to the higher level of productivity 
measures. Tnis is done oy calculating the capacity of-
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ferea on these networks. The spatial distribution of 
the network indicates the points served. The interna­
tional links serve to demonstrate each of the country's 
external links. The attempt here will be to natch 
thc.se v:it:i each o, these countries' political tics, 
while making a distinction between linns operated for 
political reasons, those operated for purely commer­
cial r e a s o n s  or t h o s e  m a k i n g  use of b o t h  
considerations. It will become clear that air links 
follow politics in almost perfect parallel. The linns 
provided inside North Africa by the region's airlines 
are as weak as commercial links and their air networks 
are as separate as their government’s political objec­
tive0 and motives. The common features in fleet com­
position amongst the region's airlines, stem from ex­
ogenous conditions (aircraft suppliers) and from the 
region's colonial history and geographic location vis 
a vis Europe, the middle East and the American 
continent.
The domestic networks of the four countries are more 
significant in administrative terms. Naturally tne 
political element in domestic networks stems from, 
governmental desire to control its own territory. The 
degree to which this aesire is expressed in air net­
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works and the role of distance in influencing the 
degree and intensity of these links can be evaluated in 
many ways. One measure is the observation of in­
dividual links and the size of capacity flows in rela­
tion to area and population on one hand and the graph- 
theoric measures of connectivity ana circuitry on the 
other. This is seen as a useful tool that could mare 
a comparison involving a numoer of aspects possible, sc 
that a sound conclusion could be collectively produced,
(see Chapter 4).
Strategic considerations
Air transport in Libya has been looked at by the 
various transport studies as a small part of the multi­
modal system. Understandably, most of tne emphasis has 
been concentrated on road transport, for road transport 
is of daily concern to every citizen. Air transport 
might not be as widely used, but its crucial importance 
is suddenly made clear when need requires rapid long 
distance travel. The importance accorded to Libya's 
air transport system since the late 1920's has changed 
in character over time from the status of a closed 
domestic and international link with the Italian 
metropolis to that of a staging post during British
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control. The fading of Libya's strategic importance in 
air transport terms was caused by the innovations in 
air transport technology.
There are signs, however, that such strategic charac­
teristics are reviving. The Soviet Bloc is now using 
Libya's air transport facilities in the same manner as 
did the British until the early 1960's. It is a fea­
ture which is indicative of the Soviet Bloc's failure 
to develop adequate long-range aircraft, in spite of 
the fact that they were the first to initiate this par­
ticular development. The difference, in Libyan terms, 
between the role Libyan airports played for the British 
in the 1 9 0 1 b ana 1 950's and the role these airports 
play for Soviet Bloc countries at ehe present: ti..ie,
however, is that Libya's liberation frcm Ioal* 
originally came mainly through the efforts of the 
Allied forces. This may have limited the initial ex­
ploitation of the potential power inherent in Libya's 
strategic location. The exploitation by the Soviet 
Bloc of such a location appears to take place without 
restriction or reciprocity in air transport terms. The 
political return that tne Soviet Bioc grants Libya for 
such facilities is, however, outside the scope or this 
thesis.
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In the Arab World, unity is a persistent aspiration. 
Libya's location in a central position between the 
Mashreq and Maghreb qualified it to act as the physical 
link between these two regions. In much of the 1970's 
Arab carriers received considerably more encouragement 
to operate on fifth freedom traffic rights than was the 
case with non-Arab carriers. Libya's location helped 
it contribute considerably to such policies and traces 
of this are still evident over many routes within the 
Arab World. Libya's political differences with 
numerous Arab regimes have, however, deprived it of 
many air links and diminished its contribution to 
building a unified and integrated Arab Air transport 
system. Thus the strategic significance of its loca­
tion was undermined for political motives and has be­
come a less important factor in the Arab air network 
overall.
The location of Libya was significant in international 
air transport politics. As with the domestic air 
transport system, the distribution of economic and 
political activity within the country has affected the 
magnitude and direction of traffic flows in the system. 
Generally, economic activity and population are con-
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centra ted in two regions in the higher latitudes, 
mainly in the coastal regions. These two regions are 
separated by the Gulf of Surt. The concentration of 
administrative control in the coastal city of Tripoli 
intensified flows in the domestic network. The 
paradox of decline in economic activity in the local 
economy and growth in air traffic trends may be 
resolved by an understanding of the effects of 
restricting international passenger flow to a single 
gateway. On the other hand - as noted by the Libyan 
leader, Colonel Qadhafi, on 1 January 1 987 - the con- 
centration of the administration in Tripoli A has 
created a distortion of air traffic patterns. The 
great distance between the two main regions of popula­
tion concentration and economic activity made the role 
of air transport very prominent, as is demonstrated by 
the amplitude in the weekly frequencies and the 
development of additional air links mainly between 
Tripoli and most of the other significant urban 
centres. The proposed shifting of the current a d ­
ministrative centre to the geographic centre of the 
country is analysed with the aim of predicting the ef­
fects of such a move on the public air transport 
system. Such an analysis assumes the change of the ad­
ministrative centre with no change in the current ad­
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ministrative policies and practices and predicts an in­
crease in the costs in the air transport system as a 
consequence, (see Chapter 5).
The US Role
'The air transportation system operates in a dynamic 
environment composed of people and their economy'. 
The vehicle of air transport in Libya has been at the 
centre of its political relations with the US and 
Britain. Britain lost much of its influence in Libya 
after the revolution of 1 9 69, as did the British 
aircraft manufacturers. The US aircraft manufacturers 
dominated the scene in Libya in the 1 970's. What is 
of particular interest is that such an imbalance ap­
pears to have been universal in airframe manufacturing. 
'Airbus Industrie' is fighting to be the one exception 
that survives. This approach does not seek an indepen­
dence from US dominance, but it is an attempt at the 
survival of an E u r o p e a n  aircraft industry in 
circumstances, as Keith Hayward describes, where: 
'...increasingly, the development and production of 
civil aircraft and aero engines is based on interna­
tional collaboration'.34 In practical terms, this rep­
resents an effort by US companies to become p a r ­
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ticipants in developments in aerospace technology 
wherever such development takes place in the industrial 
world and in certain developing countries. The growing 
awareness in Europe of the US desire to make its 
dominance total cannot be more rationally expressed 
than in the words of Mr. Hayward when he writes,
' ...[f ]rom the perspective of the mid 1 980's it is in­
creasingly apparent that although there is still a 
general consensus about the desirability of western 
security interdependence, continuing disputes in the 
economic, industrial and technological fields, have 
begun to raise serious doubts about the long term 
stability of the alliance'.35
Gradually Libya has fallen into political disfavour 
with the United States. It is of particular interest 
to note, however, that the United States alone used its 
legislation and influence around the world to handicap 
and paralyse Libya's air transport system. Libya's ef­
forts to obtain aircraft from elsewhere proved an unvi- 
able alternative because of universal US dominance over 
the industry. The damage to Libya's efforts to build 
an air transport infrastructure is far-reaching. The 
fact that political power stems from technological 
power is a recognised principle. The imbalance between
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the developing countries and the industrial world in 
technological achievement is also a widely-recognised 
problem.36 The proposal that the US alone, through its 
legislation, is able to ensure that the development of 
an air transport system of a small developing country 
should depend solely on US wishes and policies is a 
theory that this thesis will examine.
The future of the air transport system in Libya is cur­
rently at a cross roads - there appears to be no avail­
able solution to providing the most fundamental asset 
to an air transport system - aircraft. The US through 
its legislation controls the aerospace industry outside 
the Soviet Bloc because there is no commercial aircraft 
without some component or another of US origin. Even 
if there were, the US would use other pressures to 
prevent the supply of such aircraft unless that 
aircraft came from a source which was keen to develop 
an aircraft totally from European technology and for 
European purposes. Only then can Libya update its 
aircraft fleet. Such a position is not totally 
excluded. Libya, though, must take the chance. The 
change to equipment built in the Soviet Union would 
abort all the effort spent and investment made in 
Libyan human resources - an extremely high cost indeed
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in time and money. The final alternative is, of
course, a change in Libya's political links with the 
United States so that restrictions are lifted. The 
purchase of aircraft by evading US sanctions has proved 
expensive in terms of initial investment and is proving 
unworkable in practical terms. Libya bought aircraft 
in 1986 with components restricted by the Americans. 
One year after these aircraft were bought, they are
still not included in the airline's schedules, domestic 
or int e r n a t i o n a l .  In airline terms, this is
catastrophic. The Libyan national airline pays the
visible price of Libya's political differences with the 
United States. That is because it is only the United 
States that sees it appropriate to use its technologi­
cal power and universal dominance over the aerospace 
technology to demonstrate through the Libyan example 
the strength and international effectiveness of its 
legislation and, when desirable, sanctions which it 
can impose, (see Chapter 6).
Somrces
There has been considerable difficulty in finding 
reference material for this thesis. The absence of 
writings on the subject of air transport in Libya made
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it necessary to investigate the small amount of data 
available in the various relevant publications. This 
has been, in itself, an interesting venture. While, 
for example, a local (Libyan) English speaking paper 
(The Sunday Ghibli) gave an interesting account of air­
line activities in Libya between 1 949 and 1 967 - when 
it ceased to be published - the physical search for 
every article, piece of news and advertisement related 
to air transport in that period gave the author a 
pleasing opportunity to acquaint himself with the 
general background of many of the contemporary happen­
ings - political, economic and social. This newspaper 
had some piece of information relevant to the air 
transport scene in almost every issue.
Much of the information and data used in this thesis 
comes from unpublished documents. Some are government 
sources and were temporarily available in SOAS Geog­
raphy Department. The range covered by these docu­
ments is largely inadequate. For example, most of the 
documents concerning fleet planning are issued by 
airframe manufacturers. Knowledge of the airline's 
view is documented in the decisions taken towards 
airframe manufacturers' proposals in the managerial 
decisions within the airline or the Communications
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Ministry. The documents concerning these decisions are 
not available. I hope that the author's first-hand in­
formation and long term participation in the working of 
these decisions provides an honest representation of 
the facts and adequately compensates for any weaknesses 
in basic information. A considerable amount of data 
and statistics has been provided by numerous friends in 
the air transport sector and this was crucial in com­
pleting this thesis. Place names in Libya followed 
those approved by the United States Board on Geographic 
Names, as stipulated in Gazetteer No. 41 on Libya, 
issued in 1958. One of the difficulties encountered 
while this research was carried out was trying to keep 
pace with the recent happenings. This is typical of 
air transport in general. As summed up by Doganis: 
'...[t]he international airline industry is complex,
o n
dynamic and subject to rapid change and innovation1. 
The most recent example is the prediction made towards 
changes in the Libyan domestic network as a result of 
moving the capital from Tripoli to a more geographi­
cally centred location. On 1 January 1987, the decamp­
ment of Tripoli was announced. By the end of the same 
month an analysis was produced and included in this 
thesis to predict a structural change in the domestic 
air network where new routes were predicted to open and
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traffic flow in current routes to alter. Before this 
thesis was presented many of the predictions started to 
become reality. That, however, ought to have been pre­
dicted in any case for this is exactly what air 
transport is about and this is exactly how functional 
judgement dominates decisions. Air transport is a 
time-saving and flexible tool - and hence easy for 
politicians to put to use.
46
Footnotes
1. J.B. Snell, Railway Prehistory in: A History of
Transport - G.N. Georgano (Editor), J.M. Dent & Sons, 
Herts., p.73, 1972.
2. R. Oliver and B. Fagan, Africa in the Iron Age, 
Cambridge University Press, pp.145-146, 1975.
3. J. Wright, Aeroplanes and Airships in Libya 1911— 
1912.
Article in The Maghreb Review, Vol. 3, No. 10, Nov-Dee 
1 978.
4. ibid.
5. Charles H. Gibbs-Smith - Aviation, an historical 
survey f rom its origins to the end of World War II, 
HMSO 2nd Ed., p.245, 1985.
6. Libya was adopted as a name for the country by the 
Italians in 1934. Libya, a country study, American 
University, Washington DC, p.31, 1979.
7. *A1 Maarifa". An Encyclopedia, Arabic text, Vol. 
17, p.2960, Trademix-Geneve, 1971.
See also Clive Hart, The Dreamm of Flight, Faber & Faber 
Ltd., pp. 290-291 , 1 972 .
8. John Wright, 'Aeroplanes and Airships in Libya 
1911-1912', in The Maghreb Review, Vol.3, No.10, Nov- 
Dee 1978. This article is substantially based on G.F.
47
Abbott' s book, The Holy War in Tripoli - first pub­
lished in 1912 and reprinted by DARF in 1986.
9. S.E. Veale, Airliners and Airways of Today, The 
Pilot Press, p.195, 1947.
10. A. Wells, Air Trans port alt ion, Wadsworth Inc, 
California, p.4, 1984.
11 . ibid, p.25 .
12.
The Civil Aviation Law and related rules are in accord­
ance with rules set by ICAO and the Chicago Convention. 
Libya became a member of this convention on 23 February 
1 953. See Part One, Article 1 of the Civil Aviation 
Law 196 5 (Libya).
See also Article 2, Law No.5, 1975.
'The object of the company is to undertake air 
transport operations... by the commercial methods ap­
plied by international aviation companies'.
13. S.E. Veale, Airliners and Airways of Today, The 
Pilot Press, p.196, 1947.
This refers to the conference called by the French 
Government and attended by eighteen nations which 
proposed the establishment of an International Bureau 
of Air Navigation.
1 4. ibid, p .197.
15. R. Doganis, Flying Off Course: The Economics of
48
International Airlines, George Allen & Unwin, p. 26,
1 985.
See also, S.E. Veale, Airliners and Airways of Today,
The Pilot Press Ltd., pp.203-223, 1947.
16. The US had a different view from most countries 
attending the Chicago Convention of 1 944 and the Ber­
muda Agreement is a compromise between Britain's and US 
views on traffic rights. See R. Doganis, Flying Off 
Course: The Economics of International Airlines, George 
Allen & Unwin, p.28, 1985. See also C. Jonsson, Inter­
national Aviation and the Politics of Regime Change, 
Craces Printer, pp.88-116, 1987.
17. S.E. Veale, Airliners and Airways of Today, The 
Pilot Press, pp.210-213, 1947.
1 8 . Ibid, p.201.
19. R. Doganis, Flying Off Coarse: The Economics of 
International Airlines, George Allen & Unwin, p. 34,
1 985.
20. Over the last decade the economy has become in­
creasingly centrally controlled so that private en­
terprise has almost totally faded away.
21. S.E. Veale, Airliners and Airways of Today, The
Pilot Press, pp.195-196, 1947.
2 2. ibid.
23. D. Todd and J. Simpson, The World Aircraft
49
Industry, Croom Helm, p.45, 1986.
24. A. Sampson, Empires of tine Sky, Coronet Edition, 
Second Impression, p.113, 1985.
25 . ibid, pp.132-133.
26. ibid, p.133.
27. R. Doganis, Flying Off Course: The Economics of
International Airlines, George Allen & Unwin, p. 1, 1 985.
28. I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Bank of R e c o n s t r u c t i o n  and 
Development, The Economic Development of Libya, Johns 
Hopkins, Baltimore, 1960.
29. Doxiadis Associates, Transport in Libya. A
(General Survey and Study of the M e a n s  of 
Communications. Vols.1 & 2, 1964.
30. Fredrick Harris Inc., Libyan Transportation Plan­
ning Study, 1985.
31 . J.R. Meyer et al . , Techniques of Transport
Planning, The Bookings Institution, 2nd print, p. 3,
1 972.
32. He complained that the concentration of the ad­
ministration in Tripoli has grown to such an extent 
that removing the capital from the city was the only 
way to solve the problem.
33. B. Schriever and W. Seifert, Air Transportation 
1975 and Beyond: A Systems Approach, Massachusetts In­
stitute of Technology , p.8, 1968.
50
34. K. Hayward, International Collaboration in Civil 
Aerospace, Frances Pinter Ltd., p.1, 1986.
35. ibid, p.10.
36. Aliuddin Hilal, 'We and the technological 
hegemony', Al-Ahram Al-Xktisadi, p. 98, 1 986.
37. Rigas Doganis, the opening phrase in his acknow­
ledgements in Flying Off Conrse: The Economics of In­
ternational Airlines, George Allen & Unwin, 1985.
CHAPTER 1: AIR TRAMSPORT BEFORE OIL
Introduction
This chapter will deal with developments in aspects of 
the air transport systems of Libya from the time it 
emerged as an independent and sovereign state in 1951 
to the time that the oil industry commenced to con­
tribute substantially to the Libyan economy in the 
early 1960's. It is mainly concerned with examining 
these developments against the contemporary political 
background. At the centre of this examination is the 
inability of the newly-independent Libyan state to 
operate its own air transport systems and exercise con­
trol over its own air space.
Transfer of control at Independence
Libya's independence came about under the auspices of 
the United Nations.^ The United Nations General 
Assembly, by virtue of Resolution 289 (IV) of 21 Novem­
ber 1949, decreed that Libya would become an indepen­
dent and sovereign state no later than 1 st January 
1952.2 In fact, Libya was declared independent on 
December 24 1 9 5 1 The newly-independent sovereign
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state adopted a federal system of government where 
Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan, became wilayat or 
provinces composing the 'United Kingdom of Libya' . 
This system of government was adopted in order to 
provide: ' .a c o m p r o m i s e  d e s i g n e d  to p r e s e r v e
provinces' rights while at the same time yielding
p r i m a c y  in c e r t a i n  m a t t e r s . . . 1 to the federal
4- 4government.
The definition of the powers of the federal and provin­
cial governments was provided in the Libyan Constitu­
tion adopted on 7 October 19 51. Airlines and all 
agreements relating to them fell within the legislation 
and executive powers of the federal government. Joint 
powers were provided so that the federal government had 
legislative powers and provincial governments executive 
powers over aircraft and air navigation, the construc­
tion of airports, the regulation of air traffic and the 
administration of airports.^ Further related joint 
powers were concerned with navigational aids and search
7
and rescue operations.
The transfer of power from Britain and France, who had 
administered the country by virtue of the same United 
Nations General Assembly's resolution as was to grant
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Libya Independence, ° took place on the day that 
Libya's Independence was declared -24 December 1951. 
The Transfer of Power Proclamation^ was signed by the 
British resident in Tripolitania, the British resident 
in Cyrenaica and the French resident in Fezzan. The 
new Libyan federal and provincial governments became 
responsible for running the country as of that date.
The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 388 (V),
on economic and financial provisions related to Libya,
was adopted on 15 December 1 950. The annex to that
resolution provided that: '...the Libyan state shall
receive, without payment, the movable and immovable
property, within the territory of Libya, which formerly
belonged solely to the Italian state or to local
1 0authorities under the Italian Administration.'IU Under 
the provisions of this resolution, along with other im­
movable properties, airports including all installa­
tions built and left by the Italians were to become the 
property of the Libyan Government.
Military and civilian implications
An understanding of Libyan air transport in the transi­
tion period from foreign control to Independence
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requires a discussion of the condition of air transport 
in this period. By the time the Allied Forces com­
pleted the occupation of Libya in 1943, Castel 
Benito,^1 Baninah,12 El Adem and Sabhah Airports had 
begun to function to consolidate the activities of the 
occupying forces in Libya and beyond. Tripoli served 
as an intermediate point for flights to West Africa, 
East Africa and the Middle East. Benghazi and Tubruq 
complemented Tripoli's role for flights to and from 
points in the direction east of Tripoli. Sabhah 
served the French as a convenient stop for flights be­
tween French North African territories and French 
Equatorial Africa.
The importance of these airports as intermediate points 
was inherent in the fact that the maximum operating 
ranges of aircraft then were never great and stage 
operations were inevitable. Air transport for the 
Allied Forces had a support role but not to such an ex­
tent that it significantly contributed to troop 
movements. The military need for air transport of 
troops, as R.E.G. Davies has emphasised, was only 
realised by Britain after the Suez Canal crisis in 
1 9 56.  ^4 The continued importance of these airports to 
Britain after Libya became independent was expressed in
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the text of the treaty of friendship and alliance 
agreements signed between Libya and the United Kingdom, 
as will be discussed below.
British airlines
It appears difficult to exclude British civil airlines 
from the political and military implications of 
British-Libyan political relations. These operated in 
the shadow of Britain's control over the region after 
the Second World War, even after Libya's Independence. 
Indeed, from an administrative and political point of 
view, these operations were really only undertaken to 
support Britain's political and strategic objectives. 
In 1950, BOAC flights from London to Accra, Lagos, 
Kano, Khartoum, Nairobi, Brazzaville, Johannesburg and 
Mombassa had to stop at Tripoli for refuelling, since 
the four-engined Constellations and Strato Cruisers 
operated by BOAC had a range of only 3,000 statute 
miles15 which would not have allowed for direct trips 
from L o n d o n  to West A f r ican and East Af r i c a n  
destinations. Furthermore, travelling to East Africa 
and West Africa through Tripoli was also advantageous 
in three ways. First, a stop at Tripoli airport to or 
from London would have been a welcome interruption
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after six hours or more of noise and vibration, charac­
teristic of propeller driven aircraft, as well as 
providing a respite of calm and relaxation if the route 
weather was turbulent; a frequent problem in those days 
as aircraft operated with a maximum ceiling of 20,000 
feet where the atmospheric conditions are generally 
less comfortable for aircraft operations than at higher 
altitudes. Secondly, passing through Tripoli made 
planning specific Tripoli-bound operations in order to 
serve British forces in Libya unnecessary as unused 
space to and from East and West African British- 
controlled territories satisfied demand in this 
respect. Thirdly and most importantly, Libya was a 
substantially British-controlled territory and no per­
mission for British aircraft flying to East and West 
Africa from Britain was required. Libya's geographical 
location guaranteed flight continuity within British- 
controlled airspace south of the Mediterranean. Even 
if routes sometimes meant overflying French West 
Africa, there were no landing requirements for flights 
bound for British-controlled West Africa. British 
airlines, in short, collected passengers from these 
territories with the advantage that Tripoli Airport 
functioned as an outpost for flights to and from 
London.
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Besides the movement of military personnel and British
administrators in Libya through Tripoli Airport, other
types of traffic also made the traffic profile more
colourful. For example, York aircraft transited
Tripoli Airport with cargoes of zoo animals from the
Far East destined for Amsterdam and London.1  ^ Eggs were
1 7flown in on behalf of a Libyan farmer from England. 
The role of the Royal Air Force (RAF) was not always 
totally military in nature, either. On occasions the 
RAF extended a helping hand to institutions concerned 
with the study of Libya such as the assignment of an 
RAF Lancaster aircraft to a group of archaeologists 
headed by Professor R.G. Goodchild on a reconnaissance 
mission over Gharyan/Mizdah/Wadi Merzit, Wadi Zemzem, 
Gharia Shargia, Gharia El Gharbiyah and Bunjem on 7 
July 1950.^® Some purposeless and wasteful flights 
were also carried out from Tripoli Airport as 
demonstrated by the incident involving the deliberate 
unseating of two camel riders, causing them serious 
injuries, when the pilot flew low along the road be­
tween Tripoli and Zanzur, manoeuvring his aircraft 
towards a camel caravan and afterwards making an emer­
gency landing at Tripoli Airport with a wheel missing
1 9from the aircraft's undercarriage.
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OtSner operators and operations
The British dominance over the skies, as suggested by 
these examples of the variety in air traffic and flight 
activity passing through Tripoli Airport, should not 
suggest that the British were totally on their own. 
The French of course were in Fezzan, although the dirt 
strip at Sabhah Airport could only have handled rela­
tively few flights. It was clear, however, from an in-
2 ocident involving an emergency landing^ in the Libyan 
desert fifty miles south east of Nofflia in Central 
Libya by a French Air Force DC3 with 14 people on board 
en route to Tunis from Saigon on 22 June 1 950, that 
significant French flight activity came through Libya's 
airspace because of France's role in Indochina. The 
Americans transported their military and civil person­
nel through the 'Wheelus' Air base in the eastern out­
skirts of Tripoli which was constructed after the 
Second World War on the site of Tripoli's first 
civilian airport. Though TWA operated a regular flight 
in 1946^ through Tripoli Airport, this flight seems 
later to have been suspended and US personnel and 
civilians attached to the US Air Force used chartered 
flights to and from Wheelus. Advertisements m  the
local English press in 1 9 50 and 1951, (The Smumday
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GhitoXi) inviting Americans in Tripoli to use TWA and 
BOAC suggest some traffic from Americans in Libya using 
the regular services of these two airlines. Other des­
tinations advertised included Malta, Italy, France, 
Nicosia, Cairo and Tunisia^ . West Africa, East Africa 
and South Africa received little attention in the 
advertisements, indicating that flights to and from 
such destinations mainly passed through Tripoli for 
technical reasons.
Towards the end of 1950, other operators began to ap­
pear in the area. SAIDE of Egypt began a single weekly 
flight from Cairo to Benghazi, Tripoli and onwards to 
Tunis.2  ^ ALITALIA was operating three flights a week 
to Catania and R o m e . 25 MALTA AIRWAYS, a BEA 
subsidiary, operated a weekly flight from Malta to 
Tripoli and onwards to Benghazi, Tubruq and Cairo and 
back.25
By the beginning of 1951, air transport activity was 
beginning to show signs of change with foreign politi­
cal interests trying to influence local political 
events just before Independence. A United Nations DC3 
Dakota was also responsible for carrying UN officials 
and their guests between the three provincial capitals
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of Tripoli, Benghazi and Sabhah as part of the UN ef­
forts to ensure the creation of an independent Libya 
before the beginning of 19 52 as required by the UN
General Assembly Resolution 289 (IV). The UN Dakota
9 7was, however, piloted by USAF crews. On February 8
1951 ALITALIA stopped flights to and from Tripoli, os-
9 Rtensibly for economic reasons  ^ , but reopened the
service a month later 29, when the political price of 
such a closure was realised and political considera­
tions superseded economic factors, particularly the 
fact that the Italian ex-colony, was at a critical 
stage in its political development.
TUNIS AIR, really only a French proxy, operated one 
weekly service from Tunis to Tripoli and onwards to 
Sabhah from May 19 51. In September of the same year 
this service flew to Tripoli via Sfax and Djerba. The
only passenger disembarking on the first flight was the
o n
airline branch manager in Tripoli . This flight
81originally only operated once every month , until the 
introduction of the new weekly service. The increase 
in frequency of the service with no commercial jus­
tification - there were no commercial passengers on the 
first flight and only one non-paying passenger - was 
indicative of France's determination to maintain a
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presence at least at a level equal to a country like 
Egypt which was also anxious to influence Libya's 
political scene. French determination to make its 
presence felt in Sabhah was, indeed, to the exclusion 
of all other influences. It is notable that no airline 
other than French-controlled ones operated to Sabhah. 
Sabhah, however, was strategically important for 
France's air connections between French North Africa,
o 9
French Equatorial Africa and Madagascar. Of course
there was no commercial justification for additional 
flights to Sabhah by other airlines but Sabhah also 
lacked the advantageous port location of Tripoli and 
Benghazi where hauling fuel from the ports to these 
airports was a simple practical matter, while hauling 
fuel to Sabhah, 1 , 000 kilometres by road in deep 
desert, would have proved extremely expensive and 
difficult.
Libyan airports were not isolated from events elsewhere 
in the Middle East. When Mossadiq, Iran's Prime 
Minister, nationalised the Anglo-Iranian National Oil 
C o m p a n y ^ ,  BOAC flew the families of the British 
employees of the A n g l o -Iranian Oil Company through 
Tripoli Airport in late June 1951.^ By mid-August of 
the same year, BOAC cargo flights to the Far East pass­
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ing through Tripoli Airport had to be suspended due to 
lack of aircraft fuel in Pakistan.
Rescue and search operations are an essential part of 
the facilities provided by aviation authorities who 
also manage specific areas of air space. The respon­
sibility for air search and rescue just before Libyan 
Independence belonged to the British Royal Air Force, 
complemented by the United States Air Force stationed 
in Libya. The American Rescue Squadron based at 
Wheelus was equipped to carry sea rescue operations 
and the commander of the USAF Seventh Rescue Squadron 
based at Wheelus seemed to have had the authority to 
handle rescue operations off Libyan coasts with rescue 
responsibilities for the armed forces of other
"3 7
countries.J '
Encouraged by the almost year-long ideal weather condi­
tions for flight activity and the sparsity of popula­
tion in the areas surrounding Tripoli Airport, the 
British used it for testing new aircraft and for set­
ting speed records. The Comet (I) made a test flight 
to Tripoli Airport in late 1949 and the Comet (II) flew
O O
to Tripoli on another test flight on 9 April 1951 
and again in August 19 51 after a 3 hour 35 minute
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flight from L o n d o n . ^  These two aircraft were the 
first two prototypes of the Comets which entered into 
commercial service after the delivery of the first such 
aircraft to British Overseas Airways Corporation (BOAC) 
on the last day of 1951.40 The use of Tripoli Airport 
for test flights at the dawn of commercial jet air 
travel was not only due to favourable weather condi­
tions but also because the airport was relatively:
'...the best equipped in North Africa1, as The Sunday 
Ghibli e x p l a i n e d ,  anc3 thus was capable of receiving 
aircraft such as the Comet.
Besides British RAF and American USAF personnel, some 
local staff also used to work within airports and 
military bases. Data about a strike that took place at 
Tripoli Airport in August 1951, reported in the local 
English language press,42 suggests that two hundred and 
fifty local workers went on strike, claiming rights to 
a thirteenth monthly salary in the annual pay 
structure. The airport workers' union threatened to 
support Tripoli Airport workers by staging a strike at 
all airports and air bases by its 4,000 claimed 
members. Details on the development of the strike 
show that the strikers were a combination of Italian, 
Maltese and Libyan nationals. The Libyans did the
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manual work.
The effect of Independence
When Libya finally became an independent and sovereign 
federal state, the new constitution accorded the 
federal and provincial governments the responsibility 
of running the air transport systems in the country. 
Jointly, the federal and provincial governments in­
herited the responsibility for the control and manage­
ment of Libya's airspace. Inter alia, this meant main­
taining the few airports in a condition of minimum 
operational efficiency for the type of traffic that 
went through them, but this had to be done by a 
society that had not produced sufficient qualified per­
sonnel to discharge these responsibilities. What would 
the transfer of power therefore mean to air transport? 
How could the newly-independent but impoverished state 
assume its responsibilities without adequate qualified 
human and financial resources?^ The answers to these 
two questions must lead to the conclusion that this was 
an extremely difficult period for the newly-born state, 
for its airspace and air transport system effectively 
fell outside its control.
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By Independence Day on December 24 1951, Tripoli,
Benghazi, Tubruq and Sabhah Airports functioned as 
dual- purpose airports. In other words, they handled 
both military and civilian traffic. Wheelus was a 
purely military Air base. The four airports accom­
modating civil traffic were, however, predominantly 
handling military traffic serving the major Western 
armed forces.
Commercial flights operating to, from and within Libya 
belonged to airlines of those countries that had at­
tempted to influence the political scene in the period 
leading up to Libya's Independence and sought to con­
tinue such influence after Independence had been 
achieved. By March 1953, UAT, the French airline, in­
troduced two weekly flights between Tripoli and Paris 
via N i c e . ^  France, in short, saw the necessity of es­
tablishing a direct link with Libya as the country had 
become independent, so that the two capitals
A RTripoli and Paris enjoyed a direct means of c o m ­
munication which had not been considered necessary when 
the country's capital was under British administration. 
TUNISAIR, however, continued to provide the link to 
Sabhah, where the French forces continued to keep some 
regiments. At the same time BEA stepped up its serv-
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ices to three flights^ weekly and ALITALIA did the 
same. BEA's additional flight was extended to link 
Benghazi with Cairo.^
Nonetheless, the number of commercial flights through 
Libyan airports once Independence had been achieved was 
still small. In all, only fifteen flights weekly 
operated through the largest of them, Tripoli. The 
strategic importance of these airports was certainly 
more significant. In any case, the country's economic 
conditions could not have justified it taking over the 
practical responsibility of running these airports - an 
expensive operation. Indeed, the Libyan Government did 
not even intend to operate a national airline, nor did 
it have the financial and human resources to mount such 
a venture.
Aid and control
In recognition of the extreme financial difficulties 
faced by independent Libya, the British and Libyan 
Governments signed an agreement on December 13 1951 by 
virtue of which the British Government would provide 
the Libyan Government with a maximum sum of half a mil­
lion pounds sterling as of the fiscal year commencing
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on April 1 1952.^® From Independence to the effective
date of the above aid, the British Government pledged 
to give unspecified financial assistance to the Libyan 
federal and provincial governments.^ The provision of 
such aid, however, resulted in British control over in­
dependent Libya's finances beyond the amounts specified 
in the agreement.^ France pledged, by virtue of the 
temporary agreement signed by Libya and France, to con­
tinue supporting the finances of the Fezzan province 
until the end of March 1 953 .51 By accepting these 
stringent financial conditions, the Libyan Government 
had s u b s t a n t i a l l y  frittered away the c o u n t r y ' s  
sovereignty over its airspace and parts of its ter­
ritory as a consequence of its critical financial 
deficiencies and lack of qualified human resources. It 
could be argued that this position was virtually 
unavoidable. Our concern here is that for much of the 
duration of the Anglo-Libyan Friendship and Alliance 
Treaty of 1 953 and of the agreement with the USA in 
1954, most of Libya's aerospace remained under foreign 
control, as did all its airports and all domestic and 
international traffic involving Libya.
The Fiimaimcial Agreement signed on July 29 1 953 , pur­
suant to the Anglo-Libyan treaty signed on the same
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date, stated that Britain would provide aid equal to 
3,750,000 pounds sterling annually throughout the 
twenty years covering the Treaty. Half way through the 
period covered by the Treaty, however, the amount was
to be revised. ^  jn return for the aid, the Libyan
Government had, among other things, to allow the 
Government of the United Kingdom to: '...exercise full
control over aircraft, vessels and vehicles entering, 
leaving and within the agreed lands.'^  and: '...permit
United Kingdom public aircraft to fly over and in an
emergency land on and take off from any part of the 
territory of Libya... United Kingdom public aircraft 
shall be permitted to use Libyan airports under the 
conditions applicable to foreign military aircraft 
generally save that they enjoy transit facilities at 
Baninah Civil A i rport on n o t i f i c a t i o n . '^  and 
'...United Kingdom public vessels, aircraft and 
vehicles shall have freedom of movement in other dis­
tricts of Libya for the purpose of this agreement,'^
The conditions stipulated in the Military Facilities 
Agreememt: gave the British the authority to control 
Libyan airspace (Article 4) and guaranteed unrestricted 
movement of British public aircraft. The circle of con­
trol was completed, at least temporarily, by the inclu-
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sion of an article in the Military Facilities Agree­
ment of 19 53, the Friendship and Alliance Treaty en­
tered into by Libya and Britain which read:
'Article 21
Tripoli Civil Airport
(1 ) Full responsibility for the operation and 
maintenance of Tripoli Civil Airport shall be as­
sumed as rapidly as possible by the Libyan 
authorities.
(2) In the meantime, the Royal Air Force will con­
tinue to afford at their cost such technical and
other assistance as many be agreed for the effi-
S 7cient operation of the airport.'
With Libya's civil air traffic movement controlled from 
Malta, which was then under British control, and 
British control over Libya's airports, British control 
over Libyan skies, when taken together with US Air
Force interests and French control over the Fezzan 
region, was almost total.
The consequences of the Military Facilities Agreement 
of July 29, 1 953 on Libyan control of Libyan airspace
and Libyan airports were not the first experience the
70
Libyan authorities had in exercising and dealing with 
air transport policies. Just over a year before the 
agreement was signed, Libya and the United Kingdom 
signed an air services agreement, the first such agree-
c o
ment Libya ever entered into. ° This Temporary Civil 
Aviation Agreement - its official name - established 
the following points: first, that the traffic rights as 
enjoyed by British airlines on the eve of Libya's Inde­
pendence - that is during the administration by Britain 
of the two provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica - 
should be retained into the Independence era, and 
secondly, that such an arrangement should remain valid
c q
until a formal Air Services Agreement was signed.  ^
The language used in this agreement gave unrestricted 
rights of operating international flights to and from 
Libya to British and British colonial airlines.^1®
The airports of Tripoli, Benghazi and Tubruq were run 
by the RAF and its subcontractors at the time the Tem­
porary Civil Aviation Agreement was signed. A sub­
sequent agreement between the two governments provided 
that the British Government would maintain the 'present 
standard1 of the facilities at these three airports, 
the Libyan Government contributing: 34, 000 pounds ster­
ling for Tripoli Airport and 5 , 0 0 0  pounds sterling
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towards expenses incurred to maintain Benghazi Airport. 
Revenues from landing and transmitting the three air­
ports were to go to the British authorities running 
t h e m . ^  The significance of these figures can be 
assessed from the fact that they formed 3.5 per cent of 
total British aid to Libya, of 1 , 1 1 0 , 000 pounds ster­
ling for the financial year 1 951 —1 952.
British continuity in running Libyan airports after In­
dependence deprived Libya not only of revenue from 
landing fees and other sovereign income which would 
have provided much needed funds, but also of its con­
trol over airport facilities which needed the approval 
of the British Government for any 1 increase or diminu­
tion in the (present standard) of facilities at the 
airports'. (Tripoli and Benghazi ) . ^
The Temporary Civil Aviation Agreement of 19 52 signed 
between Libya and Britain may not be described as a 
conventional Air Services Agreement. It is clear that 
the purpose of making such an agreement was to 
legitimise the full and unrestricted operations of 
British and British colonial airlines in performing 
operations to, from and through Libya, where its air­
ports served as intermediate points between the UK and
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British-controlled regions in Africa and the Middle 
East. The importance of Libya's location to the 
British, and indeed to other operators with flights be­
tween Europe and Africa or with interest in North 
Africa and points west, south or east of Libya, was not 
realised at the time by the Libyan authorities, for 
their thinking was dominated by the country's inability 
to run airports. Nonetheless, geographic location in 
itself was, in fact, a significant potential lever of 
power which the Libyan government could have exploited 
to its advantage. Using it adequately could have 
brought better terms. The transition of authority en­
visaged by the constitution was, however, unfulfilled 
in reality as the Libyan authorities frittered away the 
country's sovereignty over its air space; maintained 
privileges to foreign airlines belonging to the pre­
vious administrative powers; sacrificed potential 
revenues from landing fees and associated sovereign 
income; and added to this by making a contribution to 
the running of these airports from funds which could 
have been effectively used elsewhere. Much of this 
would have been avoidable if only Libya's location had 
been taken into consideration when the agreements were 
originally negotiated.
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Air services agreements
Air services agreements between countries are necessary 
to regularise the operation of air services between 
countries signatory to such agreements. The hegemony 
of foreign powers over the Libyan air space and its 
airports through the various treaties and agreements 
did not prevent the signature of an air services agree­
ment which - at least in its general conditions - ap­
peared to look like an agreement between equals. The 
conditions of the Air Services Agreement of 1 953 ^
treated both parties equally: 'There shall be fair and
equal opportunity for the airlines of both contracting 
parties to operate the agreed services on the specified
ft 5routes between their respective territories . J Air 
service agreements are generally written in the same 
spirit, for these generally express the explicit and 
respective approval of certain traffic rights as stipu­
lated by the Chicago Convention of 1 944 and the Geneva 
Conference of 1 9 47 What was of specific
significance, though, was the agreed services schedule 
which specifies routes, type of aircraft, traffic 
freedoms and capacity offered.
The air services schedule of the 1953 Libya-UK Air
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Services Agreement gave extensive rights to UK desig­
nated air carrier(s). To some extent the Libyan desig­
nated carrier(s) also enjoyed relatively extensive 
route rights. However, the authority, given under the 
schedule, for the British to approve the Libyan opera­
tion to certain points is questionable.^ Figure 1.1 
shows British carrier(s) granted routes. Figure 1.2 
shows those rights granted to the Libyan designated 
carrier(s ).
Figure 1 . 1 and Figure 1 .2 are derived from the 
schedule®® annexed to the above Air Services Agreement. 
The extensive rights granted to British operators 
covered an unspecified number of points in Africa, the 
Middle East, the Far East and Australia in addition to 
key points in Europe. Traffic rights covered the 'five 
freedoms1^  on all destinations as implied by Article 
(2) of the said agreement. The sectors Tripoli, Ben­
ghazi and Benghazi El-Adem were restricted to the third 
and fourth freedoms. In other words, British desig­
nated airlines were not, according to Article (2) 
Paragraph (3), to carry locally generated traffic on 
these sections and thus had no cabotage rights. The 
incorporation of such an extensive and comprehensive 
network in the air services schedule came to emphasise
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the importance of the Libyan airports' function as 
gateways or stepping stones to the vast British 
operators' network and as a necessary stop^O for 
aircraft on their journey between the metropole and 
destinations in its African, Asian and Australian 
domains.
Figure 1.2 is derived from the section of the schedule 
of the air services to the 1953 Agreement which shows 
the routes Libyan designated operators would be per­
mitted to operate. The significance of the routes 
granted to Libya is a fraction of that of those granted 
to Britain. The imbalance is further noticeable in the 
fact that rights were granted to the Libyans for routes 
over which Britain had no control. Flights between 
Tripoli/Tunis and Algiers should have been the concern 
of the Libyan and French Governments; Tripoli/Rome 
that of the Italian and Lib y a n  G o v e r n m e n t s ;  
Tripoli/Zurich that of Libyan and Swiss authorities; 
El Adem/Alexandria that of Egypt and Libya and so on. 
It is not clear why Saudi Arabia would grant rights to 
Libya through an agreement Libya had with Britain. 
Britain, however, was only authorised to grant its side 
of a sector on points within the airspace under its 
control. For example, while the British had the right
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to allow flights of Libyan designated carriers to land 
in London from Zurich carrying passengers from Zurich, 
such a right could not be exercised without the ap­
proval of the Swiss Government. Thus apart from traf­
fic wholly between Libya and points under British 
control, all rights granted to Libya were subject to 
entrance by Libya into similar air service agreements 
with states within whose airspace these destinations 
fell.
At the time this Air Service Agreement was signed, 
Libya did not own or operate a national carrier. It 
could thus be argued that, irrespective of how un­
realistic the schedule of services which contained 
routes granted to Libyan designated operators was, it 
did not really matter how practical these rights were. 
What did matter, however, was that the routes desig­
nated to Libyan operators should not have included 
sectors within Libya, for these were local sectors and 
Libya required no approval from any party to operate 
them with its own airlines or airlines granted cabotage 
rights^ by the Libyan authorities to operate them. 
Such rights, however, were not granted to British 
designated airlines by virtue of the said Air Services 
Agreement. A British operator, however, made attempts
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to exploit the 'cabotage' privilege.
The first Libyan airline
7 7In 1952, a Libyan businessman 4 already operating a 
travel a g e n c y ^  joined hands with the British airline 
SILVER CITY and jointly incorporated LIBYAN AIRWAYS. 
SILVER CITY, through LIBYAN AIRWAYS, was granted 
cabotage rights to operate between Libyan airports. 
SILVER CITY, under the name of LIBYAN AIRWAYS, provided 
two Bristol aircraft and, as of March 1953, operated 
three weekly services between Tripoli and Benghazi. 
LIBYAN AIRWAYS pledged that within a year it would per­
mit majority holding in the company to Libyan nationals 
and that it would embark on a training programme for 
Libyans to become air crews, technicians and a d ­
ministrators in the company. Besides these three 
weekly regular flights (mainly cargo) the airline 
operated ad hoc flights between Tripoli and Benghazi
and Kufrah and organised inclusive tours to the holy
7 4lands for the American servicemen stationed in Libya.  ^
The existence of a Libyan airline prompted calls for 
protection of this national air carrier against foreign 
competition. The editor-in-chief of the local
newspaper A1 Difaa, for example, expressed such an
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opinion in an editorial in August 1953.75 Such ad­
vocacy gave the signal that LIBYAN AIRWAYS was not 
doing well and the SILVER CITY venture in Libya was 
thus stopped soon after. It was not until 1 964 that 
Libya finally found a way to own its own national 
airline, just like most other states.
Nonetheless, probably the most important event during 
1 953 in Libyan air transport was the commencement of 
SILVER CITY's flights between Tripoli and Benghazi un­
der the name of LIBYAN AIRWAYS as if it were a local 
air carrier. The experiment, however, could not have 
lasted for long for, although it attempted to promote 
varied activities, it did not receive the protection 
normally granted to national carriers, nor did it ven­
ture into sharing traffic with national carriers of 
other nations. LIBYAN AIRWAYS inaugurated its three 
services between Tripoli and Benghazi before the end of 
January 19537^, but the subsequent flights could not 
attract sufficient traffic for, on the Tripoli-Benghazi 
sector, other operators carried most of the traffic. 
BEA (MALTA AIRWAYS), MISRAIR and CYPRUS AIRWAYS were 
already operating on the route. Furthermore, LIBYAN 
AIRWAYS did not qualify for national carrier status, 
for not only was it denied the conventional protective
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measures of restricting cabotage rights to its services 
but it also had no intention of exploiting Libyan 
traffic rights on international routes.
Soon, from a position of financial despair, LIBYAN AIR­
WAYS embarked on charter and inclusive tour flights. In
7 7March 1 953 it operated a single flight to Kufrah, ' a 
month later it transported 110 sheep from Benghazi to 
Tripoli,^7® although the price charged for the commodity 
could not absorb the high cost of air transport, be­
cause the airline was attempting to earn revenue from
any source to lessen the effects of its failing
7 9operation. On two occasions,' J in March and July 1953, 
the airline organised inclusive tour charters to the 
Middle East. Before 1953 was over, however, the LIBYAN 
AIRWAYS venture had to be given up in the absence of 
state conventional protection measures and due to com­
petition from other international airlines in such a 
small market.
Oittoer airlines
Figure 1.3 shows regular services operated through 
Libyan airports. Four airlines operated the Tripoli - 
Benghazi sector; LIBYAN AIRWAYS, MALTA AIRWAYS (in as
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sociation with B E A ), MISRAIR AND CYPRUS AIRWAYS. They 
provided eight weekly services in each direction. While 
LIBYAN AIRWAYS operated regular domestic services, 
MISRAIR connected Cairo with Tunis with stops in Ben­
ghazi and Tripoli, showing the particular interest of 
the Egyptian Government in North African destinations. 
MALTA AIRWAYS served particularly to enhance communica­
tion between the British forces and communities in 
Malta, Libya and Egypt. BOAC'S services used Tripoli 
for the dual purpose of servicing the British forces 
and their dependents and linking London with those 
points in West Africa and where the British influence 
had existed. The French operated through Tripoli for 
political reasons as well as using it as a stepping 
stone for destinations in the French African domain. 
Only ALITALIA, the Italian airline operated to Tripoli 
as a terminal destination.
As the operations of these airlines progressed, there 
were developments in the types of aircraft becoming 
available from aircraft manufacturers. Tripoli Airport 
saw constant changes in the types of aircraft flying 
through it. ALITALIA replaced the Supermasters with 
Convair 340's , B O A C  changed from Hermes to 
Argonauts®'*. BOAC together with UAT , the French
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airline, introduced the first ever commercial jet, 'The 
Comet* to Tripoli Airport en route to destinations in 
West, Central and South Africa.8^
The routes and size of operations of the various air­
lines serving Libyan airports continued in 1954 with
Q O
fewer changes in types of aircraft used. AIR FRANCE 
alone brought change to the Libyan air scene when it 
introduced a weekly service connecting Tripoli with
p A
Nice and Paris. Hot weather testing of aircraft and 
engines by British aircraft and engine manufacturers 
continued to take advantage of the geographic charac­
ters of the Libyan climate and landscape. The Bristol 
Britannia went through a series of tests at Tripoli 
(Idris) Airport and in Libyan airspace for 18 days in 
1984.85
Opgradimg the airports
To meet the change in the types of aircraft being used, 
both Tripoli (Idris) and Baninah had to have improve­
ments made to their runways. The sparse traffic to 
Baninah had made it possible to close the airport in 
the face of all air traffic for three days a week over 
a period of four months in order that the local 
contractor, SAASCO,88 could carry out the construction
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work necessary to extend the runway and increase its 
landing capacity®7 to handle aircraft of up to 
93,0001b in weight, including the Viscount which was 
introduced to civil air transport in 1953.®® Tripoli 
(Idris) Airport runway was also to be upgraded to an 
LCN capable of suppo r t i n g  the 13 7,5001b Super 
Constellation.®9 The project was executed in 1955.®®
The activity associated with upgrading the capacity at 
Libya's two main civil airports in 1 954 saw Libya's 
concern over legislation and with the regulation of 
civil aviation in the country. This fact must have 
stemmed from Libya's financial contribution to airport 
development from much-needed funds which came to the 
country in the form of aid from Britain. The contribu­
tions towards developing these airports were much less 
than revenues anticipated from fees resultant from the 
use of these airports by airlines. It was estimated in 
1954 that revenues from landing fees at Tripoli Idris
n -i
Airport would reach 51,000 Libyan pounds. It was m  
this year that the UN expertise helped the Libyan 
Government to issue the Libyan Civil Aviation Law of 
1 956 and to sign international conventions on civil 
aviation such as the Rome Civil Aviation Convention of 
1952.®^ With the end of the agreement with France con­
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cerning the maintenance of Sabhah Airport on 31 Decem­
ber 1954,^3 responsibility for running this airport be­
came exclusively that of the Libyan Civil Aviation 
authorities.
The underdevelopment of Libya in the 1950's was charac­
terised by low population density and low per capita 
income. These conditions worked against economic 
development. Lack of financial resources made dif­
ficult the improvement of surface transport and impos­
sible the exploitation of the advantages of air 
transport. If it had not been for Libya's location, 
the events of the Second World War succeeded by the in­
tensive presence of the Allied Forces on Libyan soil 
and the use of air transport for movement between 
Britain on the one hand and its domain in Africa and 
the Middle East on the other, Libya would probably have 
had much less air activity. The Allied Forces, while 
k e e p i n g  the a i r p o r t s  busy b e f o r e  and a f t e r  
Independence, made no impact on the Libyan population 
in the air transport sector except at the manual labour 
level. That of course by no means implies that this 
situation was deliberate. The economy was so weak and 
the government so poor that its top executives used RAF 
or USAF planes whenever the aeroplane became the chosen
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and available means of t r a n s p o r t . 94 The potential for 
immediate involvement of the Libyans was simply non 
existent.
Effects of oil discovery
There was an air of change after the mid-1950's. Since 
oil exploration activities had become possible under 
the provisions of the 1 955 Petroleum L a w , ^  between 
November 1 955 and the end of January 1 956, 47 conces­
sions were granted to oil companies,^ creating an im­
mediate need and demand for surface transport to 
transport drilling equipment and oil exploration as­
sociated materials, and air transport to t r a n s p o r t  ex­
patriate oil men and urgent materials and equipment on 
international routes as well as to oil prospecting 
desert locations.
The response to these developments could be seen from 
the immediate upgrading of frequencies on international 
services to and from Libya and the introduction of 
general aviation services between the two main airports 
and desert oil locations on the one hand and drilling 
camps and seismic testing sites on the other. After 
several years of serving Tripoli with a twice weekly
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service, ALITALIA stepped up the number of services to 
three in mid-May 1955 and four weekly services forty- 
five days later. The interest of airlines and the 
change in the profile of the passenger traffic to and
from Libya could be seen from the various advertise­
ments by European carriers who advertised their serv­
ices to the USA to attract traffic from oil men as of 
the mid-1950's. The activities resulting from oil ex­
ploration operations enhanced the air transport scene 
in the country and created a new spatial pattern to air
transport within Libya through the reactivation of the 
desert airstrips built throughout the Libyan desert. 
Those strips that fall within the Surt Basin where oil 
operations and production have continued since this 
time, assumed the permanent function of points on a 
network of air services specialised in serving the oil 
community in Libya.
The increase in traffic to Libya as a consequence of
oil operations encouraged other airlines to join in on
the route. SABENA added a new link connecting Brussels
and Leopoldville in the Belgian Congo through Geneva, 
Tripoli, and Kano. Table 1.1 shows the change in sum-
Q  7
mer services through Tripoli from 1955 to 1958. The 
increase in flight activity associated with the
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TABLE 1.1
CHANGES IN WEEKLY FREQUENCIES TO LIBYAN AIRPCRTS BY 
FOREIGN AIRLINES 1955-1958 _________
1955 1956 1957 1958
AIR JORDAN 1/7
ALITALIA 4/7 5/7 7/7
BOAC 8/7
MALTA AIRWAYS (BRA) 2/7 4/7 6/7
MISRAIR 2/7 3/7
SABENA 1/7
TONISAIR 2/7
UTA 3/7 5/7
-/7 indicate number of flights in each week of the year. 
Observation occurance indicate year of change
Source: The Sunday Ghibli newspaper issues 1955 - 1958
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developments in the Libyan economy as a result of oil 
exploration saw two trends. The first is that the in­
ternational carriers operating to Libya increased in 
number each solidifying the link it operated by in 
creasing frequencies and changing its equipment to in­
crease capacity, speed and comfort. The second trend 
was the development of a growing general aviation 
activity.
Before the element of oil activities was introduced to 
the Libyan economy, the aircraft that went through 
Libya were either military aircraft or civil transport 
aeroplanes operating services to support the presence 
of the foreign communities in Libya or functioning as 
physical links to serve a foreign pol i t i c a l  
requirement. No domestic economic activity could gen­
erate demand for air transport. The Allied Forces 
managed the scene and involved the Libyan Government 
after Independence when they needed its consent to 
operate or when financial contributions were sought 
to maintain the air transport infrastructure. The 
Libyan government had a functional role. No plans or 
effort to develop the infrastructure to serve the local 
economy were made. The Allied Forces, either directly 
or through their contractors, ran the Libyan airports
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and air space. They provided, at times with Libyan 
contributions, a minimum level of communications, an 
update of the facilities to meet the requirements of 
airlines operating to the region and covered the air 
rescue and search operations.
Implications for rescue services
The arrival of the new types of airlines of the general 
aviation category created significant additional work 
load for the airports. The air traffic controllers had 
to deal with operations that were not under the control 
of the Allied military commanders. These aircraft 
operated deep into the desert adding a considerable 
burden to the air rescue facilities. The Allied 
military commanders had to search for stranded or lost 
small planes on their route to desert locations unaided 
by ground navigation equipment. They had to p a r ­
ticipate in finding men who had gone astray on their
Q Q
way to, or returning from, the oil camps. The
operation of the general aviation aircraft in Libya was 
not under the control of the military authorities, and 
it was not until 1 956, that the Civil Aviation Law 
came in to regularise all civil air operations in Libya 
creating the legislative tool through which such opera­
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tions came under some control. The first signs of the 
implementation of this law came when two pilots were 
grounded in September 1956 because they did not possess
the appropriate licenses to operate aircraft for com-
■ i 99mercial purposes.
Gradually the Libyan Government became aware that it 
was about time to play a participating role in air 
transport. Among the instances where such a role was 
sought was when Libya explored the possibility of es- 
t a b l i s h i n g  an a i r l i n e  w i t h  G r e e k  p r i v a t e  
participation.^^ But the expatriate pioneers operat­
ing the general aviation aircraft did not lack
imagination. They operated an air ambulance service
101for the oil companies already in 19 56, operated
helicopter services on an ad hoc basis and performed 
hundreds of adventures roaming the desert, surveying
and transporting people and materials, and even con­
vinced the Ministry of Communications that it should
request the provincial governments to allocate sites
down town of the two major cities in the country for 
helicopter services. These requests, however, were not 
granted. 1 02
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IBRD Report
The work carried out by the International Bank for 
reconstruct ion and development,"'^ threw light on the 
progress of Libya's economic development since Indepen­
dence until the time of the report's preparation. It 
also went on to suggest: '...appropriate targets for
further development',"'^ for the various aspects of the 
economy in the wake of promises that oil would generate 
the n e c essary funds to embark on d e v e l o p m e n t  
programmes.
Transport, being the activity of man concerned with the 
movement of people and materials, is closely associated 
with economic conditions and the increase in economic 
activities is on the one hand causal to the increase of 
transport activities and on the other it is dependent 
on its availability. The report prepared by IBRD 
cautiously approached the possible effect of oil on the 
economy and proceeded under the suggestion that no sub­
stantial sums would become available to the Libyan 
treasury before 1965^05 'On the whole, the existing 
transport system serves the need of the country 
adequately' , "* ^  the report said, and went on to doubt 
an abnormal increase in air traffic, disregarding the
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substantial increase in civil aircraft movements al­
ready being witnessed. Civil aircraft movements from 
Tripoli (Idris) Airport totalled 5,948 in 1955, in­
creasing to 14,000 in 1960, a figure substantially con­
tributed to by general aviation aircraft serving the 
oil industry.1 "^7 It quoted a substantial increase in 
passenger traffic through Tripoli and Benghazi. In 
1955, 23,000 passengers were handled at Tripoli (Idris)
Airport, the figure increasing to 80,000 in 1960. 
Baninah Airport saw a less significant increase from 
7,000 in 1955 to 10,300 in 1960.^®^ Because military 
movements are not counted in these figures, the in­
crease in passenger traffic must be totally attributed 
to oil exploration activities and services.
In an atmosphere of expectation of relief as work 
progressed to commence exports of the discovered oil, 
and with signs that the oil exploration activities 
created demand for surface and air transport, those 
concerned with air transport (irrespective of being 
non-Libyans at executive levels), were told by the 
World b a n k ^ ^  that:
1. The domestic air services ought to remain operated 
by foreign airlines.
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2. A national airline would only operate partially 
the domestic operations - why was this to be the 
case and why was it not possible to restrict 
domestic operations totally to the national car­
rier had it been recommended that one be founded 
was not explained.
3. While the busiest route between the main cities of 
Tripoli and Benghazi was to be left to foreign 
airlines, it suggested that it was beneficial to 
'make the people (of Libya) more air minded' by 
introducing air services to serve the scattered 
oases around Sabhah, Ghadames, Gialo and Kufrah - 
this time at a justified financial loss by con­
tracting the job at a subsidy to some private 
organisation.
In the years 1960-1965, the Libyan Government was ad­
vised to spend 2 per cent of its development funds on 
airports, 800,000 Libyan Pounds (LP) in all allocated 
as follows:
1. 280,000LP for development and equipment for 
Tripoli (Idris) Airport.
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2. 3,000LP for development and equipment for Benghazi
(Baninah) Airport.
3. 50 0,00 0LP to be spent as and when it becomes 
necessary to resurface the runways, taxiways and 
aprons.
These figures suggest that expenditure must proceed at 
the same pace as it had before oil played any role in 
the Libyan economy.
In other words, the World Bank Report exercised cau­
tion to the extent that it discounted any effects of 
the oil industry on the economy and suggested a 'freeze 
it all' attitude preventing any expansion of the 
facilities or infrastructure which had already suffered 
two decades of zero development, and on this followed a 
line of misguided prestige by creating air services in 
places where it would be the least effective or 
necessary. If the close association of transport and 
economic activity had been recognised, air transport 
would have been meaningful primarily between the two 
main agglomerations of Tripoli and Benghazi on the one 
hand and to and intra the oil fields on the other. The
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oasis air links proposals ought never to have been 
given precedence over the regions where population con­
centration and economic and administrative activities 
were concentrated.
Conclusion
The role of politics in shaping the air transport sys-
terns and infrastructure in Libya was of particular sig -
nificance and importance during and subsequent to the
tr an si t ional period pr eced ing Ind epend ence. U pon
L i by a 1 s Indepe nd en ce in Dece mb er 19 51, the air
transport infrastructure was in the hands of the Allied 
Forces. Independence implied that the control and run­
ning of Libyan airports and air transport systems be­
come the responsibility of the Libyan Government. The 
practical inability of the Libyan Government to assume 
such control stemmed from three factors. First, the 
Allied Forces used the Libyan airports for their own 
purposes as the traffic going through these airports 
was, at least initially, almost totally military 
associated. Secondly, the poor state of the Libyan 
economy did not encourage the generation of movement of 
materials and people by air for purposes associated 
with Libyan domestic economic conditions. Thirdly, the
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severe lack of financial resources and qualified na­
tional human resources prevented the Libyan administra­
tion from becoming in effective control of the Libyan 
skies as well as of the air transport systems and 
infrastructure. The existence of operations through 
L i b y a n  a i r p o r t s  o r i g i n a t e d  from s t r a t e g i c  
considerations.
With the developments in aircraft technology where long 
range aircraft had become available, the strategic 
position of Libya as an intermediate fuelling location 
diminished in importance. The arrival of general avia­
tion aircraft and the increase in regular services to 
meet the growing demand for air transport as a con­
sequence of the oil exploration activities, changed the 
profile of passengers and materials transported by 
air. The air traffic has become less dominated by the 
movement of the Allied servicemen and administrators. 
As the activities in the oil industry have progressed, 
so has the air network to, from and within Libya. 
International links were solidified and increased and 
links to desert locations substantiated on an ad hoc 
basis where explorations started and were then 
abandoned, or as they became more permanent in nature 
where oil was found and camps established in the
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various oil concessions.
The continued control over the air transport in­
frastructure within the country by the Allied Forces, 
and the assumption of the oil companies of the respon­
sibility of reactivating the desert strips, caused the 
total control of the airports to remain in foreign 
hands, except for the implications of applying the 
Civil Aviation Law of 1 956 and the return of the con­
trol of Sabhah Airport to Libya's authorities in 1954. 
This foreign control of the infrastructure was accom­
panied largely by a lack of investment in this sector, 
but it did serve the minimum requirements of the 
operations of the Allied Forces or the oil companies. 
After two decades of lack of investment, and at a time 
when Libya had begun to expect rent from the oil con­
cessions in the form of fees and oil production, the 
IBRD painted a picture that would continue the same at­
titude of lack of investment and of distancing the 
Libyan Government from becoming effectively involved in 
the activity of air transport; in spite of the avail­
able evidence that the time had come for some serious 
consideration of how to respond in air transport terms 
to the imminent changes in the Libyan economy.
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CHAPTER 2: OIL REVENUES AND LIBIA'S AIR TRANSPORT
SYSTEM
The founding of a national airline
Libya is in the middle of its fourth decade of 
Independence. It is almost thirty-five years since the 
country became independent in December 1951. By 
coincidence, it is possible to identify discernible 
periods, each of almost a decade, which represent par­
ticular political and economic circumstances. The 
first decade of Independence was one of poverty and 
political weakness. Libya lived on aid and rent from 
military bases operated by Britain and the USA.
The second decade of Libya's Independence was charac­
terised by promises of greater economic independence 
after substantial revenues had become available from 
oil operations. Until the time when the influence from 
monies pouring into the country for the implementation 
of exploration operations had begun to make its mark 
on the society and on the level of its economic 
activity, the Libyans were content with the fact that 
the aircraft they heard and saw landing and taking off 
from airports and bases in Libya were for foreigners -
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and at times for some of the native elite. In the 
minds of the Libyans, this almost totally illiterate 
society could not realistically dream of having its own 
airforce or airline. Only a decade after exploration 
for oil had started and after eight years of reflection 
on the part of the government, when it was becoming 
evident from the exponential increase in foreign air­
line operations into the country that a national air­
line was needed, did the government decide to establish 
one. Libya's national airline was formed by Law’ No. 
22, 1964 and operations commenced in October 1965.
The establishment of a national air carrier must be 
regarded as a fundamental response to national 
requirements. The awareness of the importance of 
owning a national airline can be traced from the early 
consideration of establishing a national carrier. The 
Libyan Government must have realised that not only does 
a national flag carrier constitute a tool for showing 
national identity inside, and more importantly outside, 
Libya but also that the geographic character of the 
country and the distribution of the population and 
economic activity as well as the administrative ana 
political structure made air links a vital tool for 
state consolidation. However, only when funds became
1 1 3
available was this national, economic and political 
requirement founded.
This chapter will consider the integration of the air 
transport system into the economy for two decades from 
the time Libya began exporting crude oil (1961), until 
the third oil shock (1982). These two decades divide 
the political scene in Libya into almost a decade under 
monarchic rule and just over a decade under the rule 
of the leaders of the 1969 Revolution.
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
By 19 58, the oil companies were spending 24 million 
Libyan dinars on exploration activities, at a time
when Gross Domestic Product, (GDP), totalled 52.2 mil­
lion Libyan dinars^ and Libya's population stood at
1,260,000 inhabitants^. Table 2.1 shows the changes in 
per capita GDP until the time the national airline com­
menced its operations. The increase in GDP per capita 
as developments in the oil industry in Libya progressed 
confirms the positive relationship between per capita 
GDP and air transport as illustrated by K.R. Sealy. It 
was thus at the 1965 per capita GDP that the 
domestic economic conditions and the use of air
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TABLE 2.1
CHANGES IN GDP PER CAPITA (IN LIBYAN DINARS) 
1958 - 1962 - 1965
Year G D P ^  Population^ GDP per Capita
1958 52.5 mn 1.26 mn 41.428
1962 182.7 mn 1.45 mn 126.000
1965 477.4 mn 1,62 mn 294.691
Source: (a) A. ATIGA, The Impact of Oil on the Libyan Economy.
Table 10 pl08 Dar Attalia, Beirut, 1972 (Arabic 
Text).
(b) F. Waddam, The Libyan Oil Industry
Table 11,4 p220 Johns Hopkins, 1980
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transport in support of economic activities became
favourable to the extent that the establishment of a
national airline, previously delayed on economic
£
grounds when considered in isolation0 , had become an
economic requirement.
1
By virtue of Law No. 22 of 1964, the national carrier, 
KINGDOM OF LIBYA AIRLINES, was established with a capi­
tal of two million Libyan dinars, in addition to 
whatever sums the Council of Ministers allocated to 
support this capital. By October 1965, the national 
carrier commenced to operate partially the domestic 
network and some international services. The airline's 
initial fleet was composed of two Super Caravelles. 
These two aircraft operated the network as shown in 
Figure 2.1.
Withdrawal of rights to operate internal services from 
foreign airlines
Upon the introduction of air services by Libya's na­
tional carrier in 1965, all international airline 
flights between Tripoli and Benghazi were stopped. The 
traffic between Tripoli and Benghazi supported the 
economic viability of flights by foreign airlines to
1 1 6
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Libya. The curtailment of their rights on this route 
deprived the international airlines operating this 
cabotage service of an important subsidy to their 
Libyan routes, to the extent that some withdrew opera-
n
tions to Libya altogether when this occurred . NAA , 
(NORD AFRICA AVIAZIONE), a locally-controlled airline, 
continued to operate the service to Sabhah, and that 
between Tripoli and Athens, with no traffic rights, 
however, on the Tripoli-Benghazi sector.
Preparations for tine introduction of the Libyan na­
tional airline
The commencement of the national airline's operations 
was a largely unprepared event. The evidence for 
such unpreparedness stems from the fact that the air­
line had to buy readily available aircraft in order to 
avoid the usual lengthy waiting time for the delivery 
of new aircraft to own specifications. It had also to 
function under a difficult condition, namely that only 
two aircraft were available, a factor which made 
operations quite awkward.® Besides these limitations, 
there were no signs that the airline had started to 
recruit its own staff, let alone embarking on training 
programmes, until after the operations had commenced.
11 8
The start of the operation itself was the subject of 
considerable complaints from the international airlines 
who were notified only a few days before their cabotage 
rights were revoked.^ The airline had no sales offices 
anywhere in the country. The arrangements for sales 
offices were made only a few days before the operation 
commenced, which meant they were left with accommoda­
tion such as space underneath the Grand Hotel internal 
main stairs in Tripoli in which to form the central 
reservations and sales centre.
Preparations were done in this fashion since proper
preparation would have involved waiting many years
before the operation could have commenced. The steps
taken by the management of the airline to mount a
quick operation of this nature can be summarised as
follows: firstly, taking advantage of the availability
of two Caravelles from SUD AVIATION avoiding the leac-
1 0time required for aircraft construction; u secondly, 
obtaining operation and cabin service crews on second­
ment from AIR FRANCE; thirdly, entrusting AIR FRANCE
with the maintenance of the aircraft, that is the line 
1 1maintenance, or major maintenance checks and repairs;
fourthly, the executive top body (who supervised 
the sales and reservations sections) was obtained on
1 1 9
secondment from KLM; and finally, the staff for 
traffic, accounts and telecommunications were engaged 
with the help of BOAC. The absence of trained Libyans, 
except for a few in lower rank management, meant that 
the airline was basically run by foreigners and at the 
same time that there were openings for quick promotion 
for able nationals employed by the airline.
Developments im the national airline's domestic nett- 
work
The introduction of Libya's national air carrier did 
not in fact make a change in the number of air services 
offered to the public on domestic routes, it merely re­
placed the existing service and capacity as operated 
by foreign airlines. Despite the public attention the 
airline drew, its operation represented a fraction of 
the civil aircraft activities in the country. The 
average annual utilisation of an aircraft in the type 
of operation embarked upon by Libya's national carrier 
is in the region of 2,000 flying hours. Thus one 
might estimate Libya's national air carrier's total 
operations in 1 965 to have been: 2,000 x 2 x 4/1 2 =
1,333 hours in all. Oil field operations in 1965 
operated by the oil companies or those chartering
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aeroplanes who had their aircraft positioned in Libya
1 4was 24,166 hours in total.
By 1968, Libya's air carrier expanded its domestic net­
work by taking over the Tripoli-Sabhah route from 
LIBIAVIA NAA, through operating a chartered DC3 from 
LAVCO, a local company with foreign capital. The ex­
tensions in the network that seem to have been airbed at 
linking the various population centres like Ghadames 
and Tubruq by regular services were significant 
despite the thinness of traffic to such destinations. 
By leasing briefly two Fokker F27's from LINA1R, 
another local airline with foreign capital and 
management, and subsequently from the Italian airline 
AT 1, 1 ^  Libya's national carrier commenced to con­
solidate its domestic network and by ordering a third 
Caravelle, it succeeded in developing its interna­
tional network. In 1968 the airline's network had 
developed to the extent shown in Figure 2.2 below.
The development in this network show that, after the 
abolition of the federal system A1 Baydah was being 
developed as a capital for the country.^ The service 
to Al Baydah was meant to link this capital with the 
rest of the country, however the location of this city
1 21
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on the Jabel A1 Khadar and the inadequacy of the air­
port facilities at Labraq made the winter operations 
quite unsafe and thus many flights had to be cancelled 
due to weather conditions at destination, a factor 
which quickly made this air link impractical. The 
flights to Marsa El Brega at the lowest latitude in the 
Gulf of Surt also failed to generate much traffic, not 
necessarily because such traffic did not exist, but be­
cause it was more practical to travel by road to Ben­
ghazi where there was an airport offering interna­
tional air links either direct or through Tripoli. The 
continuance of this service to Marsa El Brega can only 
be seen in political terms in those areas where the 
oil companies might be expected to feel the 
government's presence, as such a town was a closed com­
munity fully under the control of the oil companies. 
Ghadames offered some tourist attractions in the shape 
of its architecture, and the prospect of a close view 
of Tuareg's traditions in situ attracted groups of for­
eigners working in the country. Hence this service 
benefited the tourist interests of Ghadames as well as 
political interests in that it strengthened the physi­
cal links between this town so strategically located at 
the frontier tripoint between Algeria, Tunisia and 
Libya, and the central government.
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Expaumsioe of the Libyan carrier's international network
The expansion of Libya's national carrier's interna­
tional network to Athens, Beirut, Malta, Cairo and 
Djerba, and the extension to Cairo and Beirut was a 
matter of paralleling the operations of other carriers 
already operating this route. Flights between Benghazi 
and Athens were operated by NAA LIB1AVIA. The Libyan 
authorities stopped this airline operating this route 
and replaced it by granting the right to operate it to 
the national carrier. The authority entrusted in the
Director General of Civil Aviation by virtue of Article
1 714 of the Civil Aviation Law, 1965 was used to en­
sure the monopoly of the national air carrier. The 
opening of the Tripoli-Djerba route as a popular
tourist attraction to foreigners in Libya who formed
1 ft32.6 per cent of the total manpower10 came from the 
belief that they would find going to Tripoli Airport 
and then flying the short distance to Djerba more con­
venient than driving 120 miles and crossing the then 
relatively open border with Tunisia. This belief was 
later proved to be unfounded by the very low number of 
people flying the service. The service to Malta, 
however, was operated on more solid grounds, for it was 
operated in parallel with MALTA AIRWAYS (a subsidiary
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of BEA) mainly to provide an air link to the site 
where many oil men's families had chosen to live.
Libya's national air carrier's operations in the first 
few years were characterised by an aim to take over 
domestic routes from foreign carriers, to expand the 
domestic network so as to strengthen physical links 
(for primarily political reasons) and finally to expand 
the international network in order to duplicate the 
services of foreign carriers operating to the country. 
The political element involved in the pattern of the 
airline's domestic network, the cost in operating the 
international network as a result of the absence of an 
indigenous technical base who could run an airline, and 
the consequent necessity of entrusting the airline's 
operation to foreign know-how, ought to have made it 
clear that the Libyan air carrier could not neces­
sarily sustain itself from its own revenues. As the 
government of the then Prime Minister Abdul-Hamid El 
Bakkush took office in 1967, it appeared that they were 
concerned that the airline should function more effi­
ciently at a time when revenues from oil made money no 
obj ect.
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TWA sttodiy
Probably influenced by the experiences of SAUDI ARABIA 
AIRLINES and ETHIOPIAN AIRLINES, this government in­
vited the American airline TWA to carry out a study on 
the Libyan national carrier in order to recommend ways 
of improving its operations. The motivation for the
TWA study evaporated with the removal of Bakkush's
1 9government in late 1968. However, the report written 
by a department of Civil Aviation Commission on TWA 
recommendations showed support for the government's 
view and little understanding of the economic, politi­
cal and social environment in which this airline had to 
operate. A quick analysis of certain points in the
above report can help throw light on various facets of 
T W A ’s proposals, the Commission's view and the problems 
the airline had to face. Such an analysis is helpful 
in that it describes the state of affairs of air 
transport on the eve of the 1 969 Revolution which 
serves as a tool in understanding subsequent 
developments.
T W A 1 s scope of duties was: firstly to review and
assess the (Libyan) corporation policy objectives, its 
organisation, the available facilities and their
1 26
management; secondly to make recommendations for the
treatment of weak spots affecting the various aspects
of the operation; thirdly to present proposals so
that KINGDOM OF LIBYA AIRLINES could achieve the
highest levels of jet air transport; and finally to
present a work programme aimed at helping the
{Libyan) Corporation Management to implement these
o n
recommendations. It is obvious from the text that
the government took this step without the prior consent 
of the airline and that the airline was expected to 
implement the consultant's recommendations.
The Civil Aviation Commission's report made note of the 
fact that TWA's report had omitted to mention the fact 
that the airline leased more aircraft than stated, that 
the airline acted as general sales agents for a number 
of other airlines and that the airport handling serv­
ices were carried out by the airline's own staff. The 
report then suggested that TWA's report was anxious 
about the large number2"1 of employees compared to the 
small number of aircraft operated by the airline, hence 
the recommendations it made that the staff should 
only be increased in line with the proposed organisa­
tional structure. The Commission's report proposed a 
formula by means of which staff productivity could be
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calculated by multiplying the number of passengers 
transported by the distance travelled. However, the 
formula proposed by the Commission neglects the 
ramifications in airline operations and propose that 
each airline performs its own operations in full and in 
isolation from other airlines or services in some form 
of a closed system.
On the one hand the TWA report recognised the fact that 
the geographic character of the country implied an 
operation of a domestic network that need not neces­
sarily be commercially viable, and that the absence of 
qualified nationals made it imperative to use e x ­
patriate know-how, on the other, it recommended that 
the airline should improve its performance so as to 
function independently of government subsidies. To 
achieve this it suggested that the government should 
develop the country's tourist potential by building a 
number of hotels which would generate tourist traffic 
from around the Mediterranean which the airline could 
take advantage of by creating a Mediterranean 
network.^2 Such an unrealistic vision was discounted 
by the Commission who insisted that the airline should 
build its future plans on realistic facts and be 
directed to operate on economic grounds and not for
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prestige purposes.^ It is not clear, however, why 
the Commission should point to avoidance of operating 
the airline on a prestige basis when there was no in­
dication that this had been the case. The basic 
criticism was the level of the airline's efficiency. 
TWA suggested that additional traffic could be gen­
erated through implementing a different tourism policy 
- had such a thing existed it could possibly have been 
advantageous from an economies of scale point of view - 
a decision over which the airline had no control. It 
was recognised throughout that the domestic services 
had to operate for political reasons and to ease the 
spatial scattering of the communities forming the 
state, at a time when the traffic carried by the air­
line in 1967 was 33 per cent greater than that carried 
in 1966, achieving a market share of 55 per cent of the 
international traffic to and from the country. Such a 
performance indicated two things - which ought to have 
worried the airline's management. Firstly that while 
the government understood the necessity of operating a 
national air carrier, it failed to appreciate the com­
plexity of such an operation, particularly the fact 
that it had to function against the background of a 
complete lack of indigenous trained manpower; and 
secondly that it appeared that the national carrier was
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seen to have been operating for reasons of prestige 
rather that from vital economic, political and social
O A
imperatives. The airline's problem was two-fold: that 
it was not deriving enough revenues from its operations 
and that the imbalance within the airline's network 
made certain routes require heavy internal subsidy.
Aircraft in operation
Of all the points covered by the Commission's report, 
probably the most important was that related to the 
Five Year Plan 1 969-1 973. It was emphasised by both 
the TWA study and the Civil Aviation Commission that 
the type of aircraft in use, the Caravelles as well as 
the Fokker F27, were to blame for the airline's weak 
economic standing. The study by TWA endorsed by the 
Commission stated that a break even point of 96 per 
cent was required for the Caravelle and a very high and 
impossible to achieve 151 per cent for the Fokker 
F-27's,^ and consequently the replacement of these by 
two larger types of aircraft would solve the problem 
and reduce the break even p o i n t 0 The TWA study 
proposed the purchase of five three-engine, 138-seat 
jet aircraft and four propeller- driven, 60-seat 
aircraft.
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Had the TWA proposal been adequately interpreted, it 
would have become apparent that it stemmed from the 
wrong assumption that the question of profitability is 
a direct consequence of a single factor: aircraft size. 
The facts, however, are different. The uneconomic na­
ture of the Caravelle may only be compared with other 
types of aircraft on direct operation costs per seat/ 
km (or seat/mile) weighted against the characteristic 
of the route or group of routes over which it would be 
employed. The fact that the F27 needed a 151 per cent 
load factor to break even is a consequence of the price 
the airline was paying to charter this aircraft and low 
fares charged and not characteristic of the aircraft 
itself. The thinness of the traffic on the routes over 
which this aircraft was operated would have resulted in 
worse break even levels had a larger aircraft been 
employed under the same seat/km cost applied in the 
assessment of the F27 break even point. The recommen­
dation ought to have been that a smaller aircraft than 
the F27 should be used for the very thin routes.
The Commission appears to have rejected the major prin­
ciples produced in the TWA document. It accused it, 
rightfully, of neglecting the social, geographic and
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political aspects so important to the operation of an 
airline of the likes of Libya's national carrier. It 
proposed that "before deciding on buying aircraft some 
forecasting for at least the next eight years ought to 
be done - taking into consideration the advantages of 
fleet standardisation and of the concentration of those
0 A
kinds of aircraft in most common use."/D It is to be 
noted that at this time the competition between Boeing 
and Hawker-Siddeley - the aircraft manufacturers - was 
at its height. The first was trying to sell the Boeing 
727 and the latter was keen to sell the Trident-two1 s. 
Until 31 August 1969, Libya's national carrier network 
remained the same as it had been a year earlier, in 
spite of the opportunities persisting to expand, pend­
ing a decision on which type of aircraft the airline 
should buy.
Towards the beginning of the third decade following 
Libya's Independence, the 1 September 1969 Revolution 
came to mark the beginning of a series of changes in 
social, economic and political trends. The adoption of 
socialism obviously indicated that the government would 
intervene to a greater extent in the transport sector. 
Air transport was a combination of private and public 
enterprise. The national carrier and airports were
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owned by the Libyan Government, all other operators - 
mainly serving the oil industry with general aviation 
aircraft - were mainly foreign ventures, some with a 
nominal local interest.
Oil field services
The air transport sector by 1970 included three areas. 
The oil field operations, civil aviation including air­
ports and the national air carrier. One of the closest 
of these sectors to the oil industry was obviously that 
covering oil field operations. The air service to the 
oil companies provided the essential links between sur­
vey and drilling sites, oil company camps, contractors 1 
construction camps and oil ports on the one hand and 
the two main cities where the oil companies chose to 
have their headquarters on the other.
This sector drew little attention from the government 
as the efforts concentrated on the more visible na­
tional air carrier. The activities in this sector were 
carried out partially by privately-owned companies and 
partially by the oil companies who preferred to have 
their own control over this vital aspect of 
transportation. In 1970, the aviation departments in
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Mobil Oil, Esso, Occidental and Oasis Oil Company,
transported 150,000 passengers, leaving the remaining
95,000 passengers to LAVCO, LINAIR, WWH and AIR LIBYA.
The following year (1971) only 220,000 passengers flew
the oil air services of whom 128,000 flew on aircraft
directly owned and operated by the oil companies. The
monthly average of oil air services in 1971 totalled
1,130, each carrying an average of sixteen
27passeng ers.
The figures show that between 1 965 and 1 969 the hours 
flown on oil routes remained stable. In 1969, 1970 and 
1971 there is evidence of a substantial increase in oil 
services flying hours, a development which can be at­
tributed to oil activities as Figure 2.3 shows.
Effect of oil production on the transport system
The indicators incorporated in the above diagram show 
that between 1 965 and 1 967 Libya's oil production was 
gradually rising while drilling was steadily declining 
with oil air service flights keeping a steady trend;
1966 seeing more flying hours that could be associated
with the substantial increase in surveying activities
in consequence of the granting of additional oil con
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cessions to the oil companies 41 additional concessions 
were granted. ^  Since the 1967 Middle East War, 
Libya's oil production had increased from 1.7 million 
b/d in 1 967 to 2.6 million b/d in 1 968, 3.2mn b/d in
1 969 and 3.3 million b/d in 1 970 . In 1971, however, 
Libya's oil policy was aimed at implementing resource
2 Qconservation as decreed by OPEC in 1968, and oil 
production started to fall, diminishing to 2.7 million 
b/d in 1971. The changes in the other oil activities 
saw similar trends and so did the air services to oil 
fields which went up from 26,400 hours in 1969 to
33,000 hours in 1970 before dropping to 29,100 in 1971.
With the assumption that oil field air services are 
closely related to oil production activities, with oil 
production itself functioning as a parameter to show 
the extent of oil field services, Figure 2.4 shows the 
hypothetical changes in its volume0
The structure of the oil field air services had to 
change after the 1969 Revolution. Two factors may 
support this assumption. The first is that with 
socialism becoming the country's economic orientation, 
the government had to play a greater role in the air 
transport system. Secondly, the control over the na
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tional airline was now being exercised by upgrading 
the nationals' role in running and managing the air 
line. The latter assumption is not meant to lead to 
the conclusions that non-nationals would have delayed 
or prevented government policy but only that the na­
tionals would have impl e m e n t e d  g o v e r n m e n t  and 
nationalist objectives more spontaneously.
The First September Revolution (1969) ended an era of
"3 A
international laissez-faire , which also character!sed 
the air transport industry in Libya. The change, 
however, was not abrupt or sudden. Oil companies and
the oil air services operated and continued to run 
their operations until the middle of the decade dis­
cussed here. The continued momentum in the oil field 
operations after September 1969 stemmed from two impor­
tant facts. Firstly, there existed no government-owned 
operation specialising in general aviation activity, 
which would have served as a tool through which the 
government could have exercised direct control of 
general aviation. Secondly, the national carrier whose 
objectives included the operation of a domestic air 
network needed to consolidate its own operations and 
management before it could suggest taking on oil air 
services at a time when the airline itself had aircraft
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on loan from one of the oil air services operators to 
replace aircraft withdrawn by ATI, the Italian airline, 
immediately after the Revolution.-3' The first attempts 
at involvement in the operation of general aviation 
aircraft came with the formation of the flying club in 
1 973 at the time the national air carrier caught the 
attention of the world when one of its two B727's was 
shot down over Sinai on 21 February 1 973 by Israeli 
jets.
Over the decade 1970-1980 annual development expendi­
ture shows that from a total of 8,701.4 million Libyan 
dinars, the share of Transport and Communications was 
740.1 million Libyan dinars. Table 2.2 gives details 
of these budget details.
Improving the fleet
Until 1975, the national carrier's operations remained 
within the scope of operating regular domestic and in­
ternational schedules. It received support from the 
government through the development budget mainly in two 
areas. The training of technical crews, and partial 
support in procuring equipment. The government helped 
LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES purchase two B7271s in 1971, three
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TABLE 2.2
TRANSPORT AND OOMMUNI CATIONS SHARE OF 
DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURES (IN MILLION 
LIBYAN DINARS) 1970 ~ 1979_________
Total Developnent Transport and % of
Year
Expenditure Carmunications
Share
Total
1970 146.- 11.3 7.40
1971 247.6 23.7 9.57
1972 397.4 37.4 9.41
1973 413.8 25.8 6.77
1974 866.- 63.1 7.04
1975 923.2 49.7 5.38
1976 1187.2 78.5 6.12
1977 1280.3 118.2 9.23
1978 1371.1 130.8 9.54
1979 1868.8 201.6 10.79
TOTAL 8701,4 740.1 8.51
Source: BANK OF LIBYA, Economic Bulletin
JAN - MAR 1982. pp 2,3
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in 1974, two in 1975 and two in 1976. Of course it 
provided such additional funds necessary the for pur­
chase of aircraft operated on behalf of the government 
for VIP movement. The last two B727's purchased in 
1 9 77 were fully financed from the airline's own 
revenues. All the F27 fleet of the airline was also 
financed through loans from Libyan banks complemented
o n
by the airline's own resources.
In 1975 LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES embarked on involving it­
self with the oil field air services. It must be noted 
here that this decision stemmed from the desire to take 
over the operation of the domestic services that were 
then being operated by leased PIA's F 2 7 . ^  This notion 
was part of the desire to give a lift to the airline 
which had lost an aircraft over Sinai in 1973, and had 
suffered its share of anarchy that characterised the 
start of the popular re volution. ^  With increases in 
the price of oil a major fleet plan was devised so that 
the three Caravelles owned by the airline, and the 
single B727 it owned would be supported by an addi­
tional fleet which changed the fleet composition to: 
three Caravelles, four B727's and six F27's. Upon 
signing the purchase contract for these aircraft, it 
became evident that LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES was at last
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serious about playing a more significant role in the 
Libyan domestic air network. The decision to
strengthen the airline's fleet and the subsequent 
change from a corporation to a public company in 1975 
was aimed at solving the accumulated administrative and 
operational problems of the airline. The government 
appeared so supportive of the airline that not only did 
it give its management extensive powers and indepen- 
dence in decision-making but also restricted the 
operation of any air service within Libya solely to the 
national carrier. Under Article 4 of Law No. 5, 1 9 7 5 ^
ultimately only LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES was permitted to 
operate services within the country.
The investment in the air transport domestic in­
frastructure may be associated with the increase in the 
price of oil, particularly after the Arab-Israeli con­
flict of October 1973. The share allocated to the na­
tional air carrier from the development funds substan­
tially increased in 1 974 and 1 975 in comparison with 
those allocated in 1973. Support for the Department of 
Civil Aviation was, understandably, much greater.
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National &ir Carrier's financial performance
The imbalance in the support granted to the Department 
of Civil Aviation, as expressed in subsequent sections, 
against that granted to the national air carrier is 
justified in several ways. Primarily, the weakness of 
the airports infrastructure and the resultant govern­
ment desire to strengthen it required substantial in­
vestment which could not be expected to come from the 
DCA1s own resources or revenues. Secondly, despite the 
fact that the national air carrier's shares were to­
tally owned by the government which was designed as a 
saftey measure, any necessary liquidation of the com- 
pany required the issuance of a special law. ' The 
airline was expected to function on a commercial basis 
by generating adequate revenues to support fully its 
operating expenses as well as its anticipated further 
expansion which would pari ratione generate matching 
revenues.
This apparent imbalance, however, is substantially of­
fset by the compensations that the national carrier has
*2 D
obtained, at least theoretically, since 1975. These 
are stipulated in Article 14 and Article 15 of Law No. 
5, 1975. Article 14 instructed the Ministry of Finance
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to create a special office to settle the state's debts 
due to the airline on a monthly basis - a privileged 
position indeed since no other company has had such a 
working relationship with the Ministry of Finance. Ad­
ditionally Article 15 provided that, "The government 
shall compensate the company for whatever losses or ad­
d i t i o n a l  e x p e n s e s  it incurs in the following  
circumstances:
1) Request for opening an air route of an internal or 
external destination which is inconsistent with 
the company's commercial interests.
2) The reduction of tariffs for passenger, mail or 
cargo in specific routes or services.
3) Any laws or instructions affecting the facilities 
or standard of service offered by the company to 
passengers, mail or cargo."
Until Law 5, 1975, became effective, the national air
carrier was constantly in deficit. An example of its 
profit and loss accounts is available in the budget's 
financial report for the financial year ending 31st 
March 1972. This showed total expenditures exceeded 
all revenues, without the government support funds al­
located to the airline in the development plan, by 5.4
1 44
million Libyan Dinars (LD) compared with LD 6.3 mn in 
1971.^  (One Libyan Dinar equalled 3.3 US$).
No published financial reports are available since the 
implementation of Law No. 5, 1975. However, by the end
of 1 976 the airline was able to announce a profit 
be f o re tax wh i ch exceeded LD 5 m n . In addition to 
these profits, the funds allocated to it through the 
development budget were returned to the treasury and 
financing the purchases of new equipment was made with 
funds taken from the airlines own resources. ^  The 
emergence of the airline as a profitable organisation 
in 1976 ^  was a product of various factors. The first 
was an increase of 60 per cent in the available inter­
national seat capacity after April 1976, which was 
achieved without additional personnel except in the 
Operations Department. Secondly was a 25 per cent 
average increase in salaries which acted as an incen­
tive for greater productivity. Above all, however, the 
airline produced, for the purpose of obtaining govern­
ment compensation, an accounting fare structure for 
its domestic services which was linked to both inter­
national air fares and those of the domestic fares in 
certain Middle Eastern countries (exact details of this 
formula are not publicly available). The domestic
1 45
fares which were charged to the public between 1965 and 
1985, which covered the period from the beginning of 
Kingdom of Libya Airlines, its succesion by Libyan Arab 
Airlines General Organisation in 1969 and Libyan Arab 
Airlines Company in 1975, remained little changed when 
compared to international fares as shown in Table 
2.2.a.
Article 14 and Article 15 of Law No. 5, of 1975, 
provided the national airline with a tool to offset 
much of the government's interference which had pre­
viously resulted in operating the domestic network at 
a loss. The continuous increase in international fares 
and the substantial absence of promotional fares worked 
to achieve higher unit yields {see Table 2.2.b). By 
virtue of these two Articles, the benefit of increasing 
international tariffs, and a monopolistic oil field 
operations without interference from the government on 
the c h a r g e s  for these services, the overall 
profitability is dependent upon maintaining an opera­
tion which responds to demand and achieves an equi­
librium between operating costs and operating revenues. 
The airline's managerial practises are responsible for 
creating either positive or negative imbalances.
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TABLE 2.2.a
SELECTED MAIN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL ROUTES 
(ONE WAY - ECONOMY CLASS) FARES DEVELOPMENT (IN LIBYAN DINARS)
SECTOR YEAR
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1986
TRIPOLI - BENGHAZI 13.50 13.50 14.50 16.00 16.00 16.00
(30.00)
TRIPOLI - SABHAH 12.00 10.15 11.00 16.00 16.00 16.00
(30.00)
TRIPOLI - ROME 20.60 20.65 28.75 66.90 78.10 78.00
TRIPOLI - LONDON 39.70 39.75 54.25 126.10 166.40 166.30
TRIPOLI - ATHENS 31 .20 33.15 44.35 84.10 101.20 102.90
Source: ABC, World Airways Guide, May 1965, May 1970, May 1975, May 1980, 
May 1985 and December 1986.
* ( ) fare in brackets applied if ticket bought abroad or in conjunction
with international trip or fare. This measure has been adopted 
by the airline to prevent subsidy other than purely domestic 
traffic.
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However, since Article 14 and Article 15 of Law No. 5 
are not fully put into practice the domestic system is 
still largely subsidised by the international system 
and the oil field services.^
Airport improvements
Between 1970 and 1975 all modes of transport were allo­
cated 337.3 million Libyan dinars in the development 
budgets. Airports and air transport were allocated 
65.4 million Libyan dinars. Expenditure, however, 
totalled 49.9 million Libyan dinars or 76.3 per cent of 
allocated budgets for the same period. Government in­
vestment in airport construction received most of the 
air transport budgets. Table 2.3 demonstrates these 
allocations.
The investment in domestic air transport infrastructure 
includes that in airport facilities and navigation aids 
on the one hand and support to the national air car­
rier to purchase equipment and vehicles to operate the 
domestic air network on the other. The impact of the 
increase of the price of oil since 1 973 was reflected 
in the development plans. Expenditure on developing 
airports and navigation facilities received con
149
TABLE 2.3
ACTUAL EXPENDITURES (IN MILLION LIBYAN DINARS) 
IN AIR TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE 1973 - 1975.
FROM DEVELOPMENT BUDGET SOURCES
Year
Total^ 
Expenditure
Civil
Aviation
National 
Air Carrier
1973 4.1 3.3 .8
1974 12.6 6.6 6.-*
1975 18.9* 15.8 3.1*
* These two figures were provided by the Government to assist the 
national air carrier pay for aircraft ordered and technical 
training programs
Source: (a) BANK OF LIBYA, Economic Bulletin
JULY - AUGUST 1976
(b) DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL AVIATION, LIBYA 
Development in Civil Aviation 
1973 - 1983 1984?
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TABLE 2.4
CIVIL AVIATION, LIBYA
EXPENDITURES ON INFRASTRUCTUTE FROM DEVELOPMENT 
FUNDS (IN MILLION LIBYAN DINARS) 1973 - 1983
Year Expenditure
1973 3.3
1974 6.6
1975 15,8
1976 23.5
1977 32.1
1978 27.5
Year Expenditure
1979 27.5
1980 42.4
1981 48.7
1982 45.5
1983 t•
o<M
Source: DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL AVIATION: LIBYA
Development in Civil Aviation 
1973 - 1983 1984?
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siderable attention after 1973 as Table 2.4 
demonstrates.
This investment in Civil Aviation came after a con­
siderable period of non investment in this sector. The 
lack of investment in Libyan airports stems from the 
fact that after the Amglo-Libyani Treaty was signed in 
1953, these airports fell substantially under British 
military control and thus little effort was made to 
upgrade the facilities to accommodate the growing 
civilian traffic. On the other hand there was persist­
ent uncertainty in the 1 960's ^  as to whether or not 
these treaties would be renewed. Thus there was a sug­
gestion that it might be better to develop the Wheelus 
Air base, then used by the USAF, into a civil airport, 
taking advantage of the better location of this base in 
relation to Tripoli City and its immediate position on 
the coast. These uncertainties made the development of 
Sabhah Airport as a civil modern airport slip upwards 
in the government plans to develop Libyan airports. 
Plans to develop Tripoli and Benghazi Airports have ex­
isted since the early 1 9 60 's. Tripoli Airport was 
finally developed into a fully-equipped, mainly civil 
airport. Baninah is still experiencing the dilemma of 
unclear identity and is thus extremely unsuitable for
152
civil airline operations. By 1973, Libya had decided 
to build a Flight Information Centre to take over the 
control of its air space. At that time most of Libya's 
air space was controlled by Malta. Only after 1973 did 
Tripoli FIC assume solely responsibility of providing 
flight information for Libyan airspace. The invest­
ment in the FIC was naturally more political than 
economic. (Figure 2.5). The sector that received con­
siderable attention in development following the 
Revolution was that of airports. Until the Revolution 
of September 1969, airports in Libya could be divided 
into four categories: i)airports handling interna­
tional as well as domestic services and playing the 
role of a military air base for the British Royal Air 
Force, (these were near Tripoli and Benghazi); 
i i ) d o m e s t i c  airports handling regular internal 
services, namely Ghadames, Sabhah and Labraq (Al 
Bayd ah ) ; i i i )numerous airports serving the oil 
communities, their location and number changing follow­
ing the changes in the distribution of oil exploration 
and production activities, (one airport, however, 
received regular services as well as oil air services - 
Marsa El Brega); ivjpurely military airports used to 
serve the British and American Air Forces (such as 
Tubruq) which had received regular civil air services
1 53
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at one time or another. The other important airport 
was Wheelus used by the USAF on the eastern periphery 
of the city of Tripoli. {Figure 2.6) With the two 
main airports receiving international services remain­
ing substantially under the control of the RAF, in­
vestment in facilities at these airports was 
restrained to the minimum requirement as established in 
the agreements between Libya and Britain. Eight years 
of oil revenues did not contribute to a face lift 
for these two gateways which retained the characteris­
tics of a military airport.^
The departure of the British and American forces from 
Libya gave the Libyans an obvious opportunity to plan 
the use of airports. Blessed by the increase in 
revenues from oil soon after the 1 969 Revolution, the 
project that received attention first was the construc­
tion of the international terminal at Tripoli Airport
and the improvement of its capacity. The initial con-
4 5tract went out for 21 million Libyan dinars in 1972. 
The construction of expanded facilities at Tripoli Air­
port was not followed by similar construction at other 
locations. However, attention was directed towards in­
creasing the operational capacity of other airports.
1 56
Rimways
The development in the operational capacity of airports 
in Libya in terms of runway length in the decade 1 973- 
1983 is represented in Figure 2.7 below. As per 
classification of airports by the Libyan Civil Aviation 
Department, Libya's international airports are those of 
Tripoli, Benghazi and Sabhah. Thus the occurrence of 
runway construction in international airports falls in 
these three airports. The total length of runways at 
these airports has increased from 5,835 metres in 1973 
to 9,560 metres in 1975, 14,520 metres in 1979 and
finally 18,120 metres in 1980. This final figure does 
not go beyond 1980 as it represents full length double 
runway operations for each of the airports classified 
as 'international'. The developments in the runway 
operational capacity of the Libyan international air­
ports brought Libya to a balanced position among some 
of her neighbouring countries where Algeria had 27,540 
metres, Egypt 22,800 metres, Sudan 9,800 metres and 
Niger 7,100 metres of runway length at international 
airports in 1 9 83 .^^
The construction of runways at Libya's three interna­
tional airports was aimed at upgrading the operational
1 57
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capacity of these airports. The construction of run­
ways at domestic airports is however more significant. 
For while Tripoli, Benghazi and Sabhah Airports are 
classified as 'international airports', recently only 
Tripoli Airport has held such a function. Thus it is 
possible to consider - from practice - that Benghazi 
(Baninah) and Sabhah are purely domestic airports. 
Besides the construction of runways at these three 
airports, 20,600 metres of runway length were c o n ­
structed between 1 979 and 1 9 83 . ^  In 1 978 purely
domestic civil airports had no runway construction at-
4 fttributed to them by the Department of Civil Aviation 
(Benghazi and Sabhah excluded).
4 QThe examined document which contained a summary of 
civil aviation developments between 1973 and 1983 gave 
gross figures for runway construction at domestic 
airports. No details on the location of this construc­
tion are available. A subsequent study, however,
8 0carried out by Fredrick Harris and Associates in 1985 
listed nineteen airports for which strategic develop­
ment was proposed. Eight of these were for joint civil
ft 1and military use. Most of the investment proposed
until the end of the century centred on Tripoli and 
Benghazi Airports. The expenditure proposed for these
159
locations totalled 89.4 million Libyan dinars, (at 1980 
prices) of which 57 per cent was allocated for develop­
ing Benghazi Airport, (speculation that Benghazi's 
civil airport was being relocated at Tika 20 km south
of Benghazi on the coastal road has been around since
s ?1978) and 31 per cent to developing Tripoli Airport. 
(The plan is mainly to construct a second terminal and 
a third runway). Both projects occupy most of the 
proposed plan and both projects are unlikely in the 
near future as a consequence of the fall in oil
revenues and traffic. Hence the conclusion that fur­
ther significant runway development in domestic air­
ports is unlikely to take place in the foreseeable 
future.
Training of air crews
The investment in the infrastructure was accompanied by
investments in human resources. Very little training
took place in the first two decades following
Independence, but between 1 973 and 1 983 the number of
5 3air traffic controllers increased from 28 to 148. 
The Institute of Civil Aviation situated at Tripoli In­
ternational Airport contributed substantially to
qualifying air traffic controllers. Of 198 graduates
160
TABLE 2.5
GRADUATE NUMBERS BY SPECIALISATION FROM THE 
INSTITUTE OF CIVIL AVIATION 1973 - 19S3
No, of 
Graduates
16
6
4
16
Source: DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL AVIATION: LIBYA
Development in Civil Aviation 
1973 - 1983 1984?
Sp>ecial isation
Air Traffic 
Controller
Radio Engineers
Airframe Engineers
Navigation Equipment 
Engineers
No, of 
Graduates
75
87
3
0
Specialisation
Navigation Aids 
Engineers
Airport Management 
Flight Management 
Radar Engineers
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of the above institute, 75 were air traffic controllers 
which was exceeded slightly by the number of radio en­
gineers which totalled 87. Table 2.5 shows the number 
of national graduates from the institute over the 
period 197 3-1983.
The role of the Institute is supplying the qualified 
nationals needed to serve the Department of Civil Avia­
tion (and the Department of Meteorology) where the 
control over the air transport system and infrastruc­
ture was aimed at increasingly retaining as much con­
trol as possible in national hands. Diplomas granted 
at the middle level of qualification show that the In­
stitution produced 764 graduates over ten years of whom 
348 graduated in 1983. The specialisations covered 
most of the aspects that the Libyan Civil Aviation 
Department required as the Table 2.6 shows.
Similar to developments in qualifying nationals to re­
place non-nationals and also in meeting the demands 
caused by the expansion of the air transport system 
since 1973 was that in the Libyan national air carrier. 
The training of commercial pilots and flight engineers 
who form the operating crew was exclusively carried out 
abroad and mainly in Britain and the USA. Those
162
TABLE 2.6
INTERMEDIATE DIPLOMA GRADUATES PER SPECIALISATION 
FROM THE INSTITUTE OF CIVIL AVIATION 1973 - 1983
Specialisation No. Specialisation No.
Wireless Operators 149 Airport Lighting 48
Metreology 166 Electro Mechanical 
Engineering 33
Wireless Maintenance 161 Search & Rescue 22
Asst. Air Traffic 
Controller 68
Flight Information 59
Air Conditioning 50 Antenna Maintenance 9
Source: DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL AVIATION: LIBYA
Development in Civil Aviation
1973 - 1983 p49 1984?
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qualified as C P L 's needed the endorsement of their 
licenses by the Libyan Civil Aviation Department before 
being allowed to operate Libyan registered aircraft. 
The number of CPLs and ATPs^4 indicate the developments 
in q u a l i f y i n g  n a t i o n a l s  to o p e rate comme r c i a l  
a i r c r a f t . T a b l e  2.7 shows these developments.
While these are indicative of the number of pilots and 
co-pilots granted licenses to operate commercial 
aircraft, they were afterwards required to complete 
their basic experience and gain further practice and 
qualifications. The more indicative parameter of the 
volume of training of pilots is that of student pilots. 
These are indicated in Table 2.8.
Tables 2.7 and 2.8 show the eventual outcome of the 
training policies (time required to qualify and earlier 
years training taken into consideration)and the human 
input into these plans respect i vely. The time dif­
ference between the achievements in Table 2.7 and those 
in Table 2.8 represent the lead time between the input 
and output in the basic training process.
Figure 2.8 below shows that in 1975, 30 pilots and co­
pilots qualified for licences, 40 in 1976 and 28 in
1 64
TABLE 2.7
CPL's (COMMERCIAL PILOT LICENCE) AND ATP (AIR TRANSPORT 
PILOT) LICENCES GRANTED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL 
AVIATION, LIBYA, 1975 - 1983________________________
Year No. Year No.
1975 30 1980 16
1976 40 1981 50
1977 28 1982 120
1978 27 1983 100
1979 15
Source: DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL AVIATION: LIBYA.
Development in Civil Aviation 1973-1983 
Figure 35 1984?
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TABLE 2.8
STUDENT PILOT LICENCES GRANTED BY THE DEPARTMENT 
OF CIVIL AVIATION, LIBYA______ 1975 - 1983
Year No. Year No.
1975 200 1980 100
1976 200 1981 100
1977 200 1982 100
1978 150 1983 100
1979 150
Source: DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL AVIATION: LIBYA
Development in Civil Aviation 1973 - 1983
Figure 34 1984
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1977. During these years, 200 pilots per annum were 
sent for training abroad. The number declined to 150 
in 1 978 and 1 979, respectively, to steady at 100 in 
1980 and the three years that followed. The sig­
nificant reflection of these figures on the number of 
pilots and co-pilots who received licences together 
with flight engineers is traceable only from 1981, 
where the total of flying technical crews was 68 in 
1981, 161 in 1982 and 142 in 1983.
The low turnover in pilots between 1975 and 1981 is in­
dicative of weak inputs since the formation of the air­
line and the increase since 1975 in student pilots 
comes as evidence of the availability of candidates 
with the right educational background and the expecta­
tions of growth in the traffic following the push given 
to the airline in 1974 and 1975. The determination to 
Libyanise the technical crews was largely enhanced by 
the cancellation of AIR FRANCE'S operating contract in 
1 9 7 5 . The subsequent decline a few years later in 
sending more students to learn as pilots came in 
response to saturation in the openings for flight tech­
nical crews on the one hand and the decline in oil 
revenues on the other.57 Since 1979 Libya's exports 
were almost entirely crude oil and products. These
168
were reported in the EIU, Libya: Country Profile 119)86- 
81 as having changed as shown in Table 2.9. The 
decline in oil revenues led to speculation and con­
sequently the suspension of new development projects. 
The decline in the development budget was exacerbated
r o
by the decline in actual expenditures.
Passenger flow changes
Figure 2.9 shows the changes in traffic through Libya's 
three major airports: Tripoli, Benghazi and Sabhah, and 
changes in oil revenues in the same period. Between 
1974 and 1982 traffic through these three airports col­
lectively jumped from 1,089,000 passengers to 3,620,000 
passengers, an increase of 332 per cent. Table 2.10 
demonstrates the rates of change in oil revenues and
the number of passengers passing through the three
major airports. While revenues from oil increased 
markedly between 1975 and 1980 and declined dramati­
cally after that time, in response to the changes in
this international industry, passenger flow through 
these three airports generally followed similar trends 
except that after 1 980 passenger numbers did not drop 
in response to the sharp drop in Libyan revenues from
oil. The continued substantial increase is at
169
TABLE 2.9
LIBYA'S EXPORTS OF CRUDE OIL AND PRODUCTS 
1979 - 1986 .(IN BILLION USff)___________
% Change over
Year Value of Oil Exports Previous Year
1979 15.981
1980 21.919 + 37.16
1981 14.731 - 22.80
1982 13.701 - 7.-
1983 12.348 - 9.22
1984 10.056 - 19.16
1985 10,929(a) + 8.68
1986 4.500(b) 58.23
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. LIBYA,
Country Profile 1086 - 1987
(a) EIU Report, Libya 4. 1986 p2
(b) EIU Report, Libya 4. 1986 p3
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TABLE 2.10
RATES OF CHANGE IN LIBYA’S REVENUE FROM OIL 
AND PASSENGER MOVEMENT THROUGH LIBYA'S 
MAJOR AIRPORTS 1975 - 1982
Year Oil ^  Air Passengers ^
1975/1976 + 47% + 19%
1976/1977 + 18% + 11%
1977/1978 - 5% + 8%
1978/1979 + 81% + 28%
1979/1980 + 48% + 20%
1980/1981 - 43% + 18%
1981/1982 - 11% + 20%
Source: (1) Calculated frcm Ghanem S„M. in Planning and
Development in Modem Libya.
M. BURU, S, GHANEM AND K. McLACHLAN. MENAS 1985 
Table 15.3. Also EIU, LIBYA 4 and EIU Country 
Profile - Libya 1986-1987
(2) DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL AVIATION, LIBYA
Change calculated frcm Development in Civil 
Aviation 1973-1983 Tables 1 2 - 1 5 - 1 9
172
tributable to the important fact that the process of 
implementing development projects is a long term one 
and does not instantly react to changes in revenues 
from oil, consequently the movement of foreign labour 
continues to flow until contracts are completed. The 
paradox of increase in traffic and decline in the 
development projects is solved in understanding the 
direction of traffic. The reduction in investment in 
new projects as was originally planned in the 1981-1986 
Five Year Development Plan resulted in the departure of 
much of the foreign labour as new jobs were not being 
generated, which influenced traffic trends positively 
for a period beyond the start of decline in oil 
revenue s.
Serageldin, Socknat, Birks, B. Li, and Sinclair, (1983) 
stated that Libya was the second major labour-importing 
country in the Middle East with 280,400 migrant workers 
in 1975, second only to Saudi Arabia with 668,400. 
They also predicted that at a high growth rate the 
number of migrant workers in Libya will increase to 
71 9,300 workers in 1 985 . jn 1 983 , the decline in
oil revenues had resulted in there being only 569,000
r q
migrant workers present in Libya. In mid 1984, the
Central Bank of Libya estimated that this dropped to
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263,100 migrant labourers.^ With the decline of oil 
revenues in 1985 and dramatically in 1986, the number
r n
of migrant labourers must have dropped drastically. z 
The departing migrant labour left the country by air. ^
The inter pretation of the paradox of increase in air 
traffic and decline in oil revenue in a country where 
oil contributes overwhelmingly to the economy is only 
partially solved in terms of the departure of a sub­
stantial number of migrant labourers from the country. 
There are two other factors that go along side this 
theory. These are primarily that the Libyan Government 
since 1981 had decided that international traffic to 
and from Libya should pass through a single gateway, 
thus inflating the number of passengers through the 
country’s only real international airport, (See Chapter 
5 below) and that the increased importance of Sabhah as 
a strategic post in the management of the conflict in 
Chad, particularly since 1981, had increased the move­
ment of passengers on this route, albeit marginally.
The trends in traffic carried by LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES, 
particularly since 1973, have shown continuous and sus­
tained growth. There was no lack of support on the 
side of the government for the expansion of the na-
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tional air carrier's operations. The national air car­
rier managed to obtain its fair share of the available 
market. The desire and effort by the government to 
support the national air carrier was obstructed by the 
refusal of the the United States Government to deliver 
aircraft manufactured in the United States or with US 
components or technology as a result of Libya's having 
f a l l e n  into d i s f a v o u r  with the A m e r i c a n
administration. The paradox is that the funds avail­
able to LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES could not obtain the 
aircraft required, for on the one hand the US would 
not allow the American aircraft manufacturers to sell 
aircraft or parts to Libya, and on the other Libya can­
not get aircraft elsewhere outside the Soviet Bloc for 
the US dominates the aerospace industry outside it and 
US legislation and influence work to ensure the denial 
of aerospace technology to Libya, (see Chapter 6).
Conclusion
The bleak economic conditions which prevailed in Libya 
upon independence in 19 51 and the political weakness of 
the government continued to persist until revenues from 
oil began to provide the tool for implementing economic 
development. The lack of suitably educated nationals
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and the complexity of the air transport business 
delayed the materialisation of a national air carrier - 
until 1965. The foreign control over the country's 
airports and much of its airspace created considerable 
uncertainties in the development of the air transport 
systems and infrastructure.
For a long time the country's airports were basically 
run for, or with the help of, foreign governments or 
multi-national companies. Foreign airlines operated to 
the country almost unrestrictedly to the extent that 
cabotage routes were exploited by them. The general 
aviation sector which supported the oil industry was so 
intensely exploited by small, foreign general aviation 
companies that in comparison, the operations of the na­
tional air carrier formed only a fraction of the total 
hours flown and number of passengers carried within the 
country. In 1970 the Libyan national air carrier
transported 109,208 passengers on its domestic and in-
f14ternational networks0 while the oil field services 
operators carried 245,469^5 almost two-and-a-half times 
the total traffic transported by the national carrier.
The establishment of a national carrier achieved a par­
tial control over the air transport infrastructure as
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it took over the operation of the main domestic 
s c h e d u l e d  routes. For a d e c a d e  a f t e r  its
materialisation, from lack of adequate government
support, the national carrier developed its network 
only to the extent that it managed to find its way in 
parallel operations on the main international routes 
terminating in Libya which had previously been ex­
ploited only by foreign airlines. The small foreign 
operators continued to work, free from government con­
trol or competition from the national carrier for two 
decades. This sector was totally left to the oil com­
panies to manage.
There was a substantial change in the degree of govern­
ment control over the air transport sector after 1969. 
The end of the treaties with the USA and Britain 
brought the control back to the Libyan authorities who 
could, with available funds from oil, support the na­
tional air carrier to fulfil its role in operating the
domestic and international networks and in the mean­
time embark on a training programme which would ensure 
national control of the management and operation of the 
national airline. Similarly, the changing political 
and economic conditions made possible considerable 
development and improvement in the civil aviation 
infrastructure.
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Alongside the development in the managerial and techni­
cal abilities of the nationals and the improvement of 
the infrastructure, the air transport system saw a con­
siderable improvement in the composition of the 
aircraft used by the national air carrier. Despite the 
financial ability of the country and the government's 
efforts to help the national carrier face the growing 
demand for aircraft capacity during the era oil 
revenues grew most substantially, the political dif­
ferences with the United States prevented the healthy 
progress of the national carrier.
The decline in oil revenues after 1981 has meant a 
decline in development plans. The dependence of the 
development projects on foreign labour, and the sub­
stantial proportion these form of the air traffic to, 
from and within Libya, coupled with the Libyan 
Government's own policies that do not encourage travel 
abroad by Libyan nationals, cause a marked decline in 
the airline's international and domestic operations. 
The oil industry dominates the Libyan economy and 
changes in oil revenues reflects markedly on the Libyan 
air transport scene.
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CHAPTER 3: DEVELOPMENT STUDIES FOR AIR TRANSPORT
Introduction
The promise of wealth coming from oil revenues in the 
late 1950's gave rise to hopes that Libya would, after 
all, recover from its extreme poverty. By the time 
exploration for oil had intensified, it was realised 
that the transport infrastructure would be incapable of 
handling the activities associated with oil exploration 
operations. The weakness was evident in all transport 
sectors, foreign commercial airline services grew 
steadily adding to the profile of traffic the many oil 
experts and those in the business of supplying to the 
oil companies to those whose travels to Libya were con­
nected with some military purpose (these constituted 
the bulk of air travellers). The less important traf­
fic to Egypt (mainly composed of teachers and justice 
administrators and their families), Italy (generated by 
the residue of the Italian community) and other less 
significant places formed only a fraction of the total 
numbers of passengers. The Libyan skies began to see 
different types of aircraft than those used for 
military operations or the large commercial planes. 
In 1 954 there were no aircraft that belonged to the
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general aviation category, but in 1957 there were 30 
aircraft1 of various makes and types: helicopters,
Beavers, E9 ' s and DC3's, all operating to support the 
oil exploration operations.
The oil companies reactivated those aerodromes that 
were built during the Second World War^ making them 
operational and using them with no interference from 
the authorities in the country. Companies like SILVER 
CITY and BAHAMAS HELICOPTERS brought in their 
aircraft. After the Civil Aviation Law of 1956 was put 
into practice,  ^ various suggestions were made by for­
eign airlines that the establishment of a Libyan air­
line had become n e c e s s a r y A l r e a d y  in June 19 57, 
Libyan officials had had discussions with Greek con­
cerns regarding the establishment of a Libyan airline 
in which Libya would have held a 60 per cent share 
and Onassis the rest.^ A national airline, however, 
did not materialise until 1965.
The concern about how best to upgrade and transform the 
Libyan infrastructure to a level compatible with the 
anticipated economic change led to a channelling of 
the state's efforts into development programmes, the
f.
first of which started in 1963. Seventy-one million
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Libyan dinars of the total 337 million budget of 
the first Five Year Development Plan were allocated to 
transport. Azzabi”^ (1 982) assumed that only 75 per 
cent of the allocated funds were actually spent be­
cause 'the appropriate studies' were not carried out^ 
in time before this development plan was put into 
execution. Thus, assuming 'appropriate studies' becom­
ing available, appropriate execution of development 
plans should be expected. Accordingly, 'appropriate 
studies' ought to be completed before the execution of 
proj ect s .
This chapter aims at dealing with two studies carried 
out on behalf of the Libyan Government which deal 
specifically with a national transportation plan for 
Libya. The first is that carried out by Doxiadis 
Associates and completed in 1965, the other is the 
recent work by Fredrick Harris and Martin & Voorhees 
Associates completed two decades later. This selection 
is not only interesting because these two studies are 
the first and most recent of all studies on national 
transport objectives after revenues from oil became 
available, but also because the Doxiadis study came at 
a time when the formation of a national airline was un­
derway whereas the Harris and Associates study came at
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a time when the national carrier had already been in
operation for twenty years and was facing considerable
difficulty vis a vis its future. The former was the
first study carried out under the free economy ideology 
then prevailing whereas the latter had the Green Book 
as its ideological background.
This chapter will look only at the aspect of air
transport in these studies. Through the analysis of 
these two surveys, it is hoped to assess the usefulness 
of each of them as a tool for planning the Libyan air 
transport systems and infrastructure. The question 
will be that of the extent to which the consultants 
were familiar with local needs and thus how effective 
were the conclusions they reached which formed the 
basis of their recommendations.
The Doxiadis staidy
Between February 1964 and March 1965, Doxiadis As­
sociates prepared a document^ for the Ministry of Plan- 
ning and Development of Libya, which examined the 
prevailing conditions of the transport modes operating 
in the country at that time and the infrastructure 
that supported them. This was the subject of the first
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volume of the survey and study presented which in­
cluded several maps and illustrations. The second 
volume contained the policies and programmes suggested 
by the study.
The analysis of existing conditions in the country's 
transport system comprised of two parts including an 
introduction showing the objectives of the study so as 
to determine a national transport policy regarding:
i)the country's requirement for new roads as well as 
the improvement and maintenance of those existing;
i i ) t h e  i m p r o v e m e n t  , c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  r e p a i r ,  
rehabilitation, maintenance and operation of ports;
iii)the improvement, equipment, maintenance and opera­
tion of airports. A survey of the road network, 
ports, airports, railways, agricultural areas and road 
traffic was carried out.
The survey emphasised the central position of transport 
in any economy. The less developed a country is, the 
more transport stands out as a platform that makes the 
tapping of natural resources possible. Thus the ex­
amination of the country's economy stimulates interest 
in the planning of its transport system.^ Such a plan 
recognises that short term forecasting and short term
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plans give more realistic results. On the other hand,
optimising the provision for a transport infrastructure
1 1must depend on long term planning and forecasting.
The Doxiadis survey gave consideration to Libya's 
geographical location from an African angle. It was 
optimistic in that it saw the Arab and Pan-African 
movements as representing: 'reserves of economic, so­
cial and cultural forces, that constantly gather 
momentum' It also added that: 'it would be a great
mistake for any planner, working within a national
1 ^scale to ignore these forces.' A quick glance at
current road and rail network plans showed that the 
political hostility between Libya and all its neigh­
bours did not alter the fact that all the country's 
transport lines are planned so that their natural ex­
tension will physically connect them with those of its 
1 4neighbours. ' (See Figure 3.1 ). It was correct for 
the survey to emphasise the fact that these non­
economic considerations would have to be incorporated
1in a transport plan where political factors did 
indeed influence the shape and extent of road networks, 
the ports infrastructure and the network of the na­
tional air carrier.
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Tftne Historic Review
Doxiadis gave an historical background of trade and 
transport with illustrations and maps dating back to 
the Phoenician arrival on the Libyan coast. The il­
lustrations showed: pre-Islamic foreign influences;
influences after the Islamic conquest of North Africa; 
European exploration in the nineteenth century; the 
traditional caravan routes; pilgrim routes; and sea
trade routes, covering the Sahel, North Africa,
1 fisouthern Europe and the Middle East. D On every mode
of transport on the infrastructure it involved, the 
1 7document gave an historical account. It stated that 
regular commercial air services were commenced between 
Italy and Libya in 1 928 , with a flying boat service 
connecting Tripoli with Syracuse and Rome, and that the 
first Libyan (owned by Italian settlers) airline, NAA 
(NORD AFRICA AVIAZIONE), inaugurated a land plane serv­
ice in 1931 from Tripoli (Mellaha) to Surt, Benghazi, 
Cyrene, Darnah and Tubruq and that landing strips were 
built in many locations including Nalut, Ghat, 
Ghadames, Sabhah, Murzuq, and Brak before the beginning 
of the Second World War. The study added three impor­
tant land marks: firstly that the Italians stopped
operations when the Second World War broke out and that
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1.
1 ftthey were permitted to resume services to Libya only
in 1947. The second being that NAA/LIBIAVIA, {which
had by then become totally owned by Libyan private
capital) commenced operations connecting Tripoli with
Sabhah, Benghazi and Athens, thus signalling the start
of a national air carrier service in 1 960 to cover a
domestic network (on the two main routes) and connect-
1 9ing Libya with an external destination. ^  Finally, it
predicted that the steps taken in 1 964 to form a na­
tional airline wholly owned by the government were
taken in order that this national air carrier might
7 0commence operations m  1965.
Flying and physical Geography
The climate and morphology of a country directly in- 
f l u e n c e  h u m a n  a c t i v i t i e s  and t h e i r  s p a t i a l  
distribution. Doxiadis incorporated a section on both
9 1
of these questions, and explained that these factors 
work to determine the: 'extent of ekistic distribution
of socio-economic magnitudes' and thus that they: 
'qualify to a great extent the methods and the means of 
transport which can be used in connecting the various 
centres of socio-economic activity'.^2 The morphology 
and climate are also closely associated with airline
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operations. Doxiadis explains that winds prevailing at 
a certain site determine the alignment of runways, and 
that the hot and sand-laden Ghibli months make flying
p p
to desert destinations somewhat hazardous J when such 
storms are blowing. The atmospheric conditions at 
L a b r a q ^  which is at an elevation of 700 metres, are of 
frequent low cloud, particularly in winter, and thus
p t
highly-sophisticated equipment^Jis required there to 
ensure its regular u s e . ^
Effect of population and location of economic activity
The relationship between population as a production
factor and the distribution of the said population has
much to do with transport and transport systems. The
? 71953 and 1964 population census results were given by 
Doxiadis and showed the population to be concentrated 
on the coast of the Mediterranean, divided between the 
Benghazi agglomeration extending to cover the north­
western half of the Green Mountain and the Benghazi 
Plain. (See Figure 3.2 for location g e neral
reference). The other concentration centres on 
Tripoli. The 1964 census totalled Libya's population 
at 1,559,399, two thirds of which (1,029,216) were 
living in Tripolitania. The Tripoli and Benghazi ag-
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glomerations were divided by a desert void 28 that ac­
commodated a coastal road a thousand kilometres long. 
The population of Fezzan totalled 78,717 and this 
province's capital of Sabhah was by no means the third 
largest urban concentration. Sabhah's agglomeration
occupied the ninth position in the ranking of the
9 Qvarious Mohafadat. The political significance of
Sabhah as a capital of Fezzan and its isolated position 
put this town permanently on the air network in which 
it had particular significance as the third largest 
domestic station.
The survey showed that economic activities concentrated 
in the rain belt of +100mm per annum comprising the 
Jefara Plain, the Benghazi Plain and the north-western 
parts of the Green Mountain, while the group of oases 
around Sabhah follow the wadis of Wadi El Ajal, Wadi El
o n
Shati and the Murzuq sand sea. u Industries fell
within the coastal rain belts and were characterised by
a concentration on processing agricultural produce.
Libya's external trade saw an appreciable increase
after 1957 while the value of domestic exports
(excluding crude oil) in 1963 declined in real terms to
3 735 per cent of its 1957 value.  ^ The source of imports
3 3and destination of exports was mainly Europe.
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Oil Activities and foreign manpower
The increase in economic activity associated with oil 
exploration during the period 1957 to 1963 caused an 
average annual increase of 9 per cent in the numbers 
of people arriving in Libya.^ The study by Doxiadis 
showed these figures to be related to tourism because 
they were derived from information accumulated by the 
Tourist Department; but because there has been no sig­
nificant reason to believe that tourism per se provided 
additional motives to travel to Libya for pleasure as a 
consequence of oil discoveries, the increased number of 
visitors can only be wholeheartedly attributed to the 
increased activity in oil exploration and subsequent 
production.
Pilgrim movement
A seasonal type of traffic is that of pilgrims. In 
1 964, 8, 000 pilgrims performed the trip by sea. The
study thought that the transport of pilgrims by air 
would have proved more adequate and that at least 50 
per cent of it could have been carried by a Libyan 
national air carrier. The other fifty per cent would
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have travelled by SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES.35
The Gravity Centres Concept
Interestingly, the survey spoke of the existence of 
'gravity centres'.35 While a basic gravity model deals
"D n
with population and distance, ' the survey went on to 
describe that: 'there are centres at each level:
purely local ones, district centres, provincial, 
regional, national and finally continental and interna­
tional centres,' and that: 'the task of transport is
defined precisely by the need to connect the areas
O O
within which such gravity points lie'.
It is clear from the text of the study that the spatial 
distribution of settlements is contributed to by a host 
of factors: physical, economic and socio-political.
However it is not clear whether the survey meant to ex­
plain the spatial distribution of human settlement and 
the hierarchical organisation of such settlements 
through a geographical model as the gravity model or 
indeed Edward Ulman's elaboration on the gravity model 
and its variations. Ulman studied and came out with 
his triad where interaction between some centres is 
stronger than between others. This was largely in-
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fluenced by transferability, controlled by the prin­
ciple of intervening opportunity, where an intermediate 
zone could provide for an improved transferability or 
complementarity situation.^ To argue for the exist­
ence of 'gravity centres' from economic, social and 
political factors, Doxiadis proposed that the
geographical centre of the country should be 400 km 
east of S a b h a h . I t  appears, however, that the 
gravity centre principle was devised to explain the ex­
istence of three discernible and separate hierarchies 
in Libya, the first centred on Tripoli, the second on 
Benghazi and the other on Sabhah, and that the friction 
of distance enhanced by the absence of a transport in­
frastructure and the harsh environment contributed to 
the increased isolation of the three hierarchies from 
each other implying that: 'the comparative advantage
of air transport over [surface] transport increased 
further (where an air transport system is found) when 
the scale of intercourse [sic] between the centres of 
gravity is taken into consideration' That is,
simply stated, air transport diminishes distance 
friction.
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Formation of a natbioinial air carrier
A detailed description of the transport infrastructure 
and the modes of transport status was made, 42 includ­
ing air transport. The original terms of reference of 
the survey specified that it would give consideration 
to roads, railways, ports and airports. The
consultants^ deemed it important to include the ex­
amination of the possibilities available to establish a 
national air carrier. The reasons for such a 
rationale were stated to have been:
a) '... the operation of domestic air services form 
an integral part of a transport plan for Libya.
b) ... no recommendations could be made as to im­
provement or establishment of aerodromes other 
than Idris and Baninah, unless some assumptions 
were made about the operation of domestic services 
by a national airline and the type of aircraft to 
be used.1^
Indeed it is desirable that all modes of transport be 
considered when a national transport plan is being 
sought. However while national airlines, just like all
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airlines, have their aircraft use aerodromes, it was 
not - as a matter of principle - necessary to have a 
national airline for examining aerodromes and making 
recommendations about them. Sabhah had been served by 
regular air services ever since Libya had become inde­
pendent and many desert airstrips had been used by the 
oil companies and their contractors ever since oil ex­
ploration operations had commenced in 1955. The fact 
that an aerodrome is built to receive aircraft from any 
nation makes weak the rationale put forward by Doxiadis 
and Associates, since they saw the establishment of a 
national carrier to be a fundamental requirement of 
carrying out an aerodrome study. However, since the 
establishment of a national carrier was under discus­
sion at the time the survey was commissioned, and the 
establishment of such a carrier was decreed during the 
course of the survey, the Doxiadis survey at least 
threw useful light on the background to the national 
airline 1s birth.
The states of airports and aerodromes
The survey established that Libya's strategic position, 
by 1964, was no longer important as an intermediate 
point necessary for the refuelling of aircraft en
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route from Europe to points in West, Central and East 
Africa, or indeed on the way back to Europe, and that 
only with growth in economic activities within Libya 
itself could there be renewed importance of the Libyan 
airports. ^  It also saw that only an efficient air 
transport system could make possible the break in the 
isolation of the scattered oases in the desert as well 
as increasing interaction between the large concentra­
tions of population.
A locational map 1^  showed more than 270 positions that 
fell under various categories of aerodromes divided as 
follows:^
Airports Secondary Aerodrome Air Strip
4 18 249
The four airports at Tripoli, Benghazi, Sabhah and 
Wheelus were so categorised because they received 
regular services (Wheelus regular services were US 
chartered passenger planes operated between this base 
and bases in Europe and the USA). The secondary
aerodromes included aerodromes near urban sites or 
major oil camps, like, Ghadames, Nalut, Ghat, Ubari,
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Murzuq, Brak, Hun, Bomba, Darnah, Labraq and Bir El
Aarka, south of Benghazi, Kufrah, Sidra, Marsa El
Brega, Misratah, Al Gos , Gialo and Sarir. The
airstrips are very basic in terms of their facilities
and their high number can be explained by the fact that
most of them are built in the Surt Basin and the Sarir
Region, a site of extensive oil exploration and
production, where in many cases the terrain is so level
that a land strip need only be marked with stones for
pilots to identify its position, and the soil needs no
particular preparation for light planes to find it
4 ftsuitable for their operations. (Figure 3.3).
In 1964, the three main airports (excluding Wheelus), 
were at Tripoli, Baninah and Sabhah. The longest run­
ways at Tripoli (2,227 metres) ^  and Benghazi (2,011
metres)^ caused operational restrictions on the opera­
tion of jet aircraft thus imposing limitations on their 
payloads in the hotter days of the year. Sabhah Air­
port runways were of gravel and no jet operations were
possible there. The following table (Table 3.1) shows 
the substantial increase in passenger movement through 
both Tripoli and Benghazi Airports due to oil 
operations.
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TABLE 3.1
PASSENGER NDVEMENT THROUGH LIBYA’S MAIN THREE 
MAJOR AIRPORTS (TRIPOLI, BENGHAZI AND SABHAH) 
1959 - 1963
Year Tripoli Change % Benghazi Change % Sabhah
1959
1960
73387
87425 + 19
7193
11654 + 62 —
1961
1962
1963
94901
100795
110445
+ 7.5 
+ 7 
+ 9.5
17861
24848
35342
+ 54 
+ 39 
+ 42 1529
Annual average change + 10.7 + 49
= no data available
Source: No. of passengers frcm Doxiadis and Associates.
Transport in Libya - DOX-LIB-1965 
Tables 24 - 25 and p221.
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Table 3.1 demonstrates that Benghazi experienced 
drastic annual rates of increase in passenger traffic 
and traffic in 1 963 was five times greater than four 
years earlier in 1959. Such increases changed the
position of Baninah in relation to Tripoli as it 
handled 24 per cent of the country's passenger traffic 
in 1963 while it only received 9 per cent in 1959. 
Tripoli Airport's increase in passenger traffic over
the same period was sustained, but this was not as ex­
orbitant as that of Baninah over the same period.
The same trends are discernible from the aircraft move­
ment through the same airports. While aircraft move­
ment in Tripoli was 2.3 times that in Baninah in 1959, 
Baninah gradually caught up with Tripoli and in 1963 
there were more aircraft movements from Baninah 
(17,484) than from Tripoli (14,487). The cause for 
such a situation apart from the increase in commercial 
flights is that Baninah was the main base from which 
light aircraft from the oil field services supported 
the oil industry operations. The choice of Baninah as
a base for such operations came as a result of
Baninah's proximity to the main areas of oil explora­
tion and production. Table 3.2 demonstrates the 
volume and the change in aircraft movement between 1959 
and 1963.
21 1
TABLE 3.2
CIVIL AIRCRAFT MOVEMENT THROUGH TRIPOLI AND 
BENGHAZI (BANINAH) AIRPORTS. 1959 - 1963
Year Tripoli % Change Benghazi % Change
1959 12305 5400
1960 14403 + 9 8762 + 27.5
1961 1454S + 1 11160 + 18.“
1962 13331 - 8 13162 + 33.-
1963 14487 + 8 17484 + 35.-
Source: No, of movements frcm Doxiadis and Associates.
Transport in Libya. Dox Lib 1965 
Tables 24 - 25
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Tine recQfflmmemcied aiirpcwrts development plan
The study was clear about emphasising that the develop­
ment of a coherent national transport plan cannot be 
complete without an air transport system. This em­
phasis was stressed further when the document contain­
ing policy recommendations and a plan of action was 
presented with a national airline feasibility study 
followed by a plan to develop the airports and 
aerodromes. It goes: 'following the examination of the
prospects of traffic development, the domestic services 
recommended for the national airline, the suggested 
type of aircraft and all the other n e c e s s a r y  
conditions, one may proceed with recommendations on 
improvements, creation of new airports and landing 
grounds, navigational aids and radio facilities, 
etc'.^ a national carrier is indeed not just another 
airline. Its significance in planning airports is 
mainly concerned with the fact that the main main­
tenance base for the airline would have to be provided 
for and that no matter how big this airline grew, most 
of its aircraft would have to be parked at national 
airports when not in use. It is from these two par­
ticular aspects that the presence of a national carrier 
is important to airport planners. All other things
21 3
relating to operations and traffic are colour blind at 
least on a scale such as that of a small country like 
L i by a .
The survey stated that at the time of its preparation 
it was not clear whether Wheelus was to become 
Tripoli's international airport and consequently few
recommendations could be made on the development of 
Tripoli Airport. A series of facts however, indicate 
that the authors could have learned more regarding the 
status of affairs in the Department of Civil Aviation 
which was the authority responsible for running the
country's airports.
The survey stated that the runway at Tripoli Airport 
ought to be extended from 2,227 to 3,050 metres.^ Yet 
Doxiadis Associates do confess that plans did exist to 
extend runway 36 to 2,6 82m and work would have
started in the month the survey was presented to the
Ministry of Planning. The survey further recommended 
the extension of the runway to 3,050 metres thus coming 
short of understanding that meeting such a recommenda­
tion would have meant cutting through valuable agricul­
ture areas as could have been seen from the photographs 
provided by the authors of the survey.^ It went on to
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propose other minor developments to the secondary run­
way and the provision of navigational aids and other
c c
facilities. However, while the survey was unsure 
whether Idris Airport or Wheelus Air base was to 
receive the approval to become Tripoli's international 
airport, the Department of Civil Aviation had already a 
plan for a terminal building at Tripoli (Idris) Airport 
site. The survey went on to suggest locations for the 
terminal building: '...close to the northern end of
c c
the airport and therefore closer to the city . It
does not explain why the 'closer to the c i t y 1 the 
terminal, the better. Airport terminals are usually 
an element whose design and location give consideration 
to passenger flows within the building and to the ter­
minal building in relation to the other facilities on 
the airport compound and in relation to its acces­
sibility by road. It is further not clear why the sur­
vey should urge the quick construction of the 
terminal^ if it stated that doubt existed as to where 
an international airport for Tripoli was to be located. 
The recommendations concerning Tripoli Airport were 
thus made to catch up with the work the Department of 
Civil Aviation was already carrying out.
The position on recommendations on Baninah or indeed
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Sabhah was no different. The survey made proposals of 
a general nature and was at times obscure. Baninah 
Airport was capable of handling aircraft at a MTOK->® of 
116 t o n s . ^  That is to a maximum of a Boeing 720 
category However, a Boeing 707 - the largest
C 1
operated in the region at the time - MTOW is in the 
region of 150 tons, but this includes maximum fuel 
uplifts and maximum payload used. Because neither is 
applicable for operations from Baninah - 707's could
operate from Baninah without extending the runway 
beyond the extent intended by the Department of Civil 
Aviation. Aircraft operational take off weights are 
usually calculated from the empty weight of the 
aircraft, the fuel its tanks will hold at the beginning 
of the runway and the actual load on board being 
passengers, or cargo - the total of these must be 
within the margins of the aircraft's operational 
capability and that of the take off runway. On the 
basis that Baninah Airport runways were upgraded to ac­
commodate the operation of the largest aircraft 
operated in the region, the nature of the routes and 
payloads taken into account, it becomes unclear why the 
survey would state that: '...work [then] in hand at
Baninah [would] bring the operational standards of the 
airport to a reasonably high level ' ,62 an(~j suggest
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that: '...as far as possible, large jet aircraft should
be confined to Tripoli so that interline traffic can be 
fed to the Libyan airline',^ somehow proposing that 
cabotage traffic may be restricted to the national air 
carrier by keeping a low operational capability at 
domestic airports ana reducing the number of interna­
tional gateways in the country immediately after recom­
mending that: '...at a future time, it may be necessary
to lengthen the new runway to at least 3,050'.^ at 
Bani nah.
The obscurity of conflicting statements stood along­
side some suggestions to adopt certain strategies. In 
1964 Baninah received the same type of aircraft as 
Tripoli. In practice, Baninah was the eastern gateway 
and Tripoli the western gateway to the country by air. 
Flights coming from western Europe to Libya generally 
served the two gateways but touched on Tripoli first. 
Night stops were at Benghazi (Baninah). Flights coming 
from the east stopped generally in Benghazi first. 
These trends were to combine the international traffic 
with the Libyan domestic traffic that filled the empty 
seats on cabotage sectors. All flights at the time the 
survey was made were of medium size. Comets,
Caravelles, Electra and Boeing 720's. The clear-cut
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solution to protecting the national airline was to 
restrict cabotage traffic to it. This would force air­
lines from western Europe to stop their flights at 
Tripoli, leaving their passengers in transit to Ben­
ghazi to the national carrier since they did not 
generally justify a flight to their final destination 
on their own by every individual foreign operator. The 
same would have applied to the eastern routes and in 
this way international airlines would function as 
feeders to the domestic system and vice versa. As for 
when traffic between any of the two gateways and points 
outside Libya began to justify the operation to two 
Libyan destinations, this was entirely a matter of ne­
g o t i a t i o n  with the r e spective Civil A v i a t i o n  
Authorities concerned, taking into account the inter­
ests of the national carrier into consideration. To 
restrict operations from Baninah would have proved im­
practical and politically unacceptable at a time when 
the government was planning to have the national air­
line headquarters in Benghazi and its main facilities 
at Baninah. Above all, differential development for 
Tripoli and Benghazi, where large jets would be con­
fined to Tripoli, would certainly prove extremely im­
practical for the national airline whose fleet would 
have had to develop in a distorted form.
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Ttoe Halcrow amd Partners Plan
The survey considered the plans submitted by Sir Wil­
liam Halcrow and Partners in September 1 963 and sub­
sequently in January 1964.^5 This study contained the 
engineering details for improving Sabhah's Airport to 
handle medium-sized jet aircraft. The survey by
f tDoxiades was critical of this proposed development
for it saw that Sabhah's traffic history did not jus­
tify such improvements. Halcrow and Partners proposed 
the construction of a 2,180 metre runway, an apron and 
an air terminal. Doxiadis' objections were based on 
the vision that Sabhah was 'a gravity centre' for the 
oasis around it and that a light aircraft operation was 
sufficient and thus a runway of 1,000m length was 
enough. The extension of the runway to Halcrow's 
recommendations ought to have been something to be con­
sidered in the future. While an increase in traffic 
did not appear to justify upgrading the category of 
Sabhah Airport, the direction of the government in 
building such an airport to a level beyond immediate 
requirements was for political reasons. Sabhah was to 
be seen to be as important a political centre as 
Tripoli and Benghazi, particularly after the federal
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system was abolished in 1 963 and Sabhah was no longer 
the capital of a vilayat but merely the administra­
tive centre of a mo ha fa da hi. Sabhah Airport, runways 
and terminal, were the first to be built in the country 
in the late 1 960's. It was the only airport the Libyan 
Government could have then developed anyway. The 
others were subject to treaties with Britain and the 
USA .
Restructuring the Civil Aviation Authority
The survey^ recommended no significant programmes for 
the desert land strips. Over-all, it gave the impres­
sion that the Department of Civil Aviation had its own 
programmes and plans with which it was going ahead. 
The recommendations as to what ought to happen in the 
short term and in the long term were at times critical 
of and at times encouraging the programmes already 
being implemented by the Department of Civil Aviation. 
The survey did not appear well informed on the struc­
ture of the government services when it proposed that a 
civil aviation authority should become an independent 
authority.^® The proposal is unclear in two ways: 
firstly, the Ministry of Communications of which the 
Department of Civil Aviation was part, took an over-all
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r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  t r a n s p o r t ,  p o s t  a n d  
telecommunications. Making the Department of Civil 
A v i a t i o n  i n d e p e n d e n t  f r o m  the M i n i s t r y  of 
Communications, would have meant that it had either 
to become a ministry on its own, or a public organisa­
tion which would belong to the Ministry of Communica­
tions anyway. Secondly, the proposal would have led 
one to think that the suggested Civil Aviation 
Authority would be independent in funding the airports' 
operations and development from its own resources0 The 
limited traffic at these airports and the immense funds 
required to develop them would have made such indepen­
dence impossible to achieve:
'With the forthcoming establishment of the Royal Libyan
Airlines, the Department of Civil Aviation would be
entrusted with yet another task: that of supervising
the operation of this airline, especially from the
safety and public interest point of view. It would
have to issue regulations regarding work on Libyan
aircraft, their manning, qualifications of pilots and
other flying and ground personnel etc.* It is
striking that the survey saw this to be of significance
in view of the fact that a civil aviation law had been
7 nin existence since 1956, fully providing for such
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duties, having gone through the legislative machinery 
of the state.
The national air carrier operation plan
The question of creating a new national airline 
received considerable enthusiasm in the survey. The 
excitement was so overwhelming that the consultants 
believed that: '...unless something was planned regard­
ing such services, it would be impossible to plan other
7 1parallel transport investment (roads, etc.)'. A na­
tional carrier was certainly desirable for Libya, but 
the non-existence of one does not imply that the serv­
ices could not be performed by other air carriers and 
while the aeroplane is particularly suitable for under­
developed regions, it is an over-statement to suggest 
that the existence of a national airline is a p r e ­
requisite for national transport planning.
Doxiadis, in Transport in Libya (1965) produced a plan 
for the operation of the airline systems in the 
country. Figure 3.4 shows four different systems, the 
first an international system operated by jet aircraft 
including the domestic link between Tripoli and 
Benghazi. This system adopted the two gateway
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principle: a domestic system centred on Sabhah, as was
already proposed earlier by the International Bank for
7 7Reconstruction and Development in 1960, where, the 
use of aircraft in the general aviation category was 
proposed. The third suggested a helicopter service 
system in the north east of the country where Benghazi 
is linked with most important points in the region of 
the Jabal El Akhdar and with the oil port of Marsa El 
Brega, another proposal which had been around ever 
since prospecting for oil operations came about. The 
final system was a single, uncertain operation between 
Benghazi and Kufrah which Doxiadis suggested would best 
have been operated by a Libyan Air Force DC3 aircraft.
The eventual development of the Libyan air transport 
system immediately after the national airline was 
formed was discussed in Chapter Two above. None of the 
proposals presented by the consultants were eventually 
implemented and for good reasons. The international 
network developed so that it linked Libya with London 
first, for Britain had a considerable influence in this 
country then. Paris was on the network because the 
technical crews were French and AIR FRANCE maintained 
the aircraft - Rome was the busiest route, but services 
to Athens, Cairo, Beirut, Tunis and Algiers came later.
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The Oases system never materialised until now, for 
these places are so structured that their populations 
still follow a traditional way of life and their rare 
travels until recently were made through the methods 
they knew best, the camel and more recently the four- 
wheel drive wagons. The helicopter link system never 
materialised for two reasons: firstly the distances in
the region are so short and secondly, there is no 
central concentration of businessmen whose travels jus­
tify what travel by helicopters means in cost ana 
organisation. The Kufrah system finally came about 
with the establishment of the Kufrah Agricultural 
Project by the Occidental Oil Company in 1 965 ~ but 
not as a public service. This was part of Occidental 
Oil Company Aviation service.
Over-all, it appears that the consultants spoke to 
various authorities in the country but not often enough 
with those directly concerned with air transport. The 
systems they proposed can only, therefore be a result 
of over-enthusiasm or second-hand information. It is 
to be noted that the Doxiadis Libyan transport study in 
1965 was commissioned by the Ministry of Planning - not 
the Ministry of Communications. Clearly there was a 
certain degree of failure to co-operate.
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The Fredrick Harris amid Martin & Voortoees Associates
Study
Two decades after the Doxiadis and Associates Study was 
complete another major transport study was made avail­
able by an international consultant. The study by 
Fredrick R. Harris and Martin & Voorhees Associates was 
presented in 1985, having been prepared over an 
unusually long period of time. This study's executive 
summary is considered here. It was towards the end of 
1976 when the Libyan Secretariat of Communications and
Marine Transport entrusted Fredrick Harris with this
7 7work. The study was divided into an Introduction and 
four sections which are entitled (1) The transportation 
planning process, (2) Analyses of the study, (3) Out­
come of the study, including the recommendations, (4) 
Phasing the recommendations. The study is written in
both Arabic and English. The English text is adopted
U 74 here.
The Introduction described the study to have specified 
four stages: Stage I: Short term national transporta­
tion plan; Stage II: National transportation research
centre; Stage III: National travel model; Stage IV:
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Long term national transportation plan up to the year 
20 00."^“’ The study claimed to have taken into c o n ­
sideration the Green Book as representing the socio­
political background to the planning p r o p o s a l s  
suggested. As a study of comprehensive planning, it 
had to: '...look into the future because most planning
decisions take considerable time to implement', but 
'...all development must start from today and must be 
based on a clear understanding of prevailing attitudes 
and aspirations1."^ Thus the study would produce some 
long term vision of transport development based on the 
ideology of the Green Book.
The objectives of the study were stated in a mixed form
of methodology and objectives so that the application
of the above would finally result in recommendations
7 fifor short and long term action.
Transport planning and ideology
Discussion of the ideology of the Green Book which 
formed the background to the study - the discussion 
with respect to transport only - will throw light on 
wh e t h e r  the study has in fact taken it into 
consideration. The Green Book contains the following:
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'Whoever possesses your needs controls or exploits 
y o u 1 and ' . , . [ t ] he material needs of man that are 
basic, necessary and persona 1 start with food, housing, 
clothing and t r a ns po r t . . . t he se must be within his 
private and sacred ownership. They are not to be hired 
from any quarter. To obtain them through rent or hire 
allows the real owners, even society in general, to in­
terfere in his private life, to have control over his 
basic needs, and then to dominate his freedom and to 
deprive him of his happiness', and '...[t ]he vehicle is 
a necessity both to the individual and family. Your 
vehicle should not be owned by others. In the 
Socialist Society no man or any other authority can 
possess private vehicles for the purpose of hiring them 
out, for this is domination of the needs of others.'
The Green Book's ideology for transport saw that the 
highest level of personal mobility ever possible is a 
basic need for every individual and family and is to be 
private, and thus it would be any planner's job based 
on this ideology to provide the society with the means 
to achieve this objective. Forecasting would be made 
simple as demographic data would indicate on the basis 
of a head count the number of vehicles the society
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ought to possess on a private basis, that is, a number 
of vehicles equal to that of the population.
O o
Adams0 noticed that ideology of all colours gives 
planners the job of helping societies to achieve a 
high level of mobility. 'In the society of the future 
one must continue to expect that a wish for a car, or 
some similar means of personal transport, will rank al­
most as high among the necessities of life as a decent 
home, even for the poorest families'. The Socialist
O q
Commentary was reported to s a y . 1 This statement may 
be p a r a l l e l e d  by W.W. R o s t o w ' s  v i s i o n  that: 
'historically ...the decisive element has been the 
cheap mass automobile with its quite revolutionary ef­
fects - social as well as economic - on the life and
o y
expectations of society'.^ Mobility as seen by the 
Green Book, however, represents such a social aspira­
tion in its strongest form. The vision of the 
socialist appears to coincide with that of the 
capi talist.
There is no indication of an ideology for air transport 
in the Green Book. This is advantageous in that it 
helps the assessment made by the study authors to stem 
from their own vision or that of people with whom they
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came into contact during the period of the study 
preparation and, by the same token, the critique 
p r e s e n t e d  in this thesis is not caused to be 
restricted by specific ideological limitations.
Planning methodology and forecasting
The planning process was based on a model outlined in 
the s t u d y , ^  which basically is the Delphi model, 
translated in simpler terms to aim at:
* Measurement of demand for and supply of 
movement.
* Analysis of such findings to detect inefficiency 
or insufficiency.
* Development of recommendations for an improved
Q /
transport system.04
The effectiveness of applying the suggested methodology 
would be identifiable from the analysis for the recom­
mendations finally made. The study stated that: 
'...the process is one that has been proven on similar 
studies worldwide1 and was modified to provide for:
O C
'...the particular conditions of the Jamahiriya1. 
The study takes a unified approach to the various
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modes, and emphasises that its recommendations must be 
applied collectively otherwise: '...a change in one-
group of recommendations inherently affects other 
recommendations'.
The model provided as a basis for planning appears to 
be straight-forward in its approach to short term plan­
ning as far as air transport is concerned. It goes in 
five clear phases: (1) Review and measure existing
conditions; (2) Determine existing transport problems; 
(3) Develop short term recommendations; (4) Review 
short term recommendations; (5) Incorporate short term 
plan in comprehensive phased transport recommendations. 
The longer term planning takes into consideration the 
various factors and variables which would influence the 
trends of demand and supply. The short term planning 
would prove more crucial in examining the effective­
ness of the methodology adopted by the authors of the 
study. If the short term plans were weak, the long 
term plans would prove more so. Should the short term 
recommendations prove their robustness, the long term 
ones would likely be more realistic.
The study put forward the terms 'base year' and 'design 
year'. The 'base year', as seen from the transport
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model®^ put forward in the study, is the year for which 
data is available and thus by forecasting change in the 
explanatory factors of 'base year' data it is possible 
to forecast movement demand for design years. The 
study named the year 1977 as base year and 1985, 1990,
1 995 and the year 2000 as each representing five year
O Q
planning periods. We thus have a base year and four
planning periods extending until the year 2004.
The study rejects the concept that future demand is a 
direct projection of past trends, and sees that 
reasonable forecasting is obtainable through feeding 
present data into the transportation model it proposed 
and testing the robustness of this application using
Q Q
sensitivity tests.oy It claims that forecasting, as 
suggested, diminishes the risk of being grossly in 
error, and justifies taking the recommendations 
presented therein, in demanding financial commitments 
from the government. There is more evidence that 
forecasts are inaccurate than that they are accurate 
and it does not improve the situation to propose a 
forecasting method that is neither new nor different 
for this method to prove effective and claim that once 
the: '...robustness of the transportation plan using
sensitivity tests', takes place magic prevails^ and,
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in the meantime, to recognise: '...that the future can­
not be certain,'91 in addition to other conditional 
clauses used to throw a cocoon of ambiguity around 
f orecast s.
Among the modelling processes presented for the respec-
Q n
tive modes of transport are: (1) Outline of the
domestic air passenger modelling processes; (2) Outline 
of the international air passenger modelling processes. 
Forecasting of aircraft movements ought to lead to 
definition of an airport's future capacity and func­
tion . In this case, it is used to predict the charac­
ter and structure of the national air carrier's fleet 
and networks. Both short term and long term planning 
are important in varying degrees and with varying 
consequences, for while tactical or operational deci­
sions stem from short term traffic forecasts covering
q o
the next 6-18 months or so, such short term decisions 
have long term consequences on the infrastructure 
through which an airline operates. Opening sales 
offices, buying aircraft, building maintenance shops, 
training, communications, installations etc., are long 
term commitments risked on short term forecasts ex­
tended beyond tactical decisions to become guidelines 
for long term planning. The investment commitments to
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aircraft purchases and building airports are usually 
heavy, but, while risks for long term investment in
aircraft are generally eased through the lease in or 
lease out processes, the investment in fixed assets at 
airports is a national risk. Thus the most important 
of all forecasts are short term. 'There is no absolute 
truth in forecasting, no optimum method that can 
guarantee accuracy., .yet forecasts have to be made 
since so many decisions flow from t h e m , 1^  and if: 
'...forecasts essentially involve an assumption that 
traffic growth will continue in the future very much as
Q c;
it has done in the past then there are a few points 
in the study which cause concern. First, it clearly
stated that it would not use past trends to forecast
for the future, and that it was logical in the author's 
mind that the study should use 1977 - a year falling 8 
years behind the beginning of the short term plan - as 
its base year. The evolution in data between 1977 and 
1 985 is in itself part of the past and the study ad­
mitted using this data to test the robustness of the 
methodology used. Robustness sevitity tests meant 
testing past trends. Secondly' the gap between the 
base year and the first design year is so great that 
while 1 977 saw the beginning of rapid growth in
revenues from oil which form the substance of Libya's
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economy, by 1985 (the time the study was complete) 
Libya had already begun to experience a period of 
severe decline in such revenues. Thirdly, between 
1 977 and 1 985 the bulk of Libya's transportation in­
frastructure has already been built and many areas had 
reached a saturation point. Fourthly, with so many 
changes in the economic features of Libya's society 
during the study period it is inconceivable that the 
data used as inputs in to the mo dels could have 
properly represented and truly expressed such change. 
Fifthly and finally, the models applied did not 'take 
full account' of the particular conditions of Libya as 
could be seen from the models^ applied to forecast 
airline operations where 'future aircraft character­
istics' were an input for a country facing a dilemma 
in finding access to aircraft suited to its airline's 
operations, (see Chapter 6 below).
Data inputs
The analysis of the study put forward the various in-
9 7dicators that were used as inputs in the models used. 
The recommendations ultimately would be influenced by 
such inputs. In the year 1985 the figure shown on page 
46 shows Libya's Gross Domestic Product to have
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totalled 11,252 million dinars in 1980 prices. There 
are no published figures for 1 985 GDP but the figures
Q O
shown in authoritative publications-5 show that the
trends in GDP are those of a continuous decline since 
the fall in oil prices commenced in 1981. The EIU
shows Libya's GDP to have changed between 1978 and 1982 
as in Table 3.3.
Oil exports which form at least 60 per cent of
Libya's GDP, changed as in Table 3.4. With the slide
in oil prices and diminished oil production, revenues 
from oil would probably be in 1986 less than half that 
in 1985.
With such gross discrepancies it must immediately be 
admittable that the input into the model process used 
would result in dangerous exaggerations in the forecast 
even in the short term since the projected GDP for 1985 
would prove to be more than double the actual figure, 
as such declines affect private as well as public 
spending capabilities drastically.
Models output - air transport
The various indicators served as input to the trans-
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TABLE 3.3
GDP (IN MILLION LIBYAN DINARS) 1978-1982
Year 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
GDP 5688 7769 10395 8698
(9350) 8850
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit: Regional Review
Middle East and North Africa. 1985. Economist 
Intelligence Unit: Quarterly Economic Review
Libya 1 - 1986. Economist Intelligence Unit: 
Country Report 2 - 1986
( ) = Subsequent estimate
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TABLE 3.4
REVENUE FROM OIL EXPORTS (IN MILLION LIBYAN 
________ DINARS) 1979 - 1985_____________
Year 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Revenue
frcm Oil 4762 6489 4611 4129 3281 3269 2896
Exports
Source: Econanist Intelligence Unit: Regional Review Middle East
and North Africa 1985. Economist Intelligence Unit: 
Quarterly Economic Review’ Libya 1 - 1986, Econcmist 
Intelligence Unit: Country Report 2 - 1986
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portation models. The output, in as far as air 
transport is concerned, is hereby considered. The 
table shown on page 53 is reproduced in Table 3.5.
Firstly, it is incredible that the study authors should 
claim that no data was available for 1977 on the 
average length of domestic trips, for the schedules of 
the airline have been published and available to the 
public since 1965 and distances for operated routes 
published in specialised international publications. 
Secondly, the total of passenger/kilometre is the out­
come of multiplying the number of passengers by the 
average length of journey and thus this figure would 
have been easily obtained. However, the airline did 
publish such statistical data, monthly and annually and 
it is available and readily computed. Thirdly, there 
was nothing in the table (see Table 3.5 below) to indi­
cate that the figures contained in it represented 
domestic traffic. It remains questionable whether the 
figures used are accurate even for the base year. A 
Boeing study produced in 1977 on behalf of the airline 
showed that the actuaal number of domestic passengers 
developed as in Table 3.6. In such a situation, total 
domestic traffic was under-estimated for the base year 
by almost 50 per cent of that quoted.
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TABLE 3.5
DOMESTIC PASSENGER MOVEMENT FORECAST 
1977 - 2000
Year 1977 1985 1990 1995 2000
No. of Passengers (inn) A  1.2 2.1 3.2 4.8
Average length.of
journey (mn) 437 423 419 419
Passenger-Km (in mn) 524.4 888.3 1340.8 204.2
Source: Based on data in Table (?) page 53 in LIBYAN
TRANSPORTATION PLANNING STUDY, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. 
FREDERICK HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES 1985
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TABLE 3.6
DEVELOPMENT IN DOMESTIC PASSENGER TRAFFIC^ 
1974 - 1977
Year 1974 1975 1976 1977
No. of Passengers 195208 32588S 446000 7023888
(596310)*
(400000)**
( )* BOEING ESTIMATE, 1977 ( )** Frederick Harris base
year dataI 1985
(1) These are calculated frcro incoming and outgoing passengers 
to and frcm Benghazi. Seme of these figures may be 
slightly inflated for these contained International traffic 
frcm Benghazi - the Boeing estimate is a better judgement.
Source: Department of Civil Aviation: Libya. Development in
Civil Aviation 1973-1983-1984? BOEING, Route and 
Economic Analysis for the use of.B-737 200-C for Libyan 
Arab Airlines 1977 (unpublished). LIBYAN TRANSPORT­
ATION PLANNING STUDY. Frederick Harris and Associates 
1985.
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Data published by the Department of Civil Aviation" 
indicate that the number of domestic passengers to and 
from Benghazi in 1982 totalled 941,242 while Sabhah 
handled 286,337 passengers in the same year. Total 
domestic traffic from these two airports {both domestic 
operations only) was 1,227,676. It is true that these 
figures contain some duplication of traffic over the 
sector Benghazi/Sabhah, but this could be offset 
against the unaccounted for flights to the rest of the 
network's destinations from Tripoli other than Sabhah 
and Benghazi. The study's forecasts for domestic pas­
senger traffic departed from a lower estimate than 
reality. In 1 985, the first year of the short term 
plan, it forecasted that domestic passenger traffic 
should reach 1.2 million. The airline's statistics 
show that the trends of decline already witnessed since 
1983, when only 1,193,000 passengers were transported 
on scheduled domestic flights this year, have continued 
so that only 1,054,000 passengers travelled on the
domestic network in 1985. The study could not see the 
inevitable even in the short term.
Painting rosy pictures for bleak reality
'Both domestic and international air passenger move­
242
ments are fore c a s t  to grow s u b s t a n t i a l l y  over 
time'.101 Such expectations are seen as consequential 
to demographic and economic activity increases. It is 
questionable that in 1 985 such statements could 
reasonably be put forward with the evidence prevailing 
since 1982 indicating a general decline in oil revenues 
and economic activity. It is inconceivable that plan­
ners in 1986 would accept that the sharp decline in oil 
revenues since 1982 was going to cause growth in wealth 
and thus in travel. The forecast saw a 900 per cent 
increase in domestic travel by the year 2000, based on 
1 9 77 traffic d a t a . 1"  The decline in oil revenues
forced the Libyan Government to cancel or suspend most
1 0  3projects and restrain expenditure on development 
such actions inevitably led to a decline in air 
traffic. With the departure of the foreign labour 
whose presence in the country had continued to 
decrease since 1982, domestic travel would eventually 
decline for that reason as well as the fact that the 
Libyans connected with the various projects that had 
been suspended or cancelled from the development plans 
would have no cause to travel elsewhere in 
substitution. As for travel for social reasons on the 
domestic network, it is of significance that the policy 
d e r i v e d  from the G r e e n  Book c o n c e r n i n g  owning
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dwellings, is leading to settlement on family lines 
which, coupled with the decline in economic exchange, 
leads to a smaller demand for long distance travel.
The projections for international traffic pointed to an 
increase of 200 per cent between the base year (1 977) 
and the end of the twentieth century.104 The study ad­
mits that the present international movement is 
dominated by foreign labour, but goes on to predict 
that the Libyan nationals will substitute the foreign­
ers in this movement as their numbers decline. Their 
departure has come as a result of the decline in oil 
revenues and of the dimunition in wealth. The decline 
in oil revenues is not going to bring a growth in the 
wealth of the individual Libyans, rather their purchas­
ing power will diminish firstly due to the general 
decline in the state's revenues but also because the 
ideology of the Green Book calls for a form of 
egalitarian status where: '...[t]he final solution is
the abolition of profit'1"  which would impede the 
accumulation of wealth and its growth. Thirdly, there 
is evidence that the travel by Libyans outside Libya is 
becoming more restrictive for local reasons and due to 
restriction on travel by Libyans to countries which 
form their customary destinations. These arguments
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disprove the suggestion that Libyan nationals would 
substitute for the travel previously undertaken by non­
nationals, let alone that these nationals would con­
tribute to an increase in traffic.
Forecastimg Air Freight traffic
Air freight will increase 45 times between 1977 and the
'l Pi Ayear 2000, the study says. UD This growth, however,
remains of specific importance for the introduction of
wide-body aircraft on the domestic network, since only
they could make enough capacity available. Specific
commodities, however, may need some specialised cargo
10  7services - it went on to say. w' The study gives no 
proposals to the alternatives available in the light of 
the impasse being experienced in the acquisition of 
wide-body aircraft, nor does it give specific proposals 
as to what cargo services would be required. The study 
considers the fleet plan of the national airline until 
the year 2000.
Fleet Proposals
1 OftThree sizes of aircraft were proposed. wo A 255 seat 
aircraft, another with 1 53 and lastly a 48 seat
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aeroplane. 'It is worth noting that the mention of 
seats on aircraft is indicative of the size and not re­
lated to any type of aircraft in particular', the study
says.^ ^  To make an analysis of these statements a 
1 1 0reproduction of the table showing these recommenda­
tions is useful, (see Table 3.7).
It is remarkable that the study chose nominal seat 
sizes as if aircraft suitability for routes were only 
a matter of size. Aircraft are constructed to suit 
specific route requirements, the decision as to which 
aircraft is right for the route is reached on the basis 
of economic and operational criteria. The study claims 
that its recommendations are not based on the proposed 
fleet of Airbuses the airline has been trying to get 
(LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES managed to purchase two Airbuses 
- A310's in July 1 986. Until July 1 987 , the time of 
writing, the airline had so far failed to operate them 
to any reasonable degree of their potential and as yet 
they are not included in the airline's scheduled public 
services) and its current fleet of Boeing 727's and 
F27's, with seating capacities similar to those in the 
table except for the F27 which accommodates up to 44 
passengers. The Study foresees an increase in 255 seat 
size (Airbus) aircraft to reach twelve by the year
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TABLE 3.7
FORECAST OF MOVING UNITS (AIRCRAFT) FOR MAIN 
DOMESTIC SCHEDULED SERVICES 1985 - 2000
Design Year 1985 1990 1995 2000
255 nominal seat size 2 3 6 12
153 nominal seat size 4 4 3 1
48 nominal seat size 5 9 7 8
Total 11 16 16 21
Source: LIBYAN TRANSPORTATION PLANNING STUDY:
FREDERICK HARRIS p71 1985
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2000, a phasing out of the 153 seat (B727) beyond the 
end of this century and an up down (5, 9, 7, 8) fleet
composition trends in the smaller size aircraft in 
various design years as indicated in Table 3.7.
By the year 2000 - taking the study's case as presented 
the domestic operations need 21 aircraft. The 
average utilisation for these aircraft is usually as 
follows: AB 3,000 hours, B727 3,000 hours, F27 2,100
hours annually. With such a fleet and with domestic 
trips averaging one hour each, it is possible to make 
the following calculations to establish the total 
capacity offered by such a fleet.
Air bus annual seat capacity available =
3.000 hours x 1 hour per trip x 12 aircraft x 255 seats 
= 9,180,000 sector/seats annually
B727 annual seat capacity available =
3.000 hours x 1 hour per trip x 1 aircraft x 153 seats 
= 459,000 sector/seats annually
F27 anneal seat capacity available =
2,100 hours x 1 hour per trip x 8 aircraft x 44 seats 
= 739,200 sector/seats annually
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Total fleet seating capacity annually - 10,378,200
sector/seats. (A more conventional way would be to
calculate seat/mile capacity - that is possible by
multiplying these outcomes by an average distance. In
this case this is kept constant and does not affect the
use of the result for purposes of comparison). If we
take the study forecast that traffic on domestic routes
111by the year 2000 will be 4.8 million passengers then
a load factor of 46 per cent would be achievable while
the study claims that its calculations were based on a
1 1 270 per cent load factor.  ^ That is to say that the 
results reached by the study are defeated by the very 
proposals it presents, unless much lower levels of an­
nual aircraft utilisation went into the calculations.
The study suggests a phasing out of the 153 seater 
aircraft, extending until beyond the year 2000. The 
assumption that 153 aircraft planned to participate in 
the performance of the domestic services refers to the 
B727's currently in the airline's possession, an as­
sumption later confirmed in recommendations from the 
same study when it recommended phasing out the
B727's by the end of the century. The working life of 
jet commercial aircraft is usually calculated to be be­
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tween 12 and 17 years, depending on how the airline 
concerned wishes to distribute the investment in its 
accounts books and also on the strategy of the airline 
in the purchase of aircraft and extent of their 
utilisation. Because the LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES main­
tenance record is run in cooperation with an interna­
tionally renowned carrier like AIR FRANCE, an average 
of fifteen years life time is an acceptable target. 
LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES' B727 aircraft ought thus to be 
phased out according to the schedule contained in 
Table 3.8.
All Boeing 727's ought to be phased out by 1993, unless 
they are retro-fitted in a way that leads to the 
prolongation of their lives and acceptability in inter­
national airspace which may restrict their operation
w i t h  c u r r e n t  e n g i n e s  f r o m  e n v i r o n m e n t a l  
114considerations. It becomes costly to operate ageing
aircraft where, because of the effects of take offs and 
landings on the structures, the maximum landing and 
take off weights of the aircraft must be restricted on 
the one hand and older aircraft suffer from the high 
cost and lack of spare parts generally. As for the 
smaller category of aircraft it is not clear why the 
number of aircraft operating in design year 1995 should
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TABLE 3,8
IDEAL LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES BOEING 727’s 
HiASE OUT SCHEDULE
No. of Aircraft Year Entering into Service Year of Phase Out
1 1971 1986
3 1975 1990
2 1976 1991
2 1977 1992
2 1978 1993
Based on phase out after fifteen years of entering into the airline's 
service. All these aircraft were never operated by other carriers 
before entering into Libyan Arab Airlines service.
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decline from nine to seven and rise again to eight by 
design year 2000 for it is understood that the large 
capacity aircraft would take over routes from the 
middle capacity aircraft when the earlier increases 
in number and the latter is phased out. For the smal­
ler size aircraft, it is inconce ivable that the 
presence of the largest size aircraft would substitute 
for these as they are meant to operate to remote areas 
or as commuter services where no facilities exist to 
handle wide-body or jet aircraft.
Development PBnases and Criteria:
The study presented a base year (1977) and four design 
years, 1985, 1990, 19 95 and 2000. Outcome of the 
study, however, presents a different identification of 
period divisions. 'For convenience [sic] the recommen­
dations have been disaggregated in this part of the 
report into four periods: 1985, 1986-1990, 1991-1995,
lit
1996-2000.' This was possibly done in order to align 
these periods into future five year development plans.
'The 1985 period should see the start of a shift in em­
phasis from the rapid expansion of infrastructure to a 
consolidation of efficient operations and the economic
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maintenance of assets' This statement, however,
does not appear to have been fed into any of the models 
used to devise the plans despite its vital importance. 
Throughout, the study emphasised an exponential growth 
in traffic. Such a significant statement makes null 
and void all the proposals that were presented and in­
vites a different approach to the problems the air 
transport systems and infrastructure currently face.
Specialisation
One of the fundamental characteristics of air transport 
is specialisation. The high technology it involves and 
the complex structure of the industry make specialisa­
tion a prerequisite to its successful operation and 
development. At the time the study was presented, 
there were several airline and aircraft-owning or­
ganisations carrying out various aviation services in 
Libya. The World Airlines Fleets Directory for 1985 
lists three a i r l i n e s : J A M A H I R I Y A  AIR TRANSPORT 
formed in 1 982, and owned 26 aircraft for cargo 
operations. LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES, the national 
carrier, established in 1 964 and operates forty 
aircraft and thirdly an airline which never operated, 
but which was formed in 1982 named AIR TIBESTI, which
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as the name indicates, was probably intended to serve 
the southern regions of the country. To these the 
aero-club must be added for it carries out some air am­
bulance and air taxi services. This situation 
recently changed. JAMAHIRIYA AIR TRANSPORT has been 
liquidated and its fleet disposed of. This occurred 
because the airline had little business in spite the 
size of its fleet. Utilisation of aircraft was under 
an hour a day per aircraft whereas normally the 
figure ought to have been between 7 and 12 hours. 
Most of its staff and equipment were transferred to the 
national carrier. The study describes the arrangement 
before the liquidation of JAMAHIRIYA AIR TRANSPORT as 
having been successful and this success as providing 
proof of the effectiveness of such an arrangement. It 
took very little for this success to prove unsustained, 
as one of the main components of this air transport 
system was dismantled.
The study favoured specialisation, suggesting that for 
every type of operation there should be a different or­
ganisation to: '...[enable] each of the specialist
functions to be handled independently by the ap­
propriate professionals' and to: '...[ensure] that the
interest of other services using the airports and air
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traffic control systems are treated equally with 
LAA’.1^  To further the benefits of such ambiguous 
statements the study proposes that the domestic opera­
tion of the national carrier be assigned to a separate 
organi sa tion.
Applying the principle of specialisation to a broader 
base it will be found that other divisions are 
possible, the aero-club's current services could be 
divided into three specialist areas: a e r o - c l u b
activities, air ambulance services and air taxis. Such 
divisions do not serve in an optimum manner a society 
like that of Libya where human and financial resources 
are scarce and their utilisation ought to be maximised. 
Specialisation ought to follow different lines. It 
ought to identify such specialisations where no 
duplication or conflict of interest occurs, for the in­
dustry currently faces taunting challenges and unless 
it is properly handled, it will end up in complete 
disarray. Multi-organisational solutions, such as 
those proposed by the Study, reflect a considerable 
degree of inexperience in aviation management and 
planning. By dividing the operations of the national 
carrier between two o r g a n isations, a d d i t i o n a l  
managerial posts would be open. There would also be a
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need for more staff. The collective fleets of the two 
organisations would have to be larger to provide for 
duplicated standby aircraft time to back up both opera­
tions separately. If duplication of maintenance units 
could be avoided, at least duplication of accounting 
and administrative work for the maintenance unit must 
belong to one airline or the other - unless the prin­
ciple adopted by the study would lead to have even this 
field of activity being run by yet another separate 
organisation. The separation as proposed would create 
additional work stemming from separate dealings with 
other airlines and international organisations, and the 
list is long, most importantly, however, is the fact 
that such separation would prove uneconomical. It is 
ambiguous, however, to emphasise the demands of 
separating the domestic operations from the interna­
tional ones to the extent that a separate organisation 
is recommended and, paradoxically, to call at the same
1 1 q
time for common engineering and headquarter services 
between the separated operations. This misconception 
that the effectiveness and reliability of the domestic 
operations would be guaranteed through their dis- 
association from international operations and thus
the domestic services would not be: '...compromised by
operational problems outside the jurisdiction of the
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Jamahiriya'120, implies that there are too many snags 
creating some unspecified situations which, had they 
happened within the Jamahiriya's jurisdiction, would 
have been resolved and problems for domestic operations 
would not have occurred, and that no snags are likely 
to happen in operations on the domestic network from 
judicial or sovereign considerations. This statement 
also doubts, by its own argument, that snags on domes­
tic operations - under the jurisdiction of the 
Jamahiriya - can cause problems to the international 
operations. State jurisdiction and technical snags 
cannot be associated. Above all, the proposals 
neglect the economics of airline operations, and does 
not grasp the idea of effective airline management.
Scheduling Criteria
'[T]he traveller should be able to obtain a seat on the
flight of his choice, should be able to travel on the
day of his choice, and should be able to make a return
journey the same day allowing time for business or so-
121cial activities at the destination'. The require­
ments suggested for achieving such criteria are: (1) a
70 per cent design load factor, (2) two daily flights 
in each direction as a minimum and (3) the already dis­
257
c u s s e d  d o m e s t i c  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  o p e r a t i o n s  
separation.^^2 The quotation setting the objectives 
put the whole domestic market on a very demanding 
basis, with the distinctive requirements of seats 
available on demand and a high frequency of service. 
Yet it chooses a design load factor as high as 70 per 
cent. The levels of load factors are generally set to 
determine the economics of a specific route. Some 
routes are economic only at high load factors and these 
are usually characteristic of low fare services where 
the break even point is high. Some routes have their 
break even point significantly low, so that the load 
factors sought need not be high, as is the case with 
LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES Tripoli-London route (suspended 
since October 1986). The problem with Libyan domestic 
operations is that the break even point is so high 
that these services had to constantly be subsidised 
directly by the government or through surpluses from 
the international operations. The policies adopted 
generally by airlines are that when a low load factor 
is forecasted it is usually either that a route is 
being allowed to build up and thus the break even point 
need be achieved only after such an objective is 
achieved, or when the category of passengers are the 
demanding type who would pay more to be assured a seat
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and a schedule to suit their needs. Higher load fac­
tors are characteristic of a situation of high demand 
and low supply where either the low fares justify 
diminished chances of travelling in privileged condi­
tions or where a situation of monopoly prevails. It is 
certainly contradictory that high load factors are 
sought through privileged passenger conditions.
Air routes grow with time and become modified to 
reflect the response of airlines to the economic and 
social changes that occur at the destinations they 
serve. Thus, for example, had the domestic network in 
Libya developed, services to any destination normally 
start with a low frequency, with the increase in demand 
these are increased until such a time that it is 
widely- used and the frequencies increase beyond a 
single daily service in each direction. The study sug­
gests two daily services in each direction for a 
scheduled air service to be justifiable. A glance at 
LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES' domestic network in 1983-84 shows 
that, had this criterion been applied, the links be­
tween Tripoli and Benghazi on the one hand and Tripoli 
and Sabhah on the other would have been the only 
qualifiers. (Figure 3.5).
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The logic behind a 14/7 frequency (fourteen services 
each seven days) in each direction, if applied, would 
create a tremendous waste where, while in 1984 the to­
tal domestic weekly frequencies totalled 236, the up­
dating of less than 14/7 frequencies would need an ad­
ditional 190 services or an increase of 83 per cent.
One of the advantages of travelling by air is that it 
can shorten travel time. The study proposed: '...a
third level feeder service' to connect Tripoli with 
Beni Walid, Misratah, Mizdah and Zuara. Such a 
proposal lacks a firm foundation and falls short of un­
derstanding that the air trip is only part of a total 
trip where, initially, flying by air becomes advan­
tageous only when the total trip time is significantly 
shortened. The first problem with operating services 
as suggested is that they are so short that by the time 
the passenger reaches the airport, goes through 
security checks, hands in any baggage, waits for the 
aircraft to depart then fly to its destination, waits 
for his baggage to be unloaded, goes through security 
checks once more, travels between the airport and home 
if taxi services are available at his destination or if 
acquaintances have taken the trouble to drive to the 
airport to pick up the passenger. Going through all
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this, the individual who decided to travel the dis­
tance by road would have certainly arrived at his 
destination in a shorter time and with less trouble. 
The other side of the weakness in such a proposal is 
that it implies staffing additional airports and equip­
ping them as well as maintaining the runways ana 
facilities, no matter how small. The third point re­
lates to the fact that if such services are applied to 
serve demographic concentrations near Tripoli, those 
near Benghazi and Sabhah would be treated the same with 
results that would imply the unnecessary allocation 
of substantial sums of money as well as scarce 
qualified human resources. This proposal lacks a clear 
criterion, for experience has shown that air services 
between Tripoli and Misratah, Benghazi and Al Bayaah 
and Benghazi and Marsa El Brega operated almost empty 
for the short distance involved allows for no advantage 
for travelling by air compounded by the lack of public 
urban ground transport services outside the larger ur­
ban agglomerations. The previous experiments with des­
tinations within 250 kilometres of Tripoli or Benghazi 
have proved that air services become attractive and vi­
able only beyond such distances. The commuter destina­
tions p roposed are generally shorter than 200 
kilometres and stand no chance of success. Travel by
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air is expensive and costly unless distance friction 
grows to such an extent that it off-sets private 
mobility advantages and the flexibility of other modes. 
In a country like Britain, where the various modes of 
transport are far more efficient than in a Third World 
country like Libya, transport by air for business be­
comes competitive with the rail links within a radius
of 3 2 0 - 6 2 0  k i l o m e t r e s . " * ^
A study prepared by Air Bus Industries in 1983 and con­
taining actual data from LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES (Table 
3.9) demonstrates that over distances beyond 200 
kilometres by air, where travelling by road is a hard 
task, substantial traffic is generated from a destina­
tion as remote, albeit strategic, as Ghat and that 
where the road network is good and services at destina­
tions are lacking, a destination as far as Surt from 
Tripoli and Benghazi does not attract air traffic.
Air transport standard terms
It is difficult to deal with a subject when definitions 
are unclear. The study under consideration is liberal 
in using terms that not only mean other things in the 
airline business, but also create confusion within its
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TABLE 3.9
THE EFFECT OF DISTANCE ON. AIR PASSENGER 
_________ MOVEMENT (1982)_____________
Total Passengers Carried
Sector Distance (1982)
TRIPOLI-SURT 203 n.m. 60
SABHAH-GHAT 262 n.m. 11860
SABHAH-HUN 140 n.m. 872
BENGHAZI -TUBRUQ 186 n.m. 3078
BENGHAZI-SURT 182 n.m. 527
Source: Airbus-Industrie: Revised Fleet. Plan: 1983-1990 -
LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES.. 1983 
(Unpublished document)
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own text. The development plan for the domestic opera­
tions fleet was presented through Table 3.7 above. The 
study sees the benefits of replacing the 44 (or 48 as 
the study quoted it) seat category by selecting 70- 
100 seat aircraft, in addition to smaller aircraft 
capable of operating in a mixed passenger/freight 
'combi' r o l e . T h e  suggestion presented disqualifies 
the recommendations already presented by the study on 
domestic operations fleet planning, and creates an air 
of uncertainty as to whether the authors of the study 
are familiar with the developments in the aerospace in­
dustry where aircraft categories are not so loosely 
identified. The most important categories appearing 
now and likely still to be used in the 1990's are: 50
seaters such as the ART and the Fokker F50; 100
seaters such as the F100 and the British Aerospace 
HS146; 150 seaters such as the Airbus A320, the Boeing 
737.300 or Macdonell Douglas MD 80; and 200 seaters 
including the Boeing 757. It is unclear where the 70- 
100 seat category came from, unless the study means the 
F28's, which the airline has amongst its current fleet 
and which the study did not include in its analysis. 
The F28, however, is an aircraft that is already out of 
production. The second difficulty stems from the use
4 or
of the term 'third level operations' where there is
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no definition of a first and a second level. (Also see 
note 123 below). Thirdly, the proposal to get rid of 
the 44 seater F27 to be replaced by aircraft roughly 
double its capacity would only create confusion when 
put forward without clear explanations.
Proposals for Tried, Unsuccessful Schemes
The study proved itself to be out of date as far as the
trends in city terminals are concerned. These were
trends in the 1950's and 1960's, but their imprac-
ticality has caused airlines to shut them down and move
their operations wholly within the airport. For a
country like Libya, city air terminals are absolutely
unnecessary and wasteful for they involve building an
edifice that would be elaborately designed to handle
operations that would eventually never exist. The
12 7study proposes such a building.
Airport Definition
'Demand for international movement from various parts 
of the country was studied in relation to the interna-
1 9 Ational airports of Tripoli, Benghazi, Sabhah' lzo, the 
study goes on to say. Since 1980, the only interna­
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tional airport in Libya has been Tripoli Airport. Ben­
ghazi and Sabhah are not international airports for all 
exit and entry to the country takes places from the 
single air gateway: Tripoli.
Future of International Operations and Organisational 
structures:
The study made assessments for international operations 
fleet requirements. It used the same criteria and the 
same arguments presented for the domestic operations 
proposals generally. The activities of air transport 
in Libya are in need of experienced advice. They 
should be told that the reorganisation of the structure 
of this industry should mean that the scarce technical 
human and financial resources be used wisely and 
effectively. If at all, there is need for something 
that allows concentration of manpower in specialised 
organisations where all commercial airline operations, 
passenger and cargo, domestic and international are in 
the hands of a single national carrier. All general 
aviation activities, like helicopter, air ambulance and 
commuter services should be performed with light 
aircraft and be the responsibility of a general avia­
tion company. The aero-club should be confined to con­
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ventional aero-club activities. Only through this type 
of specialisation would there be maximisation of the 
utilisation of the available resources. The smallness 
of Libya's air services leaves little to argue about 
technical specialisation within these organisations.
Conclusion
There is no doubt that planning requires some vision of 
the future so that the proper investments are made at 
the right time at set priorities so as to expect the 
right returns from such investment with minimum risk. 
The objectives of forecasts are to give the planners 
some view as to how change is to be anticipated, cer­
tain factors and scenarios are taken into 
consideration. Forecasters apply which ever method in 
their conviction is right and leads to better 
forecasting. Because forecasting cannot anticipate 
events of all kinds that can take totally unexpected 
courses, it is to be expected that their predictions 
usually prove erroneous, particularly in the long term.
The studies considered in this chapter are about 
forecasting transport trends in Libya. Doxiadis and 
Associates' survey had the task of proposing improve-
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merits to an infrastructure which was already too weak 
to handle the then prevailing requirements of the 
various modes of transport. The pressure on the system 
stemmed from a rapidly growing demand as the prospect­
ing for and the production of oil transformed the 
economy. As for air transport, it started by giving an 
historical background that led to throwing light on the 
history of commercial airline operations in Libya since 
the Italian occupation and explained the origins of the 
various airfields revived by the oil companies after 
they were abandoned when their purpose, as military 
airstrips, diminished with the end of World War II. 
The survey attempted to explain the existence of 
central points in hierarchical systems in an organisa­
tion where Tripoli, Benghazi and Sabhah appeared the 
most important, through an analysis assumed to be based 
on a geographical model.
The Doxiadis survey was originally commissioned to in­
clude airports and aerodromes. During the progress of 
the survey, the legislation to form a national airline
i 9 q
was issued, ^  and the survey struggled to put forward 
proposals on how an airline ought to function. It took 
strongly the view that the existence of the study of a 
national airline as part of the survey was a prerequi­
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site to making recommendations towards the development 
of airports. Such a view was not totally realistic, 
for airports do develop in a colour blind fashion and 
the various facilities relate to the needs of the par­
ticular airlines and aircraft operating into these 
airports. Then that a national airline was to start 
operations, it should have represented an additional 
input to the other inputs that go into airport develop­
ment plans, indeed an important one. That the Depart­
ment of Civil Aviation was already involved in improve­
ments in advance of the recommendations of the survey, 
put the proposed recommendations in the position of 
trying to catch up with reality instead of proposing 
for the future.
The survey was carried out in an adequate period of 
time, one year, and was made on behalf of the Ministry 
of Planning and Development. The Ministry of
C o m m u n i c a t i o n s ,  under whose r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  air 
transport falls, had entrusted its immediate plans to 
other consultants. The hanging on recommendations al­
ready under execution and the absence of substantial 
long term plans on air transport and the irrelevance of 
the immediate recommendations to what actually soon 
occurred, can be interpreted as a consequence of the
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lack of coordination between the Ministry of Planning 
who commissioned the work and the Ministry of C o m ­
munications with whose domain it was principally 
concerned. The survey put forward some practical im­
mediate and short term proposals in a parasitic 
fashion. The recommendations it put forward in 
respect of air transport, lacked originality. With 
the country being aware of what her new objectives 
were and already embarking on implementing short term 
programmes, the most important thing to embark upon 
should have been the forecasting of the medium and long 
term future, not neglecting it.
A full decade is a time that incorporates a period 
covering short term and long term planning periods. 
Libya's development is customarily phased in five year 
development plans. Two development plans were consumed 
before Fredrick Harris and Martin & Voorhees Associates 
could present both a short term plan and a long term 
one. This demonstrated that their study came out with 
recommendations irrelevant to the eventual and im­
mediate needs in air transport in the country under 
consideration. The data used for projections of the 
first design year (1 985) was that of 1 977 , the base 
year. Because the base year was the year when revenues
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from oil started to soar and the design year was the 
year when the fortunes from oil diminished drastically, 
the results of such applications painted a rosy picture 
of the economy and its consequences on air transport so 
that the recommendations, immediate and long term, ap­
peared suitable only for some confused fiction.
Two important statements were made in the study and 
ought to have guided it. The first is that it aimed at 
achieving the objectives, inspired by the ideology of 
the Green Book. The second is that, ultimately, the 
i m m e d i a t e  r e q u i r e m e n t  was the c o n s o l i d a t i o n  of 
operational, economic and administrative efficiency in 
the current organisations. These two statements were 
totally neglected throughout the study and appear 
neither to have been fed into the models used nor taken 
into consideration when the results and recommendations 
were put forward. Had the study taken these two points 
into adequate consideration, it would have come to to­
tally different conclusions and recommendations which 
might have proved much more relevant to reality ana 
direct needs.
Overall, or at least for the section related to air 
transport, the Fredrick Harris Study is a confused and
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confusing document. It particularly lacks an expert 
understanding of air transport and demonstrates that 
the eight years it took to prepare were marked by no 
particular dedication, nor continuity. It is evident 
that the text has been modified several times to 
satisfy different needs at different times, and under 
different circumstances, something done in many places 
causing considerable conflict and contradictions in 
ideas.
The practice of forecasting is a two-tier job. The
basic work is that carried out by the specific or­
ganisation where forecasting serves the tactical short 
term, and strategic long term objectives of the
specific organisation. The higher tier is the Delphi 
principle which tries to work through finding a consen­
sus among the v a rious specific f o r e c a s t s  and 
objectives. Central organisations use this higher tier 
technique and return the over-all forecast achieved in 
order that the specific organisations modify their
plans to meet the larger scope objectives. As for the 
Libyan case, the specific organisations ought to under­
stand the importance of working through data analysis 
and to give it the appropriate level of support and 
prominence within these specific organisations, coor­
273
dination between the various planning bodies within and 
between the specific organisations and with the 
central organisations such as the Ministry of Planning 
and that of Communications and indeed the others. The 
use of consultants in devising planning programmes when 
the job is outside the immediate capability of the or­
ganisation is only fruitful when such consultants 
deeply understand the factors that influence the 
process of planning. The prerequisite of understand­
ing should not only be based on qualifications and pre­
vious experience elsewhere, but also on evidence of un­
derstanding the internal and local factors. In return, 
such consultants must receive full cooperation from all 
concerned. Both the knowledgeable cooperating planner 
and the fu11y -qualified consultant prove, in the 
studies handled in this Chapter, to have been lacking.
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CHAPTER 4: STRUCTURE AND ORG ANI SAT ION OF THE El BY AN AND 
NORTE AFRICAN AIR NETWORKS
I n ttrodoct i on
Tnis chapter will consider Lib\ ar. Arab Airlines network 
in comparison v;ith those operated by the national air 
carriers of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. The purpose 
of this comparison is to look at similarities and dif­
ferences and search for the underlying factors behind 
parallelity or diversity. Pointing to the political 
factor in the networks will be of particular priority.
To achieve this objective consideration will be given 
to the networks of the four airlines based on cata 
available for 1 936 in the main. This data comes from 
two sources. The first is that published in official 
digests of statistics available from specialised or­
ganisations in which the countries or airlines under 
consideration are members. These sets of data are 
frequently incomplete for the system is available for 
performance of Civil Aviation and Air Transport at a 
level of comprehensiveness chosen by the specific 
country or airline. At times airlines or governments 
choose not to provide any data and in many instances
data is not published for a long period of time. A 
search into available data on the four North African 
countries' airlines in ICAU statistical publications 
shows that data on Libya and Algeria were particularly 
scarce but reasonably available for Morocco and 
Tunisia. Data available in 1ATA publications for lids 
have shown: published information for the four
airlines. The other source of information is that puo- 
lishea by airlines, being it data about performance ci 
data provided to the public worldwide in the form c: 
public timetables in which they show their intended 
operations and networks.
Both these types of data are useful for the study of 
these airlines. The suitability of the performance 
data provided by airlines for research purposes depends 
on their range and the period they cover and how1 these 
match the interest of the researcher. Data provided to 
the puolic through time-tables and tariffs showing the 
airlines operational intentions are useful in two ways. 
First, they are readily available and are obtainable 
even for the current period, and secondly they are com­
prehensive as far as planned capacity is concerned. 
The advantages in data provided in public time-tables 
and tariffs do not on their own provide a comprehensive
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picture about an airline's operation for, they may 
change without notice and they treat the side of opera­
tion that is concerned with planned capacities; that 
is the aspect of planned supply.
Comparing airlines is generally complex and the com­
plexity stems from the fact that the aviation industry 
is a complex one and each individual airline has its 
own internal characteristics which make comparisons 
even more difficult. Doganis (1986) indicated that 
British Airways, for example, carried out a detailed 
comparison in 1982 covering 19 airlines provided 40 in­
dicators on personnel productivity alone. After intro­
ducing eleven measures on performance he concluded that 
performance measures are useful individually so that as 
Doganis said, "it would be totally misleading to com­
bine the [....] indicators so as to produce a ranking 
of airlines according to their overall efficiency".^
In this chapter, to reasonably fulfill the purpose of 
comparison, we shall use data from all sources avail­
able to make the comparisons on the four airlines cover 
several aspects of their operations. This chapter will 
look at three main themes. The first will make a 
general comparison on performance for which data from
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IATA and ICAO will be used. Secondly, an assessment of 
the international networks, so as to trace principally 
the political factor, will use intended capacity data 
as made available to the public. We prefer this source 
of data to trace this particular aspect because politi­
cal intentions are expressed in airline terms in the 
announcement of operating an air link, rather than en­
suring the p r o f i t a b i l i t y  or soundness of the 
performance. In fact, most political routes are non 
profitable. Thirdly, an assessment using networks 
structures and organisation as a measure of analysis. 
Geographical models used here will look at the struc­
tures and organisation of the networks at times and at 
others it will consider the flows as an approach to 
looking at the domestic networks which is the third 
theme in this chapter.
Libya as part of the Maghreb Region
It may immediately be noticed that Libya’s geographical 
location and particularly its Islamic and Arab history 
and colonial experience, {Italy rather than France, 
which colonised the area west of it, was its 
metropolitan power), have caused some disagreement as 
to whether: i) because it falls beyond the limits of
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the Arab Mashreq, Libya qualifies as a part of the Arab 
Maghreb; ii) the lack of a French connection qualifies 
it to be part of the Middle East rather than French 
North Africa; iii) it is part of neither one nor the 
other, but a buffer zone between the Mashreq and the 
Maghreb. F i s h e r ^  described Libya in his definition of 
the Middle East as representing its western flank. A 
US Government study^ states that only the west of the 
country experienced common history and culture with the 
Maghreb, leaving the east of the country unidentified. 
In a recent book on North Africa,^ Lawless and Findlay 
(1984) identified Libya as being part of North West 
Africa, but the theme of the book recognised Libya as 
part of the Maghreb. As if to solve, or complicate 
urther, Libya's regional identification problem at 
least for the time being, Egypt's entrance into the 
Camp David accord cut Libya from immediate links with 
the Mashreq's extreme west. The event emphasised 
Libya's desire to be identified with the Maghreb as 
witnessed in its efforts to revive political unity with 
Tunisia (which it achieved in 1 9 74 ), and in the 
repeated declarations of intent to achieve unity with 
Algeria. These efforts culminated in the Chijda Accord 
of 1984 declaring Libya and Morocco (in Arabic Al 
Maghreb) as members of a political federation. (This
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federation was dismantled by Morocco in 1986 following 
the visit by the Israeli Prime Minister to Morocco and 
outspoken Libyan criticism of the visit). These at­
tempts of un ity wi th all the Maghreb states, despite 
the failures, emphasised by the breaking of links with 
Egypt, including the closure of the borders and the in­
terruption of air links, does not end the argument 
about L i b y a ’s regional identification; it might, 
however, represent an opportunity for those who still 
divide the Arab World into Mashreq and Maghreb to iden­
tify Libya with the latter at least as far as contem­
porary issues are concerned.
Throughout independence, the trends in Libyan desire to 
be part of the Maghreb have been a persistent element 
in her relations with the rest of the North African 
countries ever since these countries gained their 
independence. Soon after Tunisia became independent, a 
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed in 1957 
with the newly independent North African State. Libya 
also became gradually involved in the process of the 
'Unification of Arab Maghreb1 which was initiated in 
the 1958 Conference for the Unification of the Maghreb 
States at Tangier.^ Libya's participation in this 
process culminated in the establishment of the Per­
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manent Consultative Committee for the Maghreb States 
which was formed in 1967 with headquarters in Tripoli.7 
The 1969 revolution in Libya interrupted this process 
to restart it all over again, albeit from a different 
standpoint and political circumstances.
Air Maghreb
Soon after the formation of the 'Consultative Committee 
for the Maghreb States' was formed a study was carried 
out for 1Le Comite Maghrebin du Transport Aerien' en­
titled "Etude Air Maghreb; Evaluation de la Rentabilite 
Economique d 'une exploitation commune par les quatre 
pays du Maghreb d ' un Reseau Arien Long-Courrier".8 
This study looked at the economies then prevailing in 
the four Maghreb States and proposed an operation of 
long route air services which was composed of five 
specific regular service routes, namely;
Tunis-Casablanca-New York (5 weekly service s )
Tripoli-Algiers-New York (2 weekly services)
Algiers-Casablanca-Dakar-Abidj an ( 2 weekly services)
Algiers-Moscow (1 weekly servi ce)
Algiers-Tunis-Moscow (1 weekly service)
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and non-schedule services which connect the Maghreb 
region with North America, Scandanavia and Jeddah.
The most important geographical aspect of the proposed 
networks is the Maghreb city pair principle as origin 
and destination of the route. Flights combining Tunis 
and C a s a b l a n c a  with New York saw the highest 
frequencies. (Five weekly in each direction). This 
service was proposed on the grounds of the number of US 
and Canadian citizens who visited Tunisia and Morocco 
in the years 1963-1968 where it was evident that these 
two countries received most of the American and 
Canadian visitors to countries of the Maghreb region. 
Tripoli and Algiers on the other hand were allocated a 
twice weekly frequency to cater for traffic associated 
with the oil industry. The allocation of Maghreb - 
'Across the Atlantic' services in this fashion created 
a distinction where tourist oriented countries, and oil 
economy oriented countries were to fall on separate 
routes.
Tripoli was involved as a point of origin only in the 
scheduled services to New York. The West African 
routes, the direct route to Moscow and that via Tunis 
involved Algiers more than any other country, and
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together with the involvement of Algiers on the 'Across 
the Atlantic' proposed operation, indicates the 
prominence of Algeria as the strongest political ele­
ment in the region as a whole.
The Maghreb region was connected by air to New York by 
US international air carriers. TWA operated the serv­
ice from New York to Tunis and Tripoli and PAA linked 
New York with Rabat. The operation linking Algiers to 
New York was a completely new idea contrasted by the 
concentration of Eastern Bloc countries air links where 
Aeroflot and Interflug transitted Algiers on their 
route to Bamako and Conakry. Aeroflot served Tunisia 
and Rabat and CSA served Rabat in the meantime.
The 'Air Maghreb' venture did not go beyond the study 
stage which assumed that traffic rights on the proposed 
routes were obtainable. It would have been an inter­
esting experience to see how multilateral traffic 
rights with the various concerned countries were to be 
achieved.
Airlines of tine Maghreb countries today
Of the specifically important points to be noted about
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the study of 'Air Maghreb' is the fact that it main­
tained the national carriers of the Maghreb states in­
dependent from the proposed long-haul airline. The na­
tional air carriers continued to develop independently, 
not only because the Maghreb long-haul airline did not 
materialise but because they were intended to develop 
to serve the respective purposes of their respective 
governments.
It must be noted in this context that the four national 
airlines of the four Maghreb countries of Libya, 
Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, operated the same type of 
aircraft in the 1960's and 1970's i n d i c a t i n g  
similarities in the structure of their networks. At no 
time did Egypt operate the same type of equipment as 
did these four countries.^ The similarities in network 
structure and fleet composition enabled a single com­
pany like AIR FRANCE to provide technical assistance to 
all four Maghreb national air carriers. Thus contem­
porary political development and similarities in 
characteristics of the air networks among other things, 
work to unify this region in a single geographical 
unit, at least from an air transport point of view, 
where a comparatiave analysis of a homogeneous region 
becomes possible.
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'The two major assets of an airline are its routes and
its aircraft'.”10 Thus routes and aircraft will be the
main elements through which this comparative analysis
of the four carriers is attempted. Before entering
into such an analysis, it is imperative to state a few
facts. Firstly, all national airlines in the Maghreb
are state-owned. Secondly, routes allocated to be
operated by these airlines are negotiated through their
governments by means of air service agreements usually
entered between gov e r n m e n t s  in line with ICAO
(International Civil Aviation Organisations) regula-
1 1tions and standards of practice. State ownership of
these airlines and the fact that these are flag air 
carriers emphasises their political role which over­
rides economic considerations and facilitates an under­
standing of these countries' political links and at­
titudes through a study of their air networks, since
these airlines operate under the direct control of the
1 7government. Taneja emphasised the second place of 
economics in national carriers' goals so that: '...one
point must be kept in mind...a nation's goals in estab­
lishing an international air carrier are not always 
based upon economic reasoning. Very often political 
and social reasons dominate the economics'. Thirdly,
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this analysis is concerned with the national air car­
riers which are given the major task of providing a
transport system for the public. The exclusion of spe-
1 ^cial purpose air transport systems that are opera­
tional within the region does not diminish their role, 
it is just that the national air carriers are a more
visible element in the air transport systems of these 
countries, and are more identifiable with the external 
links of the countries under consideration, whereas the 
purpose of other types of air transport systems in
these countries is specific to each countries own
1 4economy.
Assessment of performance in 1986 and dedmced com­
parisons
The scheduled international operations results in 1986 
of the four Maghreb airlines are included in Table 4.1. 
This Table gives the aggregate of the various aspects 
of these airlines' operations. To reach a general 
evaluation it is necessary to first look at the in- 
dividual parameters contained in this Table so as to
explain the variations between the four airlines. Each
item will be defined and discussed on its own merit. 
By choice, Table 4.1 will be disaggregated in several
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t a b l e s  e a c h  l o o k i n g  at the p a r a m e t e r s  u s e d  
individually.
Measurement of traffic and capacity
a : Kilometres Flown
This is the total number of kilometres performed by all 
the aircraft allocated to operate the flights even­
tually carried out on international routes of the 
r e s p e c t i v e  a i r l i n e s  over the p e r i o d  u n d e r  
cons iderat ion.
The prominence of Air Algerie as the airline with the 
highest number of kilometres flown by the aircraft it 
dedicated to the operation of its international 
scheduled air services is clear by looking at this 
Table. At the interval scale, the four airlines are 
ranked behind Air Algerie. The ratio scale gives an 
absolute and non arbitrary representation of this 
parameter as indicated in the indices. The measure it­
self has the weakness of being only an element in the 
various number of measurements required to deduce a 
fully representative assessment of the network weight.
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Table 4.1.a
AFRICAN AIMEINES NETWORKS;
A comparison of flown kilometres: 1966
Knis flown Ranking at 
(000)s the interval 
scale
Indices at 
the ratio 
scale
AIR ALGERIE 
ROYAL AIR MAROC 
TUNISAIR
27,399 
22,050 
12,588
LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES 8,26 7
1 00 
80 
46 
30
Source: see Table 4.1
b : Aircraft departures
The number of kilometres flown as shown in Table 4.1. a 
was carried out by operating a number of services which 
went through three phases each trip. The first is 
leaving the point of origin, the second phase was per­
forming the trip where the flown kilometres were 
achieved and finally arrival at destination. Leaving
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the point of origin is termed departure and aircraft 
departures indicate the number of services performed so 
that the flown kilometres were achieved and indeed 
every other aspect of the operation - for without a 
departing aircraft no performance takes place.
Table 4 .11 . b
NORTH AFRICAN AIRLINES NETWORKS:
A comparison of number of departures 1986
Number of 
Departures
Ranking at 
the interval 
scale
Indices at 
the ratio
scale
AIR ALGERIE 22,559.
TUNISAIR 10,345.
ROYAL AIR MAROC 10,229. 
LIBYAN ARAB 
AIRLINES 4,921.
1 00 
46 
46
22
Source: See Table 4.1
300
The prominence of Air Algerie remains obvious as indi­
cated in Table 4. 1 . b . The position of Tunisair has 
been switched with that of Royal Air Maroc in relation 
to that mentioned in Table 4.1.a. Thus while Royal Air 
Maroc aircraft a flew longer total distance, the number 
of operations was less than Tunisair. This is impor­
tant because it on the one hand shows the number of 
movements of the national air carriers international 
operations from base airports which on the other hand 
is an input in both airport planning and management. 
More movements indicates more capacity required at air­
ports air side and terminal buildings and more staff to 
attend to moving aircraft at all stages of operation.
c : Sector Average
Table 4.1.a and Table 4.1.b lead us to devise a measure 
that is p a r t i c u l a r l y  significant in a irlines  
operations. The sector average is of particular inter­
est in airline economics. This measure is obtainable 
by dividing the number of kilometres flown over the 
number of flights performed (departures). The impor­
tance of this measure stems from the fact that the 
longer the operated sector, the less the weight- 
capacity unit cost. This particular fact stems from
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cost involved in the initial and final stage of opera­
tions where speed is low and fuel consumption is high 
on the one hand and the distribution of overheads and 
allocation of human resources over the distance flown 
on the other. One example of the human resources 
aspect cost element is the fact that flying crews are- 
restricted on the number of take-offs and landings they 
can perform in a certain period. Short flights exhaust 
the allowance permitted without fully using the al­
lowance of permitted crew flying hours for the same 
period. Thus Table 4.1.c will point with specific in­
terest to an expected unit direct cost of production 
for each of the four airlines at the interval scale.
Table 4 . 1 . c bears a c o n s i d e r a b l e  n u m b e r  of 
explanations. It primarily indicates that Royal Air 
Maroc's sector average is the longest followed by 
Libyan Arab Airlines with Tunisair and Air Algerie in 
almost an equal position. Thus since production unit 
direct costs are associated with sector length, Royal 
Air Maroc production unit direct costs ought to be the 
least of all followed by Libyan Arab Airlines. Other 
things being equal (and they are not) Tunisair's and 
Air Algerie's production unit direct costs should be 
expected to be similar.
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TaJble 4 . 1 . c
NORTH AF R I C A N  AI R L I N E S  NETWORKS:
A comparison of sector average length 1986
Sector Average Ranking at 
length in Kms. the interval
scale
Indices at 
the ratio 
scale
ROYAL AIR 
MAROC 
LIBYAN ARAB 
AIRLINES 
TUNISAIR 
AIR ALGERIE
2,156
1 , 680 
1,216 
1,215
1 00
80
56
50
Source: see Table 4.1
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The different network average sector length indicates 
different network structures. The fact that Royal Air 
Maroc is located at the western edge of the region and 
the originating of many operations from points of lower 
latitudes than those of the other countries' national 
air carriers and the fact that this airline is the only 
North African airline that crosses the Atlantic works 
to explain the prominence of Royal Air Maroc in this 
aspect of comparison.
d : Freight tonnes carried
The payload which indicates all aspects of load carried 
by an airline is normally decided in three main 
categories: passengers, freight and mail. Table 4.1.d 
looks at the freight aspect of payload.
The evidence that Royal Air Maroc carried more cargo 
than any other Maghreb airline must be further 
qualified by the fact that all this cargo was carried 
on scheduled passenger flights. The figures for Tun- 
siair and Libyan Arab Airlines are of the same nature. 
Air Algerie, however, performed 2,645 tonnes on pure 
cargo flights. The prominence of Royal Air Maroc in 
transporting cargo on passenger scheduled services is
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Table 4 „ 1 .d
NORTH AFRICAN AIRLINES NETWORKS: 
Comparison of freight carried in tonnes
Tonnes
carried
Ranking on Indices on 
interval ratio scale
scale
ROYAL AIR MAROC 17,110. 
AIR ALGERIE 11 ,310.
TUNISAIR 10,057.
LIBYAN ARAB 
AIRLINES 3,658.
1 00 
66 
59
21
Source: see Table 4.1
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achieved through the capacity available in the holds of 
the Boeing 747*s this airline operates. Some 3,358 
tonnes were ca r r i e d  on purely s c h e d u l e d  cargo 
flights.^
e : Passengers carried
Each airline carried a number of passengers on its 
scheduled international services. These numbers are 
shown in Table 4.1.e below.
This is a measure that is useful in several ways. It 
indicates the flows of passengers carried by the 
various airlines which is an input in airport terminal 
planning for example. Naturally the breakdown in 
points of origin and points of destination is necessary 
when such data is used in respect of planning airports. 
The figures for all airlines operating to such an air­
port or those who plan to do so would naturally, be 
required. For the purpose of weighting networks this 
measure need be upgraded to become of significant use­
fulness in this respect.
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Table 4.1 .e
NORTH AFRICAN AIRLINES NETWORKS:
Number of international passengers carried (1986)
No of Ranking on
passengers interval
carried scale
Indices on 
the ratio 
scale
AIR ALGERIE 
ROYAL AIR MAROC 
TUNISAIR 
LIBYAN ARAB 
AIRLINES
1,850,949 
1 , 025 , 247 
930,088
429,198
1 00 
55 
50
23
Source: see Table 4.1
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f : Passenger - kilometres flown
Upgrading the data contained in Table 4.1.e is carried 
out in Table 4 . 1 . f .
Table 4 „ 1 . f
NORTH AFRICAN AIRLINES NETWORKS:
International passenger-kilometres flown (1986)
Passenger 
kms flown 
(000)* s
Ranking at Indices at 
the interval the ratio
scale scale
AIR ALGERIE 2,443,429.
ROYAL AIR MAROC 2,036,931. 
TUNISAIR 1,274,837.
LIBYAN ARAB 
AIRLINES 753,349.
1 00 
83 
52
31
Source: see Table 4.1
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The data shown in Table 4.1.f indicates the size of 
performance on the passenger side of the scheduled 
operations. This is a full measure in this respect. 
It shows the number of passengers and the distance 
flown. The expression of this type of flow is a 
reasonable measure to make a comparison between the 
four airlines in a flow unit that is uniform. The 
quality of this measure could be seen when compared 
with the measure of passenger numbers stated in Table 
4.1.d where while it appeared that Royal Air Maroc 
carried only 55% the number of passengers carried by 
Air Algerie in real terms when the element of distance 
is incorporated, this ratio changes so that Royal Air 
Maroc achieved performance on the passenger side be­
comes 83% of that achieved by Air Algerie.
g : Available seat kilometres
Airlines transport passengers on seats available in the 
aircraft performing the operations. The number of 
seats available in aircraft becomes only significant in 
performance terms when upgraded to include the distance 
these are operated. Once upgraded these become to rep­
resent the seat-distance capacity available. Table 
4.1 . g shows such capacity as offered by the four air­
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lines under consideration.
Table 4.1« g
NGKTH AFRICAN AIRLINES NETWORKS:
Available seat-ki loietres 1 9S6 ( i n t e n a t  iona 1
operations)
Seat~knn5 Ranking at Indices at 
(000)s the interval the ratio
scale scale
AIR ALGERIE 4,025,844. 1 100
ROYAL AIR MAROC 3,764,370. 2 93
TUNISAIR 1,999,342. 3 50
LIBYAN ARAB
AIRLINES 1,387,285. 4 34
Source: see Table 4.1
31 0
This measure - available seat-kilometres - is repre­
sentative in that it describes the volume of seat- 
distance available to the public on aircraft operated. 
That is the supply side of these airlines' operations. 
The interval scale ranks airlines and the indices sum­
marise the position of the four airlines in an absolute 
and non arbitrary form so that with a quick glance the 
data is readily understood.
h : Passenger load factor
To combine the information contained in Tables 4. 1 . f 
and 4.1.g would give an understanding of the performed 
passengers- kilometres measure in relation to the 
available seat-kilometres on flights operated. This is 
a measure that indicates the percentage of seat 
capacity available that has been used (consumed). It 
is a relationship between supply and performance from 
potential demand. The term describing this relation­
ship is passenger load factor. Table 4.1.h describes 
this measure for all four airlines.
31 1
Table 41.1-to
NORTH AFRICAN AIRLINES NETWORKS:
Passenger load factors 1986 (international operations)
Passenger Ranking at
load-factor the interval 
% scale
Indices at 
the ratio 
scale
TUNISAIR 63.4
AIR ALGERIE 61.8
LIBYAN ARAB 
AIRLINES 54.3
ROYAL AIR 
MAROC 54.1
1 00 
97
86
85
Source: see Table 4.1
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This Table indicates higher load-factors being achieved
by shorter sector length airlines (see Table 4.1.c).
This fact is by all means character istic of airline
scheduled operations as shorter routes need higher load
1 ftfactors to achieve a break-even point, 
i : Weight Performance
Airlines operate aircraft that have a capacity to 
transport passengers, mail and cargo. To calculate 
such available capacity a measure is devised so that 
the available tonnage capacity on operated aircraft is 
upgraded by multiplying it by the distance flown. The 
term is Available Weight Capacity. A measure to calcu­
late the Weight Performance (weight capacity used up by 
transporting passengers, mail and cargo) is calculated 
by establishing a standard weight for a passenger in­
cluding his free baggage allowance multiplied by the 
number of passengers carried, added to the weight of 
mail and cargo, the sum of which is multiplied by the 
distance flown so that:
31 3
W p [(C x P) + M + F ]  x d
where
Wp = Weight Performance
C = standard coefficient for each passenger
and his baggage
P = number of passengers carried
M = weight of mail carried
F = weight of cargo
d = distance
The aggregate of weight performance for the four air­
lines is summarised in Table 4.1.i.
31 4
Talble 4 . H . i
NORTH AFRICAN AIRLINES NETWORKS:
Tonne Kilometres performed 1986 (international)
Performed 
Tonne kms 
(000)s
Ranking at 
the interval 
scale
Indices at 
the ratio 
scale
ROYAL AIR MAROC 241,233 
AIR ALGERIE 230,448
TUNISAIR 127,891
LIBYAN ARAB 
AIRLINES 74,276
1 00 
95 
53
31
Source: see Table 4.1
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j : Available Weight Capacity
Table 4.1.i indicates the prominence of Air Algerie and 
Royal Air Maroc. Table 4.1.j below will complete the 
picture of this fully representative form! of measure­
ment of each of the four airlines as it turns to con­
sider the Weight Capacity Available.
This Table is indicative of the capacity offered by 
each of the four airlines and the outcome of combining 
the results contained in Table 4.1.i and Table 4.1.j 
will indicate the highest order measure for each 
airline. That is, it contains the weight load factor.
31 6
Table 4.1.j
A F R ICAN AIRLI N E S  NETWORKS:
Available tonne-kilometres 1986 (international)
Available 
tonne kns 
(000)s
Ranking at 
the interval 
scale
Ranking at 
the ratio 
scale
ROYAL AIR MAROC 483,754 
AIR ALGERIE 465,144
TUNISAIR 196,638
LIBYAN ARAB 
AIRLINES 149,102
1 00  
96 
41
31
Source: see Table 4.
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k: Weight Load Factor
Table 4 _ 1 „ k
NORTH AFRICAN AIRLINES NTETWORKS
Weight Load-Factor 1986
Weight Load Ranking at 
Factor the interval
% scale
Indices at 
the ratio 
scale
TUNISAIR 65.
ROYAL AIR MAROC 49.9 
LIBYAN ARAB
AIRLINES 49.8
AIR ALGERIE 49.5
1 00 
78
77
75
Source: see Table 4.1
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The overall performance of Tunisair appears to be 
prominent among the four airlines. This is indicative 
of a fuller utilisation of available capacity as has 
been demonstrated in Table 4.1.d where cargo more sub­
stantially than the other three operators filled the 
available capacity in the passenger operated aircraft 
and high passenger load factors as indicated in Table 
4.1.h were achieved.
Fleet MSeasuremeet and Comparison
Details of all aircraft in service and available for 
operation at the end of 1 986 in the fleets of the four 
Maghreb airlines are shown in Table 4.2
Table 4.2 shows the fleet composition of the Maghreb 
airlines. The number of aircraft used for public air 
transport by the four air carriers in this region to­
tals 85. These aircraft are differently configured, 
and range between the Boeing 747 which can carry more 
than 400 passengers and the Fokker F27 which can carry 
a maximum of 48 passengers. The aircraft are also dif­
ferent in their speed of travel, airlines operating the 
same type of aircraft select different cruising speeds 
for economic reasons. The B747 is a jet-driven
31 9
TABLE 4.2
NORTH AFRICAN AIRLINES NETWORKS:
FLEET AND UTILISATION; 1986
(FLEET: All aircraft in service and available for operation at 31st
December 1986, including those in but not those leased out.
UTILISATION: Average block time flown (in terms of hours and minutes) 
per aircraft per day).
AIR ALGERIE ROYAL AIR MAROC
No. of Type Daily No. of Type Daily
Aircraft Utilisation Aircraft Utilisation
2 A310-200 8.48 1 B747-200 5.46
9 B727-200 7.11 1 B747-SP 6.56
8 B737-200 7.38 2 B757 8.44
1 B737-200 C 4.47 8 B727-200 7.04
1 L-100-30 10.00 5 B737-200 7.59
21 2 F27 1 .08
1 B707 4.10
20
TUNISAIR LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES
No. of Type Daily No. of Type Daily
Aircraft Utilisation Aircraft Utilisation
8 B727-200 6.38 3 B707 6.00
4 B737-200 7.37 10 B727 5.48
1 A300-B4 5.30 3 F28 4.00
13 15 F27 2.00
31
Source: IATA, WORLD'S AIRLINES STATISTICS, 1986 
Bulletin No. 31
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aircraft and cruises at a much higher speed than the
propeller driven F27 . The various types of aircraft
1 7have different ranges'7 and are generally technically 
different. The suitability of an aircraft to operate a 
certain route is dependent on the technical, opera­
tional and economic characteristics of the aircraft as-
1 8signed to perform on such a route. For example, the 
Fokker ¥21 would not have the range to fly from North 
Africa to the USA without following an impractical 
route with several stops that would eventually get it 
there. Nor is the Boeing B747 a sound solution to 
operate between small desert oases without proper 
facilities such as paved runways and much more. Then 
how is Table 4.2 useful? It is useful in that it 
describes the aircraft population in the region and 
throws light on the composition and utilisation of the 
fleet and works as a guide line to raise the question 
as to why it is so. Of the 85 aircraft owned by the 
four national carriers and used for public air 
transport, 31 are in Libya, 21 in Algeria, 20 in 
Morocco and only 13 in Tunisia.
a : Air Algerie Fleet and its utilisation
Some general remarks may be made about the Air Algerie
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fleet and its utilisation in 1 986 . Of the twenty one 
aircraft composing the fleet eighteen are Boeing 727's 
and 737's. These two types of aircraft dominate the 
fleet on the basis of number. The two Airbus A310's 
are of particular significance despite their low number 
as these two aircraft have a much larger capacity per 
aircraft than the B7271s and B737's and the high levels 
of their utilisation (8 hours 48 minutes) must em ­
phasise their contribution to available weight capacity 
particularly that the B727's and B737's utilisation is 
considerably lower (7 hours 11 minutes for the B7271s 
and 7 hours 38 minutes for the B 7 3 7 1s ). Of the 21 
aircraft operated by Air Algerie 2 are purely cargo 
aircraft.
b: Royal Air Maroc Fleet and its utilisation
The fie et of Royal Air Maroc is quite diversified. The
twenty aircraft composing the fleet include 6 types.
Thirtee n of these aircraft are Boeing 7 271s , ( 8 ) , and
B7 37 ' s , (5 ) The two B74 7 ' s are of relatively l o  W
uti1i sa t ion , their superior we ight capacity must con-
tr ibute subs tantia1ly to weight capacity available par-
ticularly because these aircraft are used on th e
air1ine 1s long-haul routes. Such low utilisation may
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also be related to the fact that not enough long-haul
routes are available - operating more frequency on al­
ready low load factor routes would bring such load fac­
tors even lower. It must also be noted that the 
levels of utilisation of the Boeing 727's and Boeing 
737's are in general terms similar to those of Air 
Algerie. The Boeing 757 represents the highest levels 
of utilisation (8 hours 44 minutes per day) among the 
Royal Air Maroc fleet. Amongst the lowest utilised
aircraft is the Fokker F27's with a daily utilisation 
of 1 hour and 8 minutes.
c : Tumisair
The fleet of Tunisair is composed of the smallest num­
ber of aircraft among all airlines of the Maghreb, 13 
aircraft. It has the least number of aircraft types; 
three. The fleet is dominated by the B727's, (8), and
B737's, (4). The only additional aircraft type within
Tunisair's fleet is a single Airbus A300 B 4 . The level 
of Tunisair's fleet standardisation is relatively 
higher than all four airline fleets of the Maghreb. 
The levels of aircraft utilisation for the B727's is 
slightly lower than those achieved by Air Algerie and 
Royal Air Maroc, the utilisation of the B737's is
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almost equal to the two other operators. The single
Airbus is of low utilisation which is understandable 
for an operation of a single aircraft takes place in 
restricted conditions and considerable operational 
limitations, for at any time this aircraft is delayed
for whichever reason, its replacement is impossible 
particularly when loads affected by the delay on any
sector of a delayed service is beyond the capacity of 
the standby time available within other aircraft of the 
fleet. This argument does not replace the fact that 
the routes operated with the Airbus Tunisair uses may 
not justify additional capacity anyway.
d : Libyan Arab Airlines
Composed of 31 aircraft, the fleet of Libyan Arab Air­
lines is the largest, in number, of all airlines in 
the region. The fleet includes four types; B707's (3), 
B7 27 1 s (10), Fokker F28's (3) and F27's (15). The
large number of aircraft is dominated by the small size 
F27's. The Boeing B727 component is significantly 
large as well.
The Boeing 707 was a very popular aircraft in the
1 9 60 's. It is, however, becoming technically and
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economically obsolete (many, though are being retro­
fitted to achieve cleaner engines and being converted 
to tanker aircraft for military use or other types of 
operation). Of the four aircraft operating in the 
whole region of the Maghreb, three were in Libya in
19S6. It is remarkable that Libya's Boeing 707's had
become part of its fleet after this type had been
recognised as causing too much pollution and no longer 
being economical to operate. Libya's purchases of the 
Boeing 707 commenced only after 1 979 . ^  Libya's pur­
chase of B707's as its revenues from oil peaked came at 
a time when the US administration was increasingly
tightening its control over the export of aircraft to 
Libya. (See Chapter 6).
Aircraft utilisation of Libyan Arab Airlines is
importance. Low utilisation levels of aircraft are in­
dicative of the need of a lesser number of aircraft to 
achieve the operations. The position of low aircraft 
utilisation has been the product of two particular 
aspects. The first stems from the initial fact that 
traffic on Libyan Arab Airlines have substantially 
declined in recent years. The second is that Libyan 
Arab Airlines have been reluctant to cut its fleet size
rem arkably low. This point is of
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for aircraft disposed of are, under the current pres­
sures from the United States to prevent the sale of new 
airc r a f t  with US origin or content to Libya, 
irreplacable. Consequently low utilisation aims at 
preserving the ability of continued operation for as 
long as possible.
h collective fleet assessment for the four airlines
The commonest of all aircraft in the Maghreb in 1986 is
the B727. The four national air carriers of the region
own this type of aircraft. Algeria owns 11, Morocco 8,
Tunisia 8 and Libya 10. Together with the B737 these
two types of aircraft form the backbone of the region's
fleet, and had it not been for the US denial of
aircraft exports to Libya, this type would have
strongly emphasised the commonality in fleet composi-
7 ntion in the region.
However, if the Fokker F28 is considered in a category 
of aircraft which is the nearest to the capacity of a 
Boeing 737, produced outside the US without major US 
components, then Libya's operation of this type of 
aircraft compensates for the absence of the Boeing 737
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category from this country. As for the volume of the
F28 fleet in Libya (only 3 aircraft) it could be noted
that Libya operates 15 Fokker F271s which makes it not
only the largest F27 operator in this region but also
71throughout North Africa and the Middle East.
As demonstrated in Table 4.2 the aircraft population in 
the region under consideration, and the break-down of 
the fleet into types of aircraft and the association 
between this and routes, leads to the conclusion that 
commonality of fleet between the various countries 
within the region and compensations for such c o m ­
monality (i.e. the F28 and F27 to compensate for lack 
of B737's) is indicatiave of similar route structures, 
since aircraft are built to serve specific route 
purposes. The trends of increasingly diversified 
fleets in the region is a product of battles for in­
fluence in the region by aircraft manufacturers in the 
United States and Europe. With the Boeing 7 27 and 
Boeing 737 fleet soon reaching a phase out point, com­
monality is likely to be lost as the fleet of aircraft 
will be shaped according to political pressures and in­
fluences from the countries who manufacture airframes 
and engines.
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The different size and number of aircraft operated by 
each airline and the data available on the weight 
capacity operated on international routes of the four 
airlines call for an additional measure where average 
capacity per aircraft for each airline is shown.
This measure is quite useful. It is a measure that in­
clude the fleet and their product. It helps to indi­
cate that, as it offsets aircraft size, the numbers of 
a i r c r a f t  i nvolved in the o p e r a t i o n  and their 
configuration, the various airlines must be looked at 
in relation to the significance of the fleet in achiev­
ing the available weight capacity which represent the 
production output. The productivity of flying crews 
and cabin attendants may be measured based on Average 
Available Capacity per aircraft for example. The out­
come usually points to smaller aircraft and shorter 
distances which results in higher unit costs. Thus 
while LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES average sector length might 
contribute to lower operating costs, the high number of 
F27's in its fleet must offset such advantage.
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Talble 4.2.a
NOMTB AFRICAN A I R LINES NETWORKS:
Average weight capacity per aircraft 
Scheduled operations 1
AIR ROYAL TUNISAIR LIBYAN
ALGERIE AIM ARAB
MAROC AIRLINES
Avallable 
Weight
Capacity 1 465144 483754 196638 149102
No. of 
Aircraft 21 20 1 3 31
Average 221 50 24188 1 51 26 4810
Ratio 92 1 00 63 20
 ^ in (000) Tonne - Kilometre
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Am assessment based on intended operations
There appears to be substantial difficulties in obtain­
ing published data on the operations of the four air­
lines which cover detailed information on the routes 
operated. Because the aim of this thesis is to look 
into the political factor in the networks operated such 
detail or a substitute to it is essential. In order to 
solve this problem the data available in public 
timetables appears to be the available alternative and 
probably is quite adequate. While the detailed per­
formed flows would have been a complementing factor to 
the detailed analysis of the network links, the data 
available to the public through airline schedules indi­
cate the intentions of the airlines to operate the 
services including those operated for political reasons 
and from government directives. The intended services
declared in the timetables include all services ir­
respective of their true motive. That is, services 
operated for commercial reasons are not distinguished
from services operated for political reasons. This 
section of this chapter shall follow an analysis which 
aims to point to the underlying political factor in the 
scheduled operations of the four North African airlines
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based on published data on intended operations. The 
weakness in this type of data is that it can change 
without notice, the advantage of it is that it is 
readily available and represents data for the current 
position for the period it covers. The utmost advan­
tage of such data is its relative collective complete­
ness so that data for comparison is equally available 
or calculable for any airline with public services and 
thus its suitability for a comparison of the four air­
lines becomes evident.
Comparative network lemgtJhs
Table 4.3 shows the network of ROYAL AIR MAROC to be 
the longest: 90,210 miles; followed by AIR ALGERIE:
71,573 miles; TUNISAIR: 41,136 miles; and LIBYAN ARAB 
AIRLINES ranking last: 31,785 miles. As we proceed to
break these totals into international and domestic net­
work unduplicated sector lengths, we notice the 
prominence of ROYAL AIR MAROC's international network, 
measuring 85,283 miles or more than AIR ALGERIE1s and 
TUNISAIR's international network lengths (43,823
respectively) combined, leaving LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES's 
international network the shortest at 26,730 miles. 
The domestic components of the networks' sector lengths
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TABLE 4.3
NORTH AFRICAN AIRLINES AIR NOTIKS: 
ROUTE MILEAGE (IN TICKETED 
MILEAGE POINT) TOTALS: (1986)
R.AIR MAROC AIR ALGERIE TUNISAIR LIBYAN
INTERNATIONAL 85283 43823 40331 26730
DOMESTIC 4927 27750 805 5055
TOTAL 90210 71573 41136 31785
Source: Calculated by adding all International and Danestic
•►Sectors as indicated in TMP section of the Airline 
Passenger Tariff Manual 108 issued October 1, 1986,
* As indicated in respective Airline Timetables
a) ROYAL AIR MAROC Winter 1986/87 T.T.
b) AIR ALGERIE Sumner 1986 T.T. No.98 Inti
No. 6 Domestic
c) TUNISAIR Winter 1986/87 T.T.
d) LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES Surmer** 1986 T.T. No. 54-A
** TRIPOLI-LONDON route excluded as was suspended 
at time of writing.
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bear significant indications as to the extent of the 
domestic network. Algeria's domestic network is by far 
the longest of all: 27,750 miles - almost treble the
collective domestic air network of the other three 
countries in the region - with Libya's network measur­
ing 5,055 miles, Morocco's slightly less at 4,927 miles 
and the fringe domestic air network of Tunisia at only 
805 miles. It is to be argued in this chapter that 
Libya's relatively weak international network is, in 
general, a reflection of Libya's international politi­
cal relations coupled with declining oil revenues, as 
well as locational and geographical considerations, 
while the strength of its domestic operations is re­
lated to their concentration on the route connecting 
the two urban agglomerations of Tripoli and Benghazi 
which are separated by the desert and the Gulf of Surt 
and which accommodate most of the country's population. 
ROYAL AIR MAROC's fleet ranks third among the four na­
tional air carriers, yet its total and international 
network length is the greatest. It can be demonstrated 
that the length of ROYAL AIR MAROC's network is a con­
sequence of its location on the Atlantic Ocean and the 
country's extension towards lower latitudes with serv­
ices operating from locations at such low latitudes. 
Thus trips from Morocco to Europe and the Middle East
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are considerably longer, resulting in considerable in­
fluence on the figures quoted here. By contrast,
Algeria's closeness to the bulk of its international 
destinations is reflected in the shortness of its 
average sector length. It will be argued that much of 
the AIR ALGERIE network's strength stems from the fact 
that the Algerian population in France ensures that the 
size of the airline's offered capacity to and from des­
tinations in France alone is almost double the offered 
capacity of its entire domestic network. TUNISAIR has 
the smallest fleet and the smallest domestic network.
Destinations
Table 4.4 below summarises the region's four carriers' 
destinations. In all, AIR ALGERIE operates to 64 des­
tinations, ROYAL AIR MAROC to 56, TUNISAIR to 38 and 
LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES to 38. Of these, 36, 41, 33 and 
27 are destinations on the international networks 
respectively, while 38, 15, 5 and 11 destinations fall
respectively, on the domestic networks. The break-down 
of international destinations shows that the four air 
carriers have the bulk of their international destina­
tions in Western Europe, with ROYAL AIR MAROC operating 
to 24 such destinations, followed by TUNISAIR to 22,
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TABLE 4.4
NORTH AFRICAN AIRLINES NETWORKS:
DESTINATIONS BREAKDOWN - (1986)
AIR ALGERIE R. AIR MAROC TUNISAIR LIBYAN ARAB
38 
27 
11 
10 
6
2 
8
1
Source: AIR ALGERIE: ABC World Airways Guide, December 1986 
LIBYAN ARAB: ABC World Airways Guide, December 1986 
ROYAL AIR MAROC and TUNISAIR: Winter 1986 Timetables
TOTAL
.INTERNATIONAL 
DOMESTIC 
WESTERN EUROPE 
EASTERN EUROPE 
AFRICA 
NORTH AFRICA 
MIDDLE EAST 
AMERICAS 
FAR EAST
64
36
28
17
6
6
3
4
56
41
15
24
6
3
5
3
38
33
5
22
1
2
8
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AIR ALGERIE to 17 and lastly LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES to 
only 10. If we delete the French component of these 
airlines' West European destinations, it would read as 
follows: ROYAL AIR MAROC and TUNISAIR 16 each, AIR
ALGERIE 11 and LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES 9.22 Stripping 
the networks' European destinations of their French 
components divides the region's airlines into two 
groups. TUNISAIR and ROYAL AIR MAROC have a high and 
equal distribution of Western European destinations 
while LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES and AIR ALGERIE fall in a 
lower Wes tern European destination group with an almost 
equal number.
The stripping of the region's air networks' West 
European destinations off the French connection serves 
to eliminate the colonial influence latent in these 
networks. The high West European destinations in 
TUNISAIR and ROYAL AIR MAROC networks may be explained 
by the fact that the states owning these airlines have 
stronger West European political ties than Libya and 
Algeria whose national air carriers alone, as 
demonstrated in Table 4.4, are operating to destina­
tions in Eastern Europe. By adding the number of East­
ern European destinations to LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES and 
AIR ALGERIE and looking at Europe, East and West, as a
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single unit we find that the four air carriers operate 
almost to the same number of European destinations, 
i.e. AIR ALGERIE 17, ROYAL AIR MAROC and TUNISAIR 16 
and LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES 15, with the 'French 
Connection’ not present of course. Table 4.5 shows 
details of these destinations and highlights the 
’French Connection’.
The effect of Oil and Tourismi
Passenger traffic by air to the Maghreb North African
countries is significantly influenced by the tourist
flow to Morocco and Tunisia. Traditionally these two 
countries have been developing the tourist industry 
since becoming independent in the mid-1950's. Libya 
and Algeria depended largely on the oil sector as the 
engine for economic development. (Algeria started to 
encourage tourism in the early 1980's but this industry
remains, so far, less mature than is the case in
Morocco and Tunisia).^3 jn 1985, Morocco received 1.5 
million tourists^ while Tunisia's figures indicate 2.2 
million a r r i v a l s . ^  The French component of the 
tourist flow to Morocco and Tunisia in 1 985 was equal, 
as each received 400,000 French tourists. Equal flows 
of tourists to these two countries from Europe as a
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whole is also evident as Tunisia received a total of 
1.1 million while Morocco received a slightly higher 
number; 1.165 million. The Arab component of tourism 
in these two countries varies greatly. Tunisia 
received 832,000 of whom, however, 770,000 were Al­
gerians and 35,000 Libyans. The total Arab tourist 
flow to Morocco in the same period ( 1 985) was 203 , 000 
dominated by Libyan tourists who significantly declined 
in numbers in 1 986 following the American air raid on 
Libya and the deterioration of Political links between 
Libya and Morocco following the cancellation of the 
political pseudo federation signed in 1984. These two 
factors have made their mark on the figures as the num­
ber of Arab tourists in 1 986 declined to 1 30 , 000 from, 
203,000 the previous year.
Most tourist flows to these two countries enter by air 
with the exception of traffic between Spain and Morocco 
as the ease of crossing the Straits of Gibraltar make 
ferry crossings an attractive mode of transport, and 
that between Algeria and Libya on the one hand and 
Tunisia on the other, where entry to Tunisia by road is 
facilitated by the closeness of Tunisian tourist 
centres to the population concentrations in these two 
countries.
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Details of the modal split for the movement of tourist 
traffic to Morocco are not available. There are no 
details of this movement in terms of arrival by air and 
air carriers. It is, however, reasonable to assume 
that apart from the tourist flow from Spain, most 
tourist traffic uses the air services. This assumption 
thus indicates that Royal Air Maroc's nominal share of 
50 per cent of international air traffic to and from 
Morocco which totalled 1025,000 in 1986, (see Table 4.1 
above) was dominated by tourist air traffic estimated 
at 1,300,000. (Tourist figures show tourist traffic in 
one direction and indicate that charter air traffic 
dominates tourism by air).
Statisics available on Tunisian tourism give clearer 
indicators. More than 88 per cent of European tourists 
arrived by air, while by contrast more than 97 per cent 
of Maghrebian tourists, dominated by Algerians, arrived 
by road. The importance of air transport and p a r ­
ticularly of the European routes to the Tunisian 
tourist industry is thus evident. The importance of 
Tunisair, who nominally transport half of this movement 
either on regular or charter services, stems from the 
fact that the national carrier controls, at least
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nominally, half of this movement. In 1985, tourists 
arriving in or departing from Tunisia by air on regular 
services averaged 950,000, while charter flights 
carried 700,000 in each direction. Table 4.1 above in­
dicates that Tunisair carried 930.000 international 
passengers in both directions on its regular services 
in 1 986, thus it is possible to assume that, with the 
nominal 50 per cent share of all air traffic belonging 
to the national carrier, over 85 per cent of all traf­
fic on regular scheduled Tunisair regular schedule 
flights is for tourist purposes and is significantly- 
dominated by European passengers. It is to be noticed, 
however, that the figures issued by L'Office National 
Du Tourisme Tunisien does not particularly distinguish 
between arrivals in the country for other purposes than 
tourism or those passengers who eventually arrive into 
the country and mix business with pleasure.
The influence of tourism on the four Maghreb airlines 
leads to a distinct dichotomy. Where Morocco's and 
Tunisia's national air carriers are tourist orientated, 
and thus have a wider number of European destinations,
Algeria's and Libya's national air carriers' traffic 
profiles are characterised by operations related to
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these countries' oil economies. The distinction be­
tween Air Algerie and Libyan Arab Airlines is that Air 
Algerie's network French component caters for the Al­
gerian immigrants in France.
Non-Europeao desfcinaitiLoinis:
African Routes
An analysis of non-European international destinations 
is based on Table 4.6. This table shows that AIR AL­
GERIE and ROYAL AIR MAROC have the strongest African 
air links, with Tunisia operating a single weekly serv­
ice to Dakar through Casablanca. The current (1986) 
African LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES links are virtually non­
existent. The existence of air links operated by AIR 
ALGERIE, ROYAL AIR MAROC and TUNISAIR and the non­
existence of a Libyan link must have some explanations 
particularly in view of the fact that the Libyan posi­
tion was not always as at present.
When distance and levels of economic and social rela­
tions are adequate between any two states air links 
with immediate neighbours are to be expected to be the
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first to take place as long as air services are part of 
these states' transport modes. Thus Morocco's air 
links in Africa ought to have been with Mauritania and 
Algeria. A larger circle of neighbours makes Senegam- 
bia and Mali qualify for air links. Following ROYAL 
AIR MAROC's African air routes we find that it follows 
the West African Atlantic coast touching Nouakchott, 
Dakar, Conakry, Abidjan, Malabo in Equatorial New 
Guinea Bioko Island and finally Libreville in the 
Gabon. Apart from Dakar and Nouakchott, the AIR AL­
GERIE network shares no common African destination with 
that of ROYAL AIR MAROC, [see Figure 4.1], and follows 
a more inland-orientated route.
The low frequency on the African routes is indicative 
of the political origins and nature of these services. 
The service to Nouakchott by the two operators stems 
from the importance of Mauritania to both Algeria and 
Morocco in their struggle for the western Sahara and 
the changing role this country has played in this 
conflict. As for Dakar, the three Maghreb airlines; 
ROYAL AIR MAROC, AIR ALGERIE and TUNISAIR, serve this 
destination. Dakar is the central political point for 
French-speaking West Africa and thus the three North 
African airlines of the ex-French North African domain
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serve it. The absence of a coexistence of joint des­
tinations for AIR ALGERIE and ROYAL AIR MAROC may be 
interpreted, because of the political nature of these 
services, as being representative of these countries' 
political links so that countries friendly to Algeria 
are less friendly with Morocco and thus are connected 
with an air link with Algeria's capital. The situa­
tion indicated by the ROYAL AIR MAROC routes proves 
that the same theory is applicable here where countries 
favourably susceptible to Moroccan policies and not to 
those of Algeria receive an air link with Morocco's 
main city, Casablanca, as a proxy for Rabat.
Figure 4.1 shows additional revelations that are dis- 
cernable from the air network links and their shape. A 
deeper glance at the figure, with the political divi­
sions in mind, will reveal that just as Algeria flanks 
Morocco's east, so does AIR ALGERIE's African air net­
work flank that of ROYAL AIR MAROC immediately east of 
i t.
Figure 4.1 makes clear that LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES' 
operates no African links. It was only after the fall 
of Goukoni Waddai's government in 1982 and the sub­
sequent collapse of the short-lived Libya-Chad merger
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announced in 1981,28 however, that LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES
2 7services to N'djamina were suspended as of May 1982. 
The fate of the Libyan a i r l i n e ’s services which 
operated to Niamey in Niger and Cotonou in Benin was no 
different when this service was stopped as of March 
198128 due to political differences with Niger. The 
absence of air links by Libya's national air carrier 
more recently is thus expressive of Libya's problems in 
the African Sahel Region and is indicative of the 
decline in its political influence.
The Middle East
Seeking political clues from the analysis of air links, 
Table 4.6 shows that all Maghreb airlines fly to Cairo 
except for that owned by the Maghreb state of Libya 
which is closest to Egypt and where the Egyptian com­
ponent of its non-national labour force is quite 
significant. It was after President Sadat's visit to 
Jerusalem that the Libyan Government severed all offi­
cial relations with Egypt, including the vital and 
economically important air links. In the 1970,s this 
route was Libya's most important air link ever.
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AIR ALGERIE's Middle East connections are the weakest. 
Besides Cairo, only Damascus, Jeddah and Kuwait appear 
on its current network. This is probably explicable 
in that since Algeria is what is generally referred to 
as a 'hardline Arab State', her links with conservative 
Arab States would be limited. Algiers' links in the
Middle East would be expected to be with Syria, Iraq 
and Aden. The link with Iraq is not evident, for the 
apparently neutral role Algeria plays in the Gulf War 
dictates that she remain neutral between the fighting 
part ies. Consequently, no air links appear to exist 
with either of the warring states in the Gulf. It is 
possible that it might be coincidental that direct air 
services between Baghdad and Algeria never existed, but 
had Algeria been on the side of Iraq in the war
against Iran, an air link would have been imperative. 
The absence of an air link with Aden is attributable to 
the distant geographic location of this region from the 
general alignment of AIR ALGERIE' s Middle East air 
routes. The extreme cost of a service from Algiers to 
Aden may not be justified in terms of the degree of im­
portance Algeria puts on her political relations with 
Aden. The same applies to Libya's links with Aden and
Sanaa in Yemen. Morocco's national air carrier
operates to five destinations in the Middle Eastern
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region, all of which, excluding Cairo, are destinations 
within the politically conservative Arab Peninsula. 
Morocco herself being a conservative Arab State makes 
her Middle East air network entirely within the conser­
vative region. The most extensive Maghreb state air­
line links with the Middle East are those of TUNISAIR. 
In total, there are eight destinations, half of them 
in the Arabian Peninsula with the rest aligned in a 
vertical position with Istanbul at the top and Khar­
toum at the bottom with Damascus and Cairo falling in- 
between. The TUNISAIR Middle East links indicate a 
varied and less concentrated orientation than that of 
ROYAL AIR MAROC. As Tunisia acts as host to the Arab 
League since it was transferred from Cairo in 1979, her 
widest Arab air links make a consistent trend with its 
political role - moderate and largely neutral - in the 
Arab World. Libyan air links with the Middle East, 
however, are the most diverse. They include Amman, and 
Larnaca in Cyprus, the only Maghrebi airline to serve 
these two destinations. The link with Istanbul is 
basically a consequence of the presence of major 
Turkish contractors in the country. Amman also is a 
link associated with the presence of Palestinian and 
Jordanian workers in Libya in substantial numbers. 
Damascus is another political link with an economic
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component - there are twenty thousand Syrians working 
in Libya. ^  The link with Kuwait may be seen in terms 
of Libya's interest in OAPEC, where this organisation's 
permanent Secretariat and many of its oil service com­
panies are located. Jeddah, the holy link has been in 
existence for over ten years, the route depends on 
Libyan traffic to the holy places in Mecca and Medina 
throughout the year. This service was not interrupted 
when political differences surfaced between the two 
countries.
The hypothesis that Maghreb states' air links with the 
Middle East may generally be explained in political 
terms can be seen to hold as long as the economic fac­
tor in these links is weak. Most of these links are 
political. The economic exchange among the Arab 
countries is generally weak - the movement of labour 
from the Arab labour-exporting countries to Libya is 
probably the most significant of traffic movement by 
air between any Maghreb country and the Middle East.
Trans-Atlantic flights
No Maghreb air carrier operates across the Atlantic ex­
cept ROYAL AIR MAROC. However, it could be of con-
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siderable interest to answer the question as to why a 
country like Morocco should be the only Maghreb Trans­
atlantic operator, while Libya which traditionally and 
until recently, had a strong US economic presence in
the shape of the US oil companies, never operated 
flights across the Atlantic. A study prepared by 
Boeing-^0 in January 1 9 75 for LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES 
reveals that the most eastern of the Maghreb countries 
had been interested in seeing its national air carrier
operate a service across the the Atlantic to New York
since 1 9 74 . (Libya was part of the Air Maghreb
proposal made in 1968 which would have included Libya 
on a service across the Atlantic to New York). The 
study in the introduction stated that it's purpose was: 
'...to identify the LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES fleet require­
ments by focusing on the following c ritical  
obj ectives: '
o Introduction of the wide-body aircraft on high 
density routes by 1978. 
o Opening a new route to North America and Asia.
The study calculated that in 1978, 18,424 passengers
would travel from Tripoli, and 9,095 from Benghazi to 
New York. By 1985, these figures would have reached
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43,345 passengers and 27,821 from Tripoli and Benghazi, 
respectively. The desire by the national air carrier 
to operate across the Atlantic never materialised, but 
at the time the airline was considering the operation 
across the Atlantic, most other Arab air carriers were 
still considering the venture too. With the deteriora­
tion of political relations between Libya and the USA, 
particularly after 1977 (the date of Sadat's visit to 
Jerusalem and Libya's strong objections to this 
process) Libya had to drop the idea.
A number of Arab air carriers operate to the USA now. 
Only one of these is a Maghreb air carrier: ROYAL AIR
MAROC. The airline's ability to operate across the 
Atlantic stems from political, geographical and practi­
cal considerations. Morocco's ties with the United 
States are the strongest in the Maghreb Region. The 
only American military bases in the Maghreb are those 
in Morocco. Only Morocco in the Maghreb meets with Is­
raelis openly, a policy much desired and encouraged by 
the USA. (It is not intended to make meeting with Is­
raeli officials a pretext for US air links. This only 
indicates that meeting with Israeli officials is an 
open expression of alignment with the US).
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These two factors in US-Moroccan political relations 
qualify the Casablanca-New York route to fall under the 
category of a political link. The link to Rio de 
Janeiro is substantially different. This line's twice- 
weekly frequency^' depends for its traffic on two 
catchments: the Middle East and Europe. Brazil's trade 
with the Arab World is shown in Table 4.7. From this 
table it is evident that the bulk of Brazil's trade is 
with Iraq and Saudi Arabia and that her strongest trade 
partner in the Maghreb is Algeria. Morocco's weak 
trade link as well as the absence of special political 
links with Brazil does not explain the existence of a 
twice-weekly B747 service.
Two Arab air carriers operate to Brazil. These are 
IRAQI AIRWAYS and ROYAL AIR MAROC. IRAQI AIRWAYS links 
the eastern-most Arab country for economic reasons 
since Iraq's trade with Brazil exceeds that of any 
other Arab state. The weekly IRAQI AIRWAYS service 
between Baghdad and Rio de Janeiro makes a stop at Am­
man and another at Lisbon before it crosses the 
Atlantic. Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE
were among the top five Arab traders in the first half 
of 1 985 and 1 986 . 33 Returning to ROYAL AIR MAROC's 
Middle East destinations stated in Table 4.8, we see
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TABLE 4.7
NORTH AFRICAN AIRLINES AIR NETWORKS: 
BRAZIL’S TRADE WITH THE ARAB WORLD. 
FIRST HALF 1985, 1986 (IN MILLION 
USff)______________________ _________
1985
Exports
1986
Imports 
1985 1986
All Arab Countries 557.4 684.6 1305.5 967.7
Iraq 185.2 255.7 800.2 491.8
Saudi Arabia h 80.3 124.4 502.- 415.4
Algeria 76.- 103.7 - 47.-
341.5 483.8 1302.2 954.2
Egypt 99.2 83.4 - -
Morocco 17.4 9.4 — 7.1
Source: Middle East Econcmic Digest. MEED,
Volume 30 No. 51/52 20 December 8 6 - 2  January 1987
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that these are exactly in the area with strongest Arab 
trade links with Brazil. With the exception of Iraq 
which runs its own link to Rio. ROYAL AIR MAROC's non­
stop services between the Gulf and C a s a b l a n c a ^ 4  makes 
the service between the Middle East destinations served 
by this air carrier and Rio de Janeiro the shortest and 
with the fewest s t o p s . ^  Thus ROYAL AIR MAROC 
appropriately exploi ted its political air links in the 
Arab Middle East to mount the operations to Rio. Par­
ticularly in the situation of Boeing 747's fleet under 
utilisation (see Table 4.2. above).
The other catchment for Rio's service is Europe. With 
the highest number of western European destinations, 
24,-^ this must help channel traffic to the Rio 
flights, a matter achievable as Morocco's geographic 
position does not prolong the trip between the catch­
ment area and Brazil, although ROYAL AIR MAROC loses 
its advantage when in competition with European 
operators who operate a high frequency of non-stop 
services to this destination.
Influence of the geographical location
The advantageous geographical position of Morocco on
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the Atlantic and its relationship to the Rio route, 
raises the question as to how the geographical position 
of the four Maghreb countries influences the interna­
tional networks of their respective national air 
carriers. The variable through which such a comparison 
is possible comes through finding the arithmetic mean 
of the length of all of each of the carriers' opera­
tions over a certain period of time (or use the average 
sector length parameter as calculated and shown in 
Table 4.1 above when the comparison is made on the 
basis of actual performance rather than hypothetical or 
intended performance). The aim of this exercise will 
be to accept or reject the hypothesis that each 
country's location influences its international air 
network. For the sake of practicality, the areas where 
the four airlines jointly serve, i.e. Europe shall be 
the basis for this exercise. The Middle Eastern, 
African, Far Eastern and Cross Atlantic routes shall be 
excluded.
Table 4.8 contains data showing the distance and 
frequency with which each European destination is 
served directly from the area under consideration. 
Table 4.8 may be summarised in Table 4.8a.
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TABLE 4 .8. a
NORTH AFRICAN AIRLINES NETWORKS:
SUMMARY OF SECTOR FREQUENCY, DISTANCE (IN MILES) 
AND THE SUM OF DIRECT OPERATIONS TO EUROPE
B
1. No. of Sectors 37 31 27
2. Average Sector
Distances 1082.4 743.2 851.
3. Number of Weekly
Frequencies 72 146 55
4. Sum of Distances covered 
by Operations on Sectors
considered in one week 77932.8 108507.2 46805.
A = ROYAL AIR MAROC B = AIR ALGERIE
C = TUNISAIR D = LIBYAN ARAB
D
9
944.7
16
15115.2
AIRLINES
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The closeness of Northern Algeria to France, with the 
high number of weekly frequencies and destinations in 
France taken into consideration, influences the average 
sector length of AIR ALGERIE1S European air network. 
The arithmetic mean of the sectors (average sector 
length) for AIR ALGERIE amounts to 743.2 miles - the 
lowest average of all. TUNISAIR follows with 851 
miles, then LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES 944.7 miles and 
finally ROYAL AIR MAROC where the average sector length 
is 1082.4 miles.
The sums of the distances planned to Europe each week 
by the four carriers in winter 1986 show the prominence 
of the Algerian system. This prominence, despite the 
short average sector length, and the relative weakness 
of the Moroccan system when its geographical loation 
and equal population with Algeria is taken into con­
sideration is probably emphasised by the fact that the 
Straits of Gibraltar sees the greatest proportion of 
Moroccan traffic to Europe, the nearness of the 
European land mass makes crossing the Straits an easy 
alternative to travelling by air. While the Algerian 
traffic to Europe generally goes by air.
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Tine * Fremctii Comoection 1
Table 4.9 looks at the strongest and weakest links. 
The measure in establishing the comparison of these 
networks will be based on the seat/mile weekly avail­
able capacity parameter which is calculated for the 
purpose of this exercise by multiplying each intended 
operation sector distance by the number of each of the 
respective airlines aircraft seating capacity per type 
of aircraft as stipulated in Table 4.9a. Out of 19649 
thousand seat/miles weekly capacity AIR ALGERIE of­
fered on its international network 8056 thousand
seat/miles, or 41 per cent of the total international
5 7capacity was to a single French destination: Paris.
Considering the wider French connection, this receives 
1 3 206 thousand seat/miles or 66.8 per cent of AIR 
ALGERIE's total weekly seat/mile capacity offered on 
its international network.
Such a position is not unique to AIR ALGERIE's interna­
tional air network. It has already been stated in 
Table 4.5 that while AIR ALGERIE served 6 destinations 
in France, ROYAL AIR MAROC served 8 and TUNISAIR served 
7. Thus both exceed AIR ALGERIE in this respect. 
Such a position, however, is not held in terms of
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TABLE 4.9
NORTH AFRICAN AIRLINES NETWORKS: 
STROTXSEST AND WEAKEST A TRUNKS* (INTERNATIONAL)
% OF
AVAILABLE INTERNATIONAL
DESTINATION CAPACITY (000) NETWORK
AIR ALGERIE PARIS 8.056 41 .
ALL FRANCE 13.206 66.8
CASABLANCA 000.079 .0040
TUNIS .329 (7) 1.6657
TRIPOLI .040 .2025
R. AIR MAROC PARIS 4.462 24.4
ALL FRANCE 5.737 31 .4
ALGIERS .079 (1) .4
TRIPOLI .569 (3) 3.1
TUNISAIR PARIS 2.590 27.
ALL FRANCE 3.984 41 .
TRIPOLI .000 0.0
CASABLANCA .285 (2) ) Q AC
ALGIERS .527 (4) ) o * 3o
LIBYAN ARAB TUNIS .000 0.0
CASABLANCA .681 (3) 9.39
* Based on weekly Seat/Mile available in one direction (in thousands).
+ Of International Network.
( ) Indicates number of weekly frequencies.
NB Different types of aircraft were taken when capacity available was 
calculated including different types operated on the same route.
Source: Calculated from Royal Air Maroc and Tunisair winter timetables, 
1986. Air Algerie and Libyan Arab Airlines calculated frcm 
published schedules in ABC World Airways guide December 1986. 
Distance incorporated in calculation from Airline Passenger 
Tariff 108 - Oct. 1986, Ticketed Mileage Point Section.
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TABLE 4.9.a
NORTH AFRICAN AIRLINES NETWORKS: 
AIRCRAFT SEATING CAPACITY
Air Algerie Royal Air Maroc Tunisair Libyan Arab
Airlines
B727-200
B737-200
B707
B747
F27
F28
B757
A300
A310
163*
121*
158*
125*
153*
408*
48*
186<2>
155*
121*
269 (2)
159(1) 
189 <1)
44d) 
80(1 )
234(2)
Source: * Based on data available in ICAO, Digest of Statistics:
No. 224 F P30, 1976 - for Air Algerie, No. 319 F P38, 
1984 - for Royal Air Maroc, No. 330 F P39, 1985 - for 
Tunisair. (No data for subsequent dates is published).
(1) Libyan Arab Airlines.
(2) Average based on mixed class configuration as stipulated 
in Concise Guide to Cormercial Aircraft of the World, 
David Mondey, Temple Press Aerospace 1983.
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w eekly capacity offered. ROYAL AIR MAROC's interna-
R Rtional weekly capacity offered is 18286 thousand 
seat/miles, of which 4462 thousand are to Paris rep­
resenting 24.4 per cent of the whole of the interna­
tional network capacity. All French destinations rep­
resent as high as 31 .4 per cent of the total interna­
tional weekly capacity operated or 5737 thousand 
seat/miles. The influence of the 'French Connection' 
on TUNISAIR's international network is consistent with 
ROYAL AIR MAROC and AIR ALGERIE. Paris receives 27 per 
cent or 2590 thousand seat/miles per week. The whole 
of the French destinations receive 3984 thousand 
seat/miles or 41 per cent of TUNISAIR weekly interna­
tional operations totalling 9717 thousand seat/miles.
Stripping the international operations of the four 
Maghreb airlines of their 'French Connection' we would 
notice that the variation in the size of their interna­
tional operations diminishes considerably as shown in 
Table 4.10. The residue of the international 
operations shows a shift where ROYAL AIR MAROC's of­
fered international capacity becomes the highest, ex­
pressing the effect of its geographic position.
Data contained in Table 4.10 is influenced initially by
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TABLE 4.10
NORTH AFRICAN AIRLINES NETWORKS :
IMPACT OF FRENCH COMPONENT ON INTERNATIONAL 
CAPACITY OFFERED (IN MN SEAT/MILES) AND
HYPOTHETICAL
AXR ALGERIE
INTERNATIONAL 19649
FRANCE 13206
Residue 6443
Hypothetical Performance 3982
PERFORMANCE*
ROYAL AIR TUNISAIR LIBYAN ARAB 
MAROC AIRLINES
18286 9591 7253
5735 3984 199
12551 5607 7054
6790 3577 3830
* Hypothetical performance based on passenger load factors as indicated 
in Table 4.1.
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the length of each sector intended for operation, the 
number of frequencies operated and the number of seats 
on each aircraft available to operate the schedules as 
configurated by each of the four airlines. The outcome 
is thus representative of the volume available. It is 
noted that the length of sectors operated by ROYAL AIR 
MAROC and LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES have positively in­
fluenced such volume. To achieve a hypothetical posi­
tion of performance, the LOAD FACTOR eventually 
achieved in 1986 as stipulated in Table 4.1 is intro 
duced to the set of data concerning the four airlines 
without the 'French Connection'. The purpose of this 
exercise is to determine the hypothetical performance 
so as to offset the unused capacity effect.
When a country decides to operate a service for politi­
cal reasons where no significant commercial traffic is 
available, the national airline of that country falls 
under the pressure of operating a service from the 
aspect of political prestige. In this process much 
capacity may be wasted. Of course airlines are also 
restricted by the flexibility within their own fleet 
and their position in relation to type of service of­
fered by competitors on the same routes they operate.
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Tftue Maghureb Connection
The strong French orientation in the North African 
airlines' international networks is explained by these 
countries' colonial past and the continued interaction 
as a result of strong political and economic links as 
well as the existence of large groups of immigrants 
from these countries in France. If unity is felt in 
the orientation of the national air carrier networks 
towards France, how much of this French factor is mir­
rored in the air links between the Maghreb countries, 
or at least those who experienced French colonisation?
Mohammed Abed El Jabri, who is a Professor of 
Philosophy and Islamic Thought at the Mohammed Al- 
Khamis University wrote: ^ , '...much of the rich
literature of the last three decades looks at the pos­
sible emergence of a single North African entity that 
would include three, four or five regions (Morocco, 
Algeria, Tunisia, then Libya and finally Mauritania). 
Through this entity, the Maghreb would be unified in 
one state or in a federation of states; this may be the 
only solution to the problem of developing the area'. 
The first step towards unity must be marked by an in­
crease in social and economic interaction. Transport
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and communications are the vessels for such interaction 
and only the degree of their presence is indicative of 
the quantum being achieved towards such a desirable 
aspiration. Trade between the Maghreb countries has 
been consistently weak since colonisation, and Inde­
pendence has not altered this fact. Table 4.11 throws 
some light on this statement.
Overall, Table 4.11 shows not only weak trade links be­
tween adjacent countries in the Maghreb but also shows 
a general decline since Independence to the extent that 
Algerian exports to Morocco in 1976, were zero and its 
imports from Morocco were as low as 0.2 per cent of to­
tal imports. These weak trade links are consistent 
with the general weakness of inter-Maghreb air links. 
The extent of this weakness is consistent with the 
statement about strongest and weakest international air 
links, the subject of Table 4.9 above.
While France represented the strongest link for the 
three ex-French domains of the Maghreb countries, by 
contrast the weakest international links on the na­
tional carriers of the region networks are those of the 
inter-Maghreb air links. AIR ALGERIE's weakest inter­
national link is with Casablanca 285 thousand
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seat/miles weekly which represent the capacity of a 
weekly service with the smallest aircraft operated on 
AIR ALGERIE's international network (the Boeing 737). 
Table 4.11 shows that trade between the two countries 
was s tronger in colonial times than after
Independence. The trade relations between the 
largest two Maghreb states were so weak in 1 974 that
exports from Algeria to Morocco totalled 1.2 per cent
of the total Algerian exports. In the other direction, 
this was only 1 per cent of Moroccan exports. In 1976 
the state of trade was even worse with Algeria when ex­
ports to Morocco amounted to zero and not much larger 
than 0.2 per cent in the other direction. The decline 
in trade (although marginal and originally low 
anyway), or more accurately the stoppage of its flow
between these two countries, may be explained in terms
of the Spanish- Moroccan accord over the Western Sahara 
of 14 November 1975 and Morocco's 'Green Marsh' on the 
Sahara immediately afterwards.40 It was at the point 
of this incident that flights between the two countries 
operated by the two national air carriers were 
suspended, and remained so until 1983 when Morocco and 
Algeria finally opened their borders after a meeting 
between the Heads of State of these two countries. 
Morocco's air links by its national air carrier are
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weakest with Algeria, as might be expected, since 
these links represent only .4 per cent of ROYAL AIR 
MAROC's international capacity.^2 The weakest of all 
are those between Libya and Tunisia. There are no 
links between these two national air carriers serving 
points in the other country.^ (These services have 
now been resumed subsequent to the return of diplomatic 
relations as of July 1987).
The Maghreb international air links operated by the 
respective air carriers are weakest between the capi­
tals of these states. However, while these weakest 
links fall totally within this geographical area, the 
air links within the region show various degrees of in­
tensity to mirror political affiliations. Table 4.9 
shows the highest volume of links to be between Morocco 
and Libya, 569 thousand seat/miles weekly or three 
weekly services operated by ROYAL AIR MAROC as LIBYAN 
ARAB AIRLINES offers the same capacity and frequency 
on this route. ^  While the capacity offered is the 
greatest between these two countries, it is inflated by 
the location of these two countries at the extreme ends 
of the region. The total number of flights between 
Casablanca and Tripoli operated by the respective na­
tional air carriers of Libya and Morocco are six per
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week in each direction. Between Algeria and Tunisia 
these total 11 in each direction as operated by AIR AL­
GERIE and TUNISAIR. The short distance between Tunis 
and Algiers affects the degree of interaction as 
described here in comparison with the interaction be­
tween Tripoli and Casablanca which is as such inflated. 
Overall, however, the link capacity between Tripoli ana 
Casablanca and vice versa is greater than between 
Tr i p o l i  or C a s a b l a n c a  and any other M a g h r e b  
destination. By the same measure, links between Al­
geria and Tunisia, are greater than their air links 
with any other destination in the region.
In the air links within the Maghreb there is a positive 
sign, however, that may be recorded. While the links 
are extremely weak between the countries of the region, 
there exists a higher degree of links than the pure 
political link at the weakest level would normally 
imply as it must be noted that while all African links 
from Morocco and Algeria operate from these countries' 
airlines main bases of operations: Algiers and
Casablanca, respectively; the links between Algeria 
and Tunisia depart from these criteria and Tunis is 
linked with two gateways in Algeria, namely Algiers 
and Constantine.^ This particular point was also evi­
374
dent in the air links between the national carriers of 
the region such as Libya and Tunisia which had direct 
air links connecting Tripoli with Sfax and Tunis until 
these services were interrupted following the expulsion 
of 30,000 Tunisian workers^ in 1 985 .
International air gateways
The multiplicity of gateways through which air service 
operations within the region are operated demands that 
this region's international gateways be considered. 
These are special nodes on the international network 
at which international air links start or terminate. 
They assume their description and character from the 
fact that at these nodes, passengers technically enter 
or leave the country and thus they function as interna­
tional border points irrespective of their physical 
location within a country's political aerial definition 
of confines or as stated by Taaffe and Gauthier:
'...[t ]he term [gateway]...refers to a main entry-and- 
exit point for a region 1 .^  In the context of the 
Maghreb airlines' networks, these gateways function to 
particularly enhance the complementarity of the respec­
tive domestic air networks of the Maghreb countries and 
their respective international air networks.
375
Fi
C  
U
R
E
o
. ■ y y ~ >.*
<\J d d  U. GO ^
• • tL 0
<j > u
* 5 >r
376
Figure 4.2 above indicates the relative position of 
Maghreb countries' international air gateways and a 
ranking of gateways within their respective networks. 
The greatest potential interaction between the domestic 
and international networks occurs through Casablanca, 
Algiers, Tunis and Tripoli. Almost 87 per cent of the 
potential interaction between ROYAL AIR MAROC's inter­
national and domestic air network occurs through
A Q
Casablanca. As for AIR ALGERIE, Algiers gateways
represents 71 .5 per cent, Tunis 86.5 per cent of 
Tunisair's operations, and Tripoli 100 per cent of 
Libyan Arab Airlines operations, since it is the only 
international gateway available.
An Analysis of the domestic air networks
From data published on the results of North Africa's 
airlines, some details are available on the performance 
in 1986 on the domestic networks. Such details are 
available for LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES, ROYAL AIR MAROC and 
TUNISAIR. No data is available on AIR ALGERIE'S domes­
tic network performance for the same period. The 
available data is reproduced in Table 4.12.
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Kilometres flown: the figures indicate that LIBYAN 
ARAB AIRLINES performed 6561 thousand kilometres 
which ranks by far as the highest performance 
among the three North African carriers. The ratio 
of this variable is as follows;
ROYAL AIR MAROC 100; TUNISAIR 113 and LIBYAN ARAB 
AIRLINES 1566.
The size of LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES domestic network 
qualified this airline to rank 46 among world air­
lines whose domestic network data were published 
by IATA for 1986, World Airlines Statistics, 1986, 
(Builetin 31).
b and c )
Aircraft departure numbers and average length: 
aircraft departures indicate the number of flights 
performed. LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES operated 10459 
while ROYAL AIR MAROC operated 1896 flights and 
TUNISAIR 1493. The average sector length operated 
was 627 kilometres, 221 kms, 317 kms for LIBYAN 
ARAB AIRLINES, ROYAL AIR MAROC and TUNISAIR 
respectively. Based on these figures, LIBYAN ARAB 
AIRLINES has, by far, operated a greater number of 
flights each of which flew a much longer distance.
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Passengers carried (number): the trends in the
prominence of LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES domestic 
scheduled air network are markedly expressed in 
the number of passengers carried. LIBYAN ARAB 
AIRLINES carried 953688 passengers while ROYAL AIR 
MAROC and TUNISAIR carried 70035 and 123083 
respectively, producing a ratio of 100 for ROYAL 
AIR MAROC, 176 for TUNISAIR and 1 336 for LIBYAN 
ARAB AIRLINES.
f, g and h)
P a s s e n g e r  k i l o m e t r e s  flown, a v a i l a b l e  seat 
kilometres and passenger load factors: the general 
prominence of LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES domestic 
scheduled operations in comparison with that of 
ROYAL AIR MAROAC and TUNISAIR is generally 
reflected in the passengers kilometres flown and 
available seat/kilometres operated. LIBYAN ARAB 
AIRLINES passenger/kilometres flown figure for 
1 986 is 61 6765 thousand for ROYAL AIR MAROC and 
TUNISAIR this is 21339 thousand and 39112 thousand 
respectively creating a ratio of ROYAL AIR MAROC 
100, TUNISAIR 183 and LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES 2890
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achieving a passenger load factor of 40.5% for 
ROYAL AIR MAROC, 55.8% for TUNISAIR and a 59.7% 
for LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES.
i, j and k)
P e r f o r m e d  t o n n e - k i l o m e t r e  a v a i l a b l e  tonne- 
k i l o m e t r e s  and weight load f a c t o r : these
parameters sum the overhaul operations of the 
three airlines on their respective networks. As 
for weighting each network, LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES 
performed 49887 thousand tonne-kilometres, ROYAL 
AIR MAROC 2238 thousand and TUNISAIR 3414 thousand 
against an available weight capacity of 85981 
thousand tonne-kilometres for LIBYAN ARAB AIR­
LINES 5961 thousand for ROYAL AIR MAROC and 7298 
thousand for TUNISAIR creating a ratio of ROYAL 
AIR MAROC 100, TUNISAIR 122 and LIBYAN ARAB AIR­
LINES OF 1442 achieving weight load factors of 58% 
for LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES, 37.6% for ROYAL AIR 
MAROC and 46.8% for TUNISAIR.
In every respect of comparison for the domestic network 
between the three airlines, LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES has 
occupied a supreme position indicating the paramount 
importance of its domestic network.
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A collective cotmpaxison for One fonir airlines
The prominence of LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES domestic network 
among the three airlines - LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES, ROYAL 
AIR MAROC and TUNISAIR was carried out in absence of a 
significantly large domestic network in the North 
African region. That is the domestic network of AIR 
ALGERIE. The absence of data on actual operations of 
AIR ALGERIE in the data published in international pub­
lications can be compensated through another comparison 
that is based on data publicly available through the 
intended capacity which is calculable. These data do 
not show performance. They show intended capacity and 
as a measure for comparison they do make good the 
shortage, albeit, these are less comprehensive than 
what a full comparison requires.
This type of data is suitable for comparison in 
analysis of the nature of that carried out in this 
thesis. Domestic networks are operated for economic 
reasons which are associated with the country's economy 
as a whole, and for political reasons where the ad­
ministrative element in the country's political system 
and the state's control over its own territory is
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expressed in linking the states territory to the 
political centre or centres within. It must be noted 
in this context that the figures incorporating summed 
distances shall vary from those reported in the Tables 
already made concerning total operations or domestic 
operations based on data published by IATA. This 
variation is the outcome of the fact that annual 
results include actual operations throughout the year 
(1986) where summer and winter s c h e d u l e s  were 
performed. Summer schedules are usually more intense 
than winter schedules. The data used in the analysis 
included in this section look at winter schedules only.
Scheduled Capacity
Table 4.13 shows the weekly scheduled domestic winter 
intended capacity for the four airlines of the region 
of North Africa as calculated from their respective 
published Winter 1986 timetables.
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Tatule 4 .113
M Q M T M  A F R I C A N  A I M LIMES METWORKS
Scheduled domestic capacity. Winter 1986 (in thousand 
seat/miles) in one direction
Air Algerie Libyan Arab Royal Air Tunisair
Airlines Maroc
9504 6124 2676 357
Source: calculated from Winter domestic schedules
1986. ABC World Airways Guide, December 1986. Seat 
capacity see Table 4.9a above and distances are Ticket 
Point Mileages as shown in APT. 108, October 1986
AIR ALGERIE's domestic network offers the largest 
capacity of the four. The weekly available capacity in 
thousand seat/miles for the four airlines is: 9504,
61 24, 26 76 and 357 for AIR ALGERIE, LIBYAN ARAB
AIRLINES, ROYAL AIR MAROC and TUNISAIR respectively.
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At the ratio scale these are 1000 AIR ALGERIE, 64 4 
LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES, 282 ROYAL AIR MAROC and a fringe 
38 for TUNISAIR. These ratios are useful in making
further comparisons involving the North African States
areas and populations.
network capacity ratios and area and population size
For this analysis to be more representative it has to
include upgraded data that would desribe more ac­
curately the network in relation to area and population 
size, that is in quoting such capacity in seat/miles 
available and for finding a per area unit and per 
capita capacity per country. Such a measurement is 
useful in that it gives evidence of the relative extent 
to which each of the air networks spreads to cover the 
area of the country it serves and its relevance to 
population. A glance at Figure 4.3 gives a visual im­
pression of how extensive and spread the Algerian sys­
tem is. The different shapes and sizes of the 
countries of the region makes it imperative that some 
quantative measurement should be found to confirm the 
visual perception.
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The ratios in Table 4.14 show a particularly favourable 
position of the Libyan per capita capacity available on 
the network. However, with the general weakness of the 
Libyan position in all other measurements when the 
network as a whole is considered including the interna­
tional operations, some explanation is due. Primarily 
this position is a result of the fact that Libya has 
the lowest population density per square kilometre: 
2.045. (Algeria 9.2398, Morocco 30.3448 and Tunisia 
42.6829), emphasised by the division of country's 
population in two major agglomerations separated by the 
Gulf of Surt. The geographical distribution of the 
population in distinctively two major aeas is charac­
teristic of Libya alone among the Maghreb states. 
Table 4.15 looks at the area/network ratio. This is
important in that the size of the state dictates the 
shape and length of its domestic air network. While
Table 4.14 showed Libya's prominence per capita Table
4.15 reverses the position when the area/network 
parameter is used. Domestic network/area ratios for 
the four states are 406 for Algeria, 237 for Morocco, 
171 for Tunisia and 100 for Libya. This is a sign that 
indicates the level of aerial ramification and dis­
tribution of the networks. The high capacity available 
per capita ratio and low network/area ratio is a result
387
TABLE 4.14
NORTH AFRICAN AIRLINES NEIWORKS: 
WEEKLY DOMESTIC CAPACITY/PER CAPITA RATIOS
POPULATION<1> WEEKLY DOMESTIC*2* PER CAPITA
CAPACITY RATIO RATIO
ALGERIA to to 1000 253
MOROCCO 22. 282 71
LIBYA 3.6 644 1000
TUNISIA 7. 381 30
Source: (1 ) Based on data in EIU, Middle East and North Africa
Review, 1985.
(2) In mn Seat/Miles - see Table 4.4 above.
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TABLE 4.15
NORTH AFRICAN AIRLINES NETWORKS: 
DOMESTIC NETWORK/AREA COMPARATIVE RATIOS
(1) (2)
Area Danes tic Network Length Ratio
ALGERIA 2,381 27750 406
MOROCCO .725 4927 237
LIBYA 1.760 5055 100
TUNISIA .164 805 171
(1) in mn sq.km
(2) Danestic Network as calculated in Table 4.3 above.
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of low and concentrated population, high frequency and 
limited routes. The position of the Algerian network 
indicates the extensive coverage of the territorial 
area of this country. Morocco follows Algeria in its 
coverage of its area with the domestic network. Areas 
in the Western Sahara, Laayoun and Dakhla represent an 
important component in the Moroccan domestic air 
network.
Connectivity and alternative routings
A graph that represents the linkages and nodes of ROYAL 
AIR MAROC's, AIR ALGERIE's and TUNISAIR's domestic net­
works is contained in Figure 4.3. The number of 
linkages and their incidence at the various nodes for 
each of the three networks demonstrates that the Al­
gerian domestic air network is the most complex. 
Figure 4.4 describes the Libyan domestic network. It 
is possible that, after downgrading the data charac­
terising the structure of this network to the same 
level as that of Figure 4.3, one may include this net­
work in the total comparison made for the four domestic 
networks to measure the degree of connectivity of these 
networks. This is attempted here through the graph-
390
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theoric measurement of Gamma and Alpha indices follow­
ing the applications suggested by Taaffe and 
Gauthier.^
To apply these two models we start with the gamma 
model to find the degree of connectivity in the four 
domestic networks with which we are concerned.
Equation a).
actual edges (linkages) e
Y (gamma) = --------------------------- = -----
maximum edges emax
Where v = the number of nodes
To apply this model to the four networks under 
consideration we assign :
Morocco (Y^), Algeria (Yj^), Tunisia 
Libya (Yiv)
e
3(v-2)
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22 22
1 . Yj_ =   =   = 56 . 41
3 ( 1 5 - 2 )  39
61 61
2. Yii 72 . 61
3 ( 3 0 - 2 ) 84
3 .  Y i n 5 5 . 5 5
3 ( 5 - 2 )
1 3 13
4. YI V
3 ( 1 1 - 2 )
48 .1 4
27
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Thus, AIR ALGERIE's domestic network connectivity is 
the greatest at 72.61 per cent, followed by ROYAL AIR 
MAROC at 56.41 per cent, then TUNISAIR at 55. 55 per 
cent leaving LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES1s connectivity to 
occupy the last position at 48.14 per cent.
Such a measure is applicable and may be promoted to 
absorb the circuitry aspect in networks. For example, 
as Tripoli is reachable on a direct link from Sabhah, 
this destination is available through the Benghazi 
node, or even with Tubruq added to it, yet a circuit 
might be completed to Sabhah initiating a journey 
through the three nodes of Benghazi, Tubruq and 
Tripoli. Connectivity through circuitry is more com­
monly known as alternative routings. The four net­
works are measured through the Alfa circuitry model.
Eqeatiomu h) -
actual circuits e - v + 1
Z (Alfa) =   = ----------
maximum circuits 2v-5
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Where e = actual edges (linkages) 
v = the number of nodes
Z-: assigned to Morocco Z+i assigned to Algeria
Ziii assigned to Tunisia Z^v assigned to Libya
11
iv
2 2 - 1 5 + 1
1 . Z ±
(2x15) - 5 25
32. 00
61 30 + 1 32
2. Zi:L 58.18
(2x30) - 5 55
5 + 1
3. Z i n 20. 00
(2x5) - 5
1 3 - 1 1 + 1  3
4. Ziv =   = ___ = 17.65 %
(2x11) - 5 17
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The Alpha equation shows the greater circuitry of the 
Algerian system at 58.18% followed by Morocco at 32% 
and Tunisia at 20%. Leaving the Libyan system to oc­
cupy the last position giving evidence of a highly 
centralised system with Tripoli at the core.
From the results of equations a) and b), the percent­
age of circuitry in the domestic networks in the
region confirms the ranking of the degree of minimal 
connectivity (direct links). That is to say AIR 
ALGERIE's domestic network enjoys the highest level of 
connectivity and circuitry, followed by ROYAL AIR 
MAROC, TUNISAIR and lastly LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES.
FurtJher AmaJLysis of tine Libyan domestic air network:
The preceding analysis placed Libya's domestic air 
transport network at different places when compared 
and ranked with and among those of the region's four
countries' networks. The length of its domestic net­
work ranked second; so was the annual capacity
offered; it ranked third as to the number of des­
tinations following Algeria and Morocco; as to the 
measure of connectivity and circuitry, it ranked last 
under the Gamma and Alpha graphtheoric measurements as
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it also did when area/domestic network length was 
calculated. When the per capita/capacity measure at 
the ratio scale was examined, Libya ranked highest. 
The fact that the general concern of this thesis in 
mainly Libya's air transport system makes further 
elaboration on the Libyan domestic air network, as a 
system independent of those within the region of the 
Maghreb, imperative.
The concentration in the comparative analysis of the 
region's networks was very much divorced from many of 
the variables that are associated with transportation 
in general. These comparisons tended to receive in 
most cases some explanation in terms of political as- 
sociation of their causations, as has been the case 
with the links in the international networks. Or in 
structural and organisational terms, or in terms of 
area and demographic data as has been the case with 
the domestic networks. This abstraction has been 
necessary since, if our concern is with: 'fully under­
standing transport in all its ramifications [we] 
should pursue [our] interests in many disciplines be­
sides geography'.^
£“ *1
The Libyan domestic network is produced in a model
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figure 4: 5.
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398
graph in Figure 4.5. A graph entails an abstraction, 
simplification and generalised description of the 
domestic network, for it lacks the definition of the 
geographic region in which it is operated. It 
merely looks at the network as a finite number of 
places, where each sector is a set of two places with 
no distinction made between origin and destination. 
This graph shows eleven domestic destinations with 
various degrees of connectivity. Tripoli is connected 
with seven destinations, Benghazi six, Sabhah three, 
Tubruq and Hun two, and Kufrah, Ghat, Ghadames , 
Misrata, Al Baydah and Martouba (Darnah) are all 
linked through a single link.
'All networks, apparently, have a hierarchical 
structure . The number of links from each of the
nodes on the Libyan system show the cities of 
Tripoli, Benghazi and Sabhah to rank top of the 
system. Figure 4.5 assumes that all nodes are of unit 
size and all links of unit length, thus, looking at a 
specific system such as the Libyan domestic air serv­
ices system required some additional data describing 
its organisation so as to be closer to eventuality 
which is obviously more complex.
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Of particular significance in Figure 4.5, is the fact 
that Tripoli is Libya's only international gateway and 
that the Tripoli Agglomeration accommodates almost one
C O
million people, mostly in Libya's largest city, 
Tripoli. The existence of the central government of­
fices in Tripoli, despite the different nomenclature 
5 4in use, has made it, de facto, the central a d ­
m i n i s t r a t i v e  centre of Libya since the 1969 
Revolution. (As of January 1987, Libya's capital is 
no longer Tripoli). Thus the prominence of Tripoli in 
the domestic system stems from the fact that all traf­
fic leaving or entering the country must pass through 
it. Every destination on the domestic network is 
directly linked with Tripoli, except Kufrah, Ghat and 
Misratah. Kufrah's link with Benghazi stems from the 
fact that at Kufrah the main economic activity is 
directly associated with the Kufrah agricultural 
projects whose headquarters are in Benghazi. Kufrah's 
link with Tripoli existed until September 1 985 , ^  but 
seems to have been suspended since, presumably due to 
economic reasons associated with the national air 
carrier. It is, however, evident that the Libyan 
domestic air transport system had been more extensive 
in 1985 than it was in 1986 as previously Surt used to 
be connected with Tripoli and Benghazi. As for
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Ghat, this sector has traditionally been served as an 
extension of services to Sabhah. The link between
Tripoli and Misratah is not evident on the map. This 
link operated in the mid-1 970's, ^7 t>ut proved commer­
cially unpopular. The level of mobility of the 
population on the coastal regions in Tripolitania and 
the good coastal road, low flight frequency, distance 
between Tripoli and Misratah on the one hand and their 
respective airports on the other, made the trip by car 
more practical. With all the above points in mind and 
the absence of many possible links between points on 
the m a p , ^  works to support the assumption that the 
system is characterised by the dominance of a d ­
ministrative links. In fact, the nature of the inter­
nal economic system based on the Green Book which does 
not encourage trade or wealth accumulation, leaves no 
option to accept that assumption where the whole sys­
tem is operated for political and administrative 
reasons, irrespective of the intensity of traffic on 
the routes operated.
The air links between the Libyan domestic destinations 
are expressed in Figure 4.4 in bars. The total number 
of flights operated by the national airline including 
international services is 140 per week, 101 of which
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are on the domestic network. The thickest of these 
bars is the link between Tripoli and Benghazi. With 
3592 thousand seat/miles offered in one direction on 
this route which represents 59 per cent of the entire 
domestic capacity offered. With 61 flights weekly in 
each direction between Tripoli and Benghazi, this sec­
tor dominates the domestic operations, followed by the 
sector between Tripoli and Sabhah.
The offered capacity between Libya's two major cities 
of Tripoli and Benghazi is attributable to demographic 
and administrative factors since they are the two 
largest cities and Tripoli in patricular accom­
modates most of the adminsitrative organisations. 
Sabhah has always received the status of the third 
politically important town in Libya, initially as the 
capital of the Fezzan province and later as an ad­
ministrative centre. Alawar estimated that
Fezzan's population which was 59,313 according to the 
population census of 1954, 79,329 in the population
census of 1964 and 110,318 in the census of 1973 had 
reached 161,960 in 1980 and 206,000 in 1985. Sabhah's 
population in 1 980 exceeded 70,000.^ From trends in 
the region's population growth and the particular 
growth of Sabhah as a consequence of the: '...super­
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imposition of commercial and government services of 
present agricultural activities' and the fact that: 
'...in the future trends will follow the same 
c o u r s e ' , it is rational to assume that Sabhah's 
population in 1986 has reached 100,000, especially 
with this town's growing importance as a gateway to 
the strategic Aouzou region.
Figure 4.6 attempts to test the gravity model and com­
pares the outcome with estimated offered capacity on 
the routes from Tripoli to Benghazi and Sabhah. The 
Tripoli Agglomeration population is estimated at one 
million, Benghazi's at 600,000 and Sabhah's at 
100,000. The outcome of the calculation shows that 
the gravity model works acceptably to show that 
the catchment potential for movement to Tripoli from 
Sabhah and from Benghazi is being exploited in a 
degree indicating the equal importance of Tripoli as 
an administrative and political centre. Ratios of
interaction between Tripoli and Sabhah are relatively 
higher for the element of Sabhah's role as a strategic 
gateway to the Auzou region and the security situation 
in that region causes additional traffic. In a society 
where trade is completely centrally controlled and the 
private sector is restricted, so far, to mainly tradi-
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tional agriculture, movement is dominated by a d ­
ministrative causations, with Tripoli as the 
central administrative focus.
Conclusion
The Maghreb airlines are responsible for providing in­
ternational and domestic services so as to allow for 
the movement which stems from the region's economic 
and social links within its own territory and with the 
rest of the world. However, the state ownership of 
these airlines and the monopolistic nature of such 
ownership makes them operate their international 
routes from largely political directives. The inter­
national networks of these airlines are parameters of 
each of these countries' political orientations.
The geographical position and field of operations in­
fluenced the extent of networks and the type of 
routes operated. For much of the 1970's there ap­
peared to be a consistency in standardisation on the 
e q u i p m e n t  u s e d  r e s u l t i n g  in r e g i o n a l  f l e e t  
commonality, however with political differences 
deepening and with pressure from the United States on 
Libya as well as pressure from European aircraft
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manufacturers and governments in the whole region it 
appears that such commonality in fleet structures is 
disappearing.
The comparison between the fleet and networks operated 
have shown firstly that AIR ALGERIE is the region's 
largest operator. The international component of this 
operator's network keeps it ranking first among those 
of the region, however, the dominance of French des­
tinations in this network throws light on the 
strength of Algeria's French connection. Secondly, 
Morocco's national airline ranks second among the air­
lines of the region. Morocco's geographic alignment 
versus the main traffic catchment, Europe, contributes 
to influence the seat/mile capacity operated and thus 
inflates it. Morocco's geographic position on the 
Atlantic and her political relations with the United 
States and the conservative Arab states in the 
Arabian Peninsula made of ROYAL AIR MAROC the first, 
and so far the only, Maghreb airline to operate across 
the Atlantic. Thirdly, Tunisia's connection with the 
France is equally significant and her Middle Eastern 
links are the strongest and most varied and fall en­
tirely within the Arab Middle East. Fourthly, Libya's 
international capacity offered is the smallest of all.
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No destination on the Libyan network dominates any 
other to any significant degree.
The analysis of the African aspect of the region's in­
ternational networks indicated political competition 
for hegemony in the region of Francophone West Africa. 
Competition is clearly expressed in parallel services 
so that in general terms, AIR ALGERIE's network ap­
pears to contain that of ROYAL AIR MAROC, showing 
where these two countries' policies have been 
accepted. Tunisia's, West African link is restricted 
to a single destination. More surprisingly, Libya, 
maintains no operations in African regions outside the 
Arab countries (namely the Maghreb and Sudan).
In spite of the geographical unity of the region, and 
the many claims towards finding some economic and 
political unity among the countries of the region, it 
is evident that the air links operated by the respec­
tive national airlines of the region inter alia these 
countries are the weakest in the absolute. These, it 
is argued, are largely an expression of the deep 
political divisions in the region and the absence of 
economic and social interaction which is imperative to 
achieve practical unity.
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The airlines of the region, by virtue of their 
ownership, assume the responsibility of providing ex­
clusively and in a monopolistic fashion, the domestic 
air links. On the other hand, their operations as 
such are representative of the government's policy of 
linking all areas for administrative reasons. The 
largest network with the most circuitry is that of AIR 
ALGERIE. The least circuitry efficient but largest 
per capita/area network is that of Libya. The weak­
ness in circuitry in the Libyan network is indicative 
of demographic, administrative and political con­
centration in the coastal areas, but particularly in 
Tripoli which also represents the region's only inter­
national gateway.
In sum, air networks operated by the national air car­
riers serve as useful tools to examine economic, so­
cial and political links in the region. Geographical 
analysis helps to explain the patterns observed.
408
Footnotes
1. Rigas Doganis, Measure for Measure, in Airline
Business, May, 1986.
2. W.W. Fisher, The Middle East, Methuen & Co., (7th
ed.), pp.1-3, 19 78.
3. US Government, Libya: a Country Study, (3rd ed.),
Area Handbook Series, p.222, 1979.
4. Richard Lawless & Allan Findlay (et At.), Morth 
Africa, Croom Helm, p.xi, 1984.
5. J. Wright, Libya: A Modern History,, p.86, 1983
(reprint).
6. ibid, p .9 5.
7 . ibid, p. 95 .
8. Rigas Doganis,
Etude Air Maghreb:
Evaluation de l a  Rentabilite Econo uni gee d'une ex­
ploitation commune par les qeatre pays du Maghreb d*en 
Reseae Arien Long-Coerrier. Prepared for Le Comite 
Maghrebin Du Transport Aerien, 1968?
9. In the 1960's, Libyan, Tunisian, Algerian and 
Moroccan national air carriers operated French-made 
SUD AVIATION Caravelles. Egyptair (UNITED ARAB 
AIRLINES) operated British-built Comets.
In the 1970‘s, Libyan, Tunisian, Algerian and Moroccan
409
national air carriers all operated Boeing 727 's. 
EGYPTAIR operated 707's and more recently Airbuses and 
B767's.
10. Nawal K. Taneja, The Commercial Airline Industry,
D.C. Heath & Company, (8th ed.), p.93, 1982.
11. Such regulations and standards are drawn by the
Air Navigation Committee of ICAO. ibid, p.281.
12. ibid, p .282.
13. Air ambulance, aero-clubs, helicopter services,
agricultural spraying, special operations etc.,.
14. Libya operates an extensive air network to the 
oil fields by special arrangement with the oil 
organisations. For example, Morocco does not have a 
similar system and Algeria depends mainly on its 
public domestic system while Tunisia has little such 
activity. For details of aircraft in the General 
Aviation category see:
Aviation Data Centre, World Airlines Fleets, 1985-
Libya pp.573-574
Tunisia p.498
Algeria p.585
Morocco p.94
15. World Airlines Statistics 1986, Bulletin No. 31, 
IATA. IATA Members Statistics, p. 54.
16. Nawal Taneja, The Caoramerclal Airline Industry,
410
Heath, pp.40-42, 8th printing (1982).
17. B747 configuration depends on operator's routes 
but 450 seats is not unusual. At 5,988 mile ranges it 
can seat 452 passengers. The maximum speed is 602 
mph. F27 configuration with 44 passengers permits a 
maximum range of 1,197 miles and its normal cruising 
speed is 298 mph.
See David Mondey, Concise guide to Commercial Aircraft
of the World, pp. 49, 118, Temple Press, (3rd Ed.),
1 985 .
18. See N.K. Taneja, The Commercial Airline Industry, 
D.C. Heath, (8th e d .), p.93, 1982.
19. See CAF, A C o m p l e t e  H i s t o r y  of C o m m e r c i a l  
Aircraft Fleets, pp.3 46, 563.
Jet and Turbo-Prop Equipped Airlines of the World
1950-1982, Avmark Inc, 1982.
Also note Libya received one B707 in 1 976 which was 
new and configurated for use in VIP travel. All sub­
sequent B707's were second-hand with many hours on 
their air frame.
20. As recently as 30 November 1982, Boeing made ap­
plications for export licenses to Libya for 5 Boeing 
767.200's. 6 Boeing 737.200's and one Boeing 747 SP
(presumably to replace the B707 operated for VIP 
travel).
41 1
21. Aviation Data Centre, Airliner Production List 
86, pp.410-446, 1986.
22. ROYAL AIR MAROC's French destinations are:
1) Bastia 2) Bordeaux 3) Lyon 4) Marseille 5) 
Paris 6) Strasbourg 7) Toulouse 8) Nice.
TUNISAIR1s French destinations are:
1) Bordeaux 2) Lyon 3) Nice 4) Paris 5) Strasbourg 
6) Toulouse.
AIR ALGERIE's French destinations are:
1) Lille 2) Lyon 3) Marseille 4) Nice 5) Paris 
6) Toulouse.
LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINE's only French destinations is:
1) Paris.
Source: 1986 timetables of the four operators.
23. The Middle East Magazine, I.C. Publications, 
London, No.153, July 1987, reported this fact as the 
Algerian Government intends to invest some 19,000 mil­
lion Algerian dinars ($4bn US) before the end of this 
century so that the bed capacity in Algeria reaches 
120,000. (Tunisia's 1985 capacity was 93,275 beds as 
indicated in the Office National Du Tourisme Tunisien,
41 2
Le Tourisme Tunisian ei Chiffres, 1 985).
24. All data used for Moroccan tourist figures from, 
La L e t t r e  De Tons ri sime - B m l l e t i n  I n t e n e  
d * Informations Touristiques, Office National Marocain 
De Tourisme, Rabat, Morocco, 1 February 1987. 
Provided by courtesy
of Morocco Tourist Office - London.
25. All data used for Tunisian tourist figures are 
from Le Tourisme Tumisiee en Chiffres, 119*85, Office 
National Du Tourisme Tunisien, Tunis, Tunisia, 1986? 
Provided by courtesy of the Tunisia Tourist Office - 
London.
26. V. Thompson and R. Adoloff, Conflict in Chad, 
p p . 141-143.
C. Hurst & Co., 1981.
27. LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES, Market Share Analysis, 
(unpublished), 1982.
28. LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES, Market Share Analysis, 
(unpublished), 1981.
29. In 1983, there were 44,456 Turks, 12,042 
Palestinians, and 23,227 Syrians.
EIU, Regional Review, The Middle East and North 
AFriea, The Economist Publications, p.155, 1985.
30. Boeing Commercial Airplane Company, Seattle, 
LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES, Airline Analysis, 1975-1985,
41 3
January 1985.
31. ROYAL AIR MAROC, timetables for winter 1986/87.
32. IRAQI AIRWAYS flight 521/522 routing and
frequency in ABC World Airways Guide, December 1986.
33. TOP FIVE ARAB TRADE PARTMERS WITH BRAZIL
(in In US$) first half year 
1985 1986 1985 1986
EXPORTS IMPORTS
1 -Iraq 1 85.2 255.7 800.2
2-Saudi Arabia 80 . 3 124.4 502 . 0
3-Egypt 99.2 83. 4 -
4-Kuwait 16.4 21 .3 -
5-UAE 24.5 16.1 _
Source: MEED, Vol.30, No. 51/52, p.82.
34. The most recent such service is between
Casablanca and Riyadh, see ROYAL AIR MAROC, winter 
timetable 1986/87.
35. Only one stop - Casablanca.
36. See Table 4.4 above.
37. See Table 4.9.
38. ibid.
414
39. Halim Barakat (et al. ) , Con temporary ffifforth 
Africa, p.63., Croom Helm, 1985.
40. T. Hodges, 'Western Sahara1 in The Moots of a 
Desert War, Croom Helm, p.viii, 1983.
41 . EIU, Regional Review , The Middle East and Morth 
Africa, The Economist, p.50, 1985.
42. See Table 4.9.
43. At the time of writing, based on winter 1 986/87 
timetables.
44. See LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES, 1986 timetables, ABC, 
World Airways Guide, December 1986.
45. See AIR ALGERIE, 1 986 timetables, ABC, World
Airways Guide, December 1986.
46. Middle East, IC Publications, October 1985.
Also see: LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES, Statistical Annual
Report 1985 dated 3.5.86 (unpublished) for stoppage of 
air services to Tunis and Sfax as of September 1985.
47. E.J. Taaffe & H.L. Gauthier, Geography of 
Transportation, Prentice Hall, p.11, 1973.
48. Based on a number of international frequencies in 
each direction.
49. E.J. Taaffe & H.L. Gauthier, Geography off 
Transportation, Prentice Hall, pp.100-115, 1973.
41 5
Models reproduced below.
See also J.Lowe and S. Moryadas, The Geography of 
Movement, Houghton & Mifflin Co., pp.86-97, 19 75.
Y (Gamma) measure.
r/jej/cs s. I MAx/Mt/»i avf NOJMSj
t>/A ^/?4M^ 4 7TC
*t*SA£f£xr*p*#er £*<fss .
15
The relationship between the number of nodes (v) and
41 6
the maximum number of linkages (e) in a planar graph 
(where no edges intersect) is always:
e = 3{v -2)
Thus Y = e
emax
e____
3(v - 2}
Z (Alpha) measure
In a finite circuit e - v - 1
e - (v - 1 ) = e - v + 1
The number of circuits is a function of nodes,
replacing emax to become as Y =  e
3(v - 2)
therefore e - v + 1 = 3{v - 2) - (v -1) = 2v - 5
therefore z = e - v + 1
2v - 5
thus
41 7
50. ibid, Preface.
51. As in winter 1986 and as shown in LIBYAN ARAB AIR­
LINES timetables, in ABC World Airways Guide, December 
1 986.
52. E.J. Taffe & H.L. Gauthier, Geography of 
Transportation, Prentice Hall, p.97.
53. Libya's population is estimated at 3.6 million 
(see EIU, Regional Review: The Middle East and North 
Africa, 1 985 ) .
For Tripoli Agglomeration population see M.M. Buru in 
M.M. Buru, S.M. Ghanem and K.S. Mclachlan (et al.), 
Planning & Development in Modern Libya, MENAS, p.110, 
1 985.
54. Libyan ideology denies the existence of a govern­
ment in Libya in the presence of 'direct democratic
rule 1 .
55. Annual Passenger, Cargo and Mail Traffic Report, 
LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES, p.16, 1985 (internal document). 
Load factors January/September 1985 were 20.8% Tripoli 
Kufra and 14.1% Kufrah Tripoli.
56. List of domestic sectors Ibid, p.16.
57. This link was initiated by the researcher in 1977
but was stopped due to misunderstandings with the 
military authorities responsible for Misratah Airport 
over additional flights from Benghazi at short notice.
418
The Tripoli-Misratah sector was not commercially 
popular but had to be operated due to aircraft 
positioning requirements.
58. Libya's domestic network level of circuitry is the 
lowest in the Maghreb at only 17.65 per cent.
59. Mohammed Alawar, M.M. Buru & K.S. Mclachlan (Eds.) 
Planning and Development In Modern Libya, pp. 91-95. , 
MENAS, 1985.
60. ibid, see Figure 6:2.
61. ibid, p.9 5.
41 9
CHAPTER 5: IMPLICATIONS OF LOCATION ON THE LIBYAN AIM-
TRAMSPORT SYSTEMS:
Comprehensive studies on transportation in Libya with 
collective modal evaluation are relatively few. 
Elazzabi stated in 1981 that only three transport 
studies were available. That by Doxiadis Associates in 
1964 which considered road, air and maritime transport, 
a United Nations Commission for technical cooperation 
prepared for the Libyan Government by N.D.A. Chandry in 
1970 and the industry orientated economic survey of the 
Libyan Arab Republic prepared for the Libyan Industrial 
Research Centre, all of which Elazzabi found unsatis­
factory in that they fell short of providing detailed 
and useful assessments. Since 1981, however, a study 
by Fredrick Harris entitled luibyaim Transportation 
Sfctmdy, was completed in 1 985, and presented to the 
Secretariat of Communications and Maritime Transport, 
under whose authority all transport modes fall. This 
study covered the period up to the end of the current 
century.
The various writings and reports, whatever aspect of 
transport in Libya they were concerned with, looked at 
this problem from the basic fact of the economic need
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for transport. The report by the International Bank
o
for Reconstruction and Development (1960) looked at 
transport through a general assessment of Libya's 
economic situation at the dawn of Libya's oil industry. 
The study by Doxiadis summarised the task of transport 
as the provision of internal links and specifying: 
'...the two coastal regions' as springboards for links 
with: ' . ..neighbouring African countries and other
overseas countries'.^ Elazzabi' s l o a d s  and Roa d  
Tzransport amd Social and Economic CSnamge in the 
Socialist IL ilb y a im  Arab Jamahiriya: A  Geographical
Analysis  ^ was concerned with the development in road 
transport touching on the physical, historical, 
demographic and economic background that accompanied 
the development of roads over time. A memorandum by 
the Directorate of Road Transport and Railways dated 
September 1984,^ demonstrated how Libya forms the miss­
ing link in a North African railway system that would 
link Egypt with Morocco,^ emphasising the vital impor­
tance of a railway system to the development of the 
heavy industry sector in the country as well as the 
strategic importance of a railway system for defence 
purposes. Interestingly, however, this study went as 
far as weighing the advantages of the proposed network 
from environmental aspects against other modes as if to
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propose that such an advantage may encourage implemen­
tation of such an extensive system to replace other 
modes of transport from environmental considerations, 
or from energy considerations where, as shown by this 
document, railways depend on oil for only 50 per cent 
of their energy requirements, while all other mechani­
cal power driven modes of transport depend entirely on 
oil energy.^ This document, however, must be given 
credit for raising the environmental and energy con­
siderations absent in all other studies. The latest of 
the studies under consideration is that of Fredrick 
Harris Inc.  ^ which is concerned with transportation in 
Libya as a whole with the objective of understanding 
existing transport problems and devising a plan for all 
modes covering the remainder of the current century. 
The approach depended on the application of forecasting 
m ode ls fed with data from v a r i o u s  g o v e r n m e n t  
departments, while the study claimed to have been 
devising a plan for an integrated multi-modal transport
system, evidence shows that the various modes were
1 ohandled separately.
The vital role of air transport in the Libyan 'island1
The various approaches to an analysis of transport sys-
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terns in Libya indicate the need for finding some 
reasoning to support the view that air transport does 
play a distinguished role; a role that elevates the 
degree of the vitality of this mode where, while 
surface-bound modes are quite important, air transport 
would be proven to be vital in the extreme. The ap­
proach to achieving such an objective shall stem from 
two assumptions. The first is that Libya's quarrels 
with her neighbours, cut links and closed borders 
qualify her to be looked at as an island - without air 
transport she would be isolated from the world beyond 
her immediate neighbours. Secondly, even the dis­
tance factor alone within the island makes it the most 
important mode for moving people among the various 
demographic concentrations.
Transport, lines and political lines off demarcation
In times pre-colonial, Libya formed part of a region 
where political divisions did not imply the existence 
of borderlines defining the extent of areas of sov- 
reignty since, as argued by Joffe: ’...pre-colonial
...political authority was expressed through communal 
link s ' . ^  Thus lines of transport were extended 
throughout the Sahara and Africa's northern coast
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through which the caravan trade flowed. Figure 5.1 is 
a cartogram showing Saharan trade routes which: 
'...prevailed around 1800 and was to persist throughout 
the 19th C e n t u r y ' . ^  This cartogram demonstrates that 
the contemporary means of transport were used in 
economic exchanges between the regions of this vast 
area. The nature of the trade and commodities e x ­
changed demonstrates that the desert which ought to 
have functioned as a barrier worked to link the 
societies in North Africa with those at the southern 
edge of the Sahara. The interaction between these 
societies was brought to a halt by the introduction of 
the linear demarcation of boundaries by the colonial 
powers who progressed in partitioning Africa in 
general, particularly after the Treaty of Berlin of 
1 885. J.M. MacKenzie, a lecturer in history at the 
University of Lancaster wrote in 1983: 'More than 10
million square miles of African territory and over a
hundred million African people had fallen to European
1 ^rule in the space of little more than a decade'. '°
The effects of partitioning on North Africa are inter­
esting in that the three powers: France, Britain and
Italy, divided the region with the end result of creat­
ing an Italian colony surrounded by French- or British-
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dominated regions, which could only look north to its 
conquerers across the sea for economic and social 
relations. Because Libya's trade links with Sudanic 
Africa were the vehicle of the Sanusia1s Order, which 
centralised on Libya's territory, for political in­
fluence in the Sahel in general, ^ ^  the occupation by 
France of what became Western and Equatorial French 
Africa, and the completion of the occupation of what 
became Libya by the Italians was only achieved after 
the rooting out of the Sanusia military resistance in 
these territories.'J The consequence of this was a to-
1 CT
tal decline in these trade links.
The Imtroduictloo of the aeroplane to Libya:
The self interest among the colonising powers was
mainly concerned with bringing their areas under
direct control from the metropole, particularly the
French and Italians, through numerically important
1 7white settlement in North Africa. The arrival of the
Italians in Libya was marked by the introduction of new
transport technology into the country. Previously, as
modes of transport in Libya and the Sahara: '...man and
1 ftbeast of burden were supreme'. ° As for aeroplanes, 
the Italians first used them in reconnaisance and later
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in battles against the Libyans on 22 October 1911 (only
two weeks after the first Italian landing on Tripoli
shores on 7 October 1911 ) when Captain Carlo Piazza
started Air Force military operations in a recon-
naisance mission over Arab and Turkish lines in the
outskirts of Tripoli, followed by Lt. Gafotti's first
1 9ever bombardment from an aircraft on 1 November 1911.
* Demograpliiic colemisation* and Libya's first air 
services:
After 1928 the Fa s c i s t  policy of 'demographic  
colonisation' ultimately resulted in the arrival of 
substantial numbers of Italian colonist families; the 
figure reaching 32,000 during Balbo's rule of Libya in 
1 938 and 1939.^0 The adoption of the Fascist policy of 
'demographic colonisation' in 1928 seems coincidental 
with the introduction of civil air services to link 
Libya with Italy, for it was in November of that year 
when a weekly scheduled service connected Rome and 
Tripoli via Siracuse (Italy) operated by SANA (SOCIETE 
ANONIMA DE NAVIGAZIONE AEREA) using a Dornier flying 
boat. NAA (NORD AFRICA AVIAZIONE) an airline formed by 
the Italian settlers operated a service covering the 
coastal points of Tripoli, Surt, Benghazi, Cyrene, Dar-
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? 1nah and Tubruq. '
Expansion for strategic considerations
The advantages of the aeroplane seem to have received 
considerable attention from the Italian colonial power 
in Libya. Besides linking Tripoli with the metropole 
and operating the littoral local services during the 
inter-war period, numerous landing strips were built 
near the various oases including Nalut, Ghat, Ghadames,
9 9
Sabhah, Murzuq and B r a k .  ^ An interruption in ac­
tivities inevitably took place as a consequence of the 
events of the Second World War. The strips built by 
the Italians in the various parts of the interior of
the country had been used exclusively for military 
23purposes.
Categories of operations and the closed system
This summary of air affairs during Italy's control over 
Libya enables us to categorise the air operations into 
three types. Firstly military: where the initial
Italian military operations involved aircraft and the 
effort to build airstrips near the scattered human 
settlements in the desert aiming at administrative con­
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trol as well as controlling the indigenous populations; 
added to these watching French adherence to agreements 
over territory as the location of some of the airstrips 
indicates must have an important preoccupation. It is 
worth noting that the presence of the airstrips was 
heavier in the western area of the country, the freedom 
of the eastern parts from Italian-built strips may be 
explained in the fact that although the frontiers with 
Egypt were eventually finalised in 1 928 ,24 Italy's dif­
ferences with France over territorial matters remained, 
as France controlled all other Libyan frontiers.
Secondly, colonial settlement: the operation of domes­
tic air services as of 1931, demonstrates that the end 
of national resistance to Italian occupation marked by 
the capture and hanging of Omar El Mokhtar in the same 
year^S and the Italian view that pacification was thus 
completed, encouraged the use of aircraft so that 
agricultural settlement in the region of moderate 
climate on the coast might be effectively managed.
Thirdly, the physical links with the metropole: air
transport developed only after the First World War. By 
1 9 29 this means of transport had won public  
acceptance.^ Linking Tripoli with the metropole as
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early as 1928 shows the determination of Italy to be on 
the same footing as the imperial powers who raced to 
link their vast and scattered territories, as noted by 
R.E.G. Davies.27 Thus, as the Italians saw it, this 
link was intended to create some visible physical weld­
ing of Libya with its motherland.
The importance of the aeroplane in political, military 
and economic activities may be discerned from the 
specific example of Italy's preoccupation with Libya. 
The role it played in support of colonial military and 
economic designs on Libya at the dawn of air transport 
showed how the Italians could reach and thus control 
the distant oasis in the desert without the need either 
for camels or the building of expensive roads. Such 
was the potential of the aeroplane. The process of 
colonising North Africa in general worked to- polarize 
transport flows towards the ports cutting the internal 
connections and transport communications between North 
Africa and the Sahara. Libya's transport system formed 
part of the Sahara caravan trade network which served 
economic, social and political interaction between the 
societies of this region. The disruption of this net­
work after the arrival of the colonists worked to iso­
late Libya from the Saharan and North African societies
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that fell to French colonialism. This isolation was 
completed by the Italians, who concentrated their ef­
forts on creating conditions for the Italian settlers 
by confiscating prime land and building a road 
infrastructure totalling 1,600 kilometres of metal 
roads by 1 934 , in the shape of a road parallel to the
9 Q
coast from the Tunisian to the Egyptian borders. ° The 
route of the domestic air service operated by NAA since 
1931 followed this coastal road.
The Italians used road transport, railways and air 
transport in consolidating their colonial efforts in 
Libya. Libya's external links focused on the sea as 
did air transport. During Italian rule, Libya's air 
links were only with Italy. The air links worked to 
create a corridor between the isolated Italian colony 
with her metropole in a sort of a closed system.
British control and Libya's inclusion in a wider air­
transport system
The process of the Italian colonisation of Libya was 
interrupted by the outbreak of the Second World War. 
With the beginning of this War, civil air services 
stopped in, to and from Libya. ^  The defeat of the
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Axis brought the Allied Forces to Libya. The con­
tinuity of Britain's influence to the East of Libya 
meant the incorporation of Libya into a larger region 
under British control. While Libya's position did not 
provide transport advantages to Italian regions beyond 
Libya as a result of a lack of continuity in Italy's 
colonial domain, Libya's location proved considerably 
more useful to the British, thus breaking the country's 
transport system's isolation.^ Libya's isolation
was broken not only by incorporating this territory 
into British air transport operations, but also through
allowing air services from other nations including
11Italy who restarted air services to Libya after 1947 
once Italy had signed the Peace Treaty of Rome. The 
Americans operated a TWA flight from 1 946 and by Inde­
pendence in December 1951, Libya was linked with almost 
every territory that surrounded it.
Britain's inclusion of Libya in the wider British air 
network stems from Britain's belief in air power. The 
influence of air power over isolation may be understood 
through reading the works of Alfred Gollin in his book 
No ILoimger An Island.^ The book discusses the begin­
nings of heavier than air powered aeroplane flights, 
particularly by the Wright Brothers 1902-1909. It
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suggests an obsession on the part of the British
Government with obtaining the Wrights' invention at a
time when she relied on the British Navy for her
progress and very existence.^ There was a feeling of
threat from German air superiority, since the- Germans
were enthusiastically developing an air transport fleet
through building airships. Germany appeared to aim at
dominating Europe by supporting its armies by an air
lift power which would have transported 350,000 troops
3 5simultaneously from Calais in France to D o v e r . T h e
calls for a British air power were made by Lord
Northcliffe who: '...by the beginning of 1909, was
convinced that the British future would be changed more
significantly than that of any other country as a
result of the s u c c e s s f u l  d e v e l o p m e n t  of the
a e r o p l a n e ^  and who, after the success of his
i 3 7campaign, said: England is no longer an Island , im­
plying that the landscape of the earth must now include 
a third dimension by incorporating the sphere through 
which the flying machines operate. Thus to be iden­
tified as an island or otherwise is a matter which 
could be considered from the air. Northcliffe's vision 
continues to dominate military strategies today and so
O Q
it will in the forseeable future. °
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The effect of the aeroplane on isolation work to remove
most constrains of physical barriers of all kinds from
the face of interaction. Through the medium of the
air, the continuity of the sphere around all corners of
the planet Earth becomes reachable. The most recent
case of such continuity came through realising another
3 Qdream, in spite of its impractical use, J that of cir­
c u m n a v i g a t i n g  the Earth non-stop and w i t h o u t  
refuelling, as achieved by the 'Voyager'.^ The divi­
sions of this sphere adopted since the advent of the 
aeroplane into airspace of sovereign political en­
tities has reimposed some of the limitations formerly 
deriving from physical barriers.
Tripoli: A strategic node on tine British African air
network
Figure 5.2 shows the internationa1 operations through 
Libya on the eve of its Independence. This cartogram 
shows the operations of BOAC, BEA/MALTA AIRWAYS, 
ALITALIA, T UN ISAIR and SAIDE, all being foreign 
operators to Libya. Table 5.1 ranks these operators 
according to the number of frequencies they operate 
weekly through Libyan airports.
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TABLE 5.1
WEEKLY FREQUENCIES TO/THROUGH LIBYAN AIRPORTS, 1951 
RANKING OF AIRLINES OPERATIONS
WEEKLY
AIRLINE: FREQUENCY NATIONALITY
1. British Oversea Airways Corp. 9 British
2. BEA/Malta Airlines 2 British
3. Alitalia 2 Italian
4. Tunisair 1 French
5. SAIDE 1 Egyptian
Source: Accumulated frcm advertisements and published
Timetables in the Sunday Ghibli newspaper - 
various issues 1951,
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This Table describes Tripoli as an important node on
BOAC's network to West, East and South Africa and the
Middle East. BOAC1s operations in 1951 to West, East
and South Africa touched on three African gateways,
namely: Tripoli, Cairo and Khartoum. The first was
BOAC's only African gateway to West Africa - all
flights to West Africa (excluding Dakar which served as
a hob point for South American routes) were operated
exclusively through Tripoli. The West African routes
extended to Brazzaville, Livingstone and Johannesburg.
Cairo and Khartoum served as gateways to BOAC's East
African operation and completed the Eastern loop of
41BOAC's operations to Johannesburg. Tripoli's impor­
tance is indicated from its position among the other 
African gateways on BOAC's network. Tripoli had the 
highest frequency of call among these gateways as seen 
from Table 5.2.
The importance of these gateways stems from their 
geographic location within the British-dominated areas 
in Africa at the time, and their necessity as inter­
mediate stops for refuelling and for technical reasons. 
Tripoli port was an important fuel supply point for the 
fighting forces in the North African and Italian cam­
paigns in World War 1 1 ^  and the fuel facilities at the
437
TABLE 5.2
RANKING BOAC'S AFRICAN GATEWAYS IN 1951
GATEWAY WEEKLY FREQUENCY
1. CAIRO 4
2. KHARTOUM 4*
3. TRIPOLI 3
* South African Airways: BOAC Associate Airline.
Source: ABC, WORLD AIRWAYS GUIDE,
15 January - 14 February 1951.
ALSO, ABC, 15 January - 14 February 1951 
BOAC Route Map p30Q and Tables p304
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port caused Tripoli Airport to play a supply post role 
after the war. Table 5.2 adds a volumetric sig­
nificance to British flights through the gateway of 
Tripoli. The British dominance was particularly over­
whelming as the length of the operated sectors is taken 
into account. While the British found Libya's position 
advantageous and the role of the Libyan airports was as 
strategic transit and supply points along certain air 
routes, they later lost their role with the introduc­
tion of longer-range aircraft that came into service in 
the late 1 950's. It was after the discovery of oil 
that air traffic through Libyan airports quickly 
revived and continued to grow from traffic originating 
in Libya. Throughout the 1960's, the uncertainties 
about the presence of the Allied Forces in Libya was 
kept at a low profile and the Libyan market for air 
transport continued to grow from indigeneous factors.
Revival of Tripoli Airport strategic role
With the development of Libyan-Soviet relations after 
1969, it appeared that Tripoli was once more regain­
ing its position as an intermediate strategic stop for 
aircraft of a Super-power, this time, however, for 
Eastern Bloc countries' airlines as Table 5.3
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TABLE
demonstrates.
Besides the African destinations stated in Table 5.3, 
AEROFLOT operates to Algiers and Tunis with turn-around 
services, two and one weekly services, respectively, as 
well as Maputo with a single weekly service via Aden.
The total number of African destinations on AEROFLOT's 
network is twenty-one. Except for Algiers, Tunis and 
Maputo, these are served through the gateways of Dakar, 
Casablanca, Tripoli and Cairo. Tripoli, however, ranks 
first in number of weekly frequencies (four) and in 
number of African destinations for which it functions 
as a gateway. It appears that AEROFLOT's African 
routes operate on three axes. The western axis is that 
of North West Africa using Casablanca or Dakar as 
gateways. The middle axis serves West Africa and the 
Congo with Tripoli as its gateway and the Eastern axis, 
serves East Africa through Cairo.
Umtrecxproeated Privileges
The Soviet airline appears to enjoy total traffic 
rights on the services it operates through Tripoli with 
the exception of T r i p o 1i-0ugodougo and Tripoli-
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Brazzaville, as does the Bulgarian airline BALKAN 
AIRLINES. Libya's national air carrier operates to 
Sofia, Belgrade, Bucharest and Moscow in the Soviet 
Bloc countries. However it enjoys no traffic rights 
(fifth freedom) on its services operating between any 
points within that territory. LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES' 
operations are treated on strictly third and fourth 
freedom rights basis. By contrast, while Tripoli as a 
gateway to AEROFLOT's West African routes functioned 
with full traffic rights to almost all these 
destinations, Cairo as a gateway functions as a techni­
cal stop where no embarking or disembarking traffic is 
permitted except on third and fourth freedom basis. 
Casablanca is in the same traffic rights position as is
Tripoli, but Dakar is similar to Cairo's technical stop
• n 43 principle.
The difference in the traffic rights position between 
Cairo and Tripoli gateways, despite the equal number of 
the destinations served, is quite significant. The 
technical stop in Cairo does not allow for the movement 
of traffic of any kind with Cairo being the origin of, 
or destination for, such traffic except for that in­
volving Moscow. AEROFLOT's traffic rights to and from 
Tripoli made it possible to move Russian officials be­
442
tween Tripoli and these African destinations. The ab­
sence of interaction between the peoples of West Africa 
and the Libyans meant that these links were ex­
clusively used for the benefit of the super power now 
using Tripoli Airport strategic location.
Three phases are thus discernable in the foreign 
airlines' use of Libya. Initially it was dominated by 
Britain as an intermediate supply post with full traf­
fic freedoms; subsequently, Libya emerged as having a 
potential for air traffic originating from within the 
state; and finally Libya resumed its position as in the 
first phase, this time being used by the Soviet Bloc. 
This serves to demonstrate that Tripoli plays an iden­
tical role for whichever Super-power with which its 
ties are strongest. Figure 5.3 demonstrates Libya's 
fluctuating status.
Super-power airlines operating through Tripoli had, and 
still have, little relevance to Libya's population or 
to its direct economic activities. Britain's air 
carriers' privileges in Libya were exercised at a time 
when Britain treated Libya during and immediately after 
World War II as 'occupied territory', or when it was 
administering the country at the request of the United
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Nations and then after Independence when Britain and 
Libya entered into treaties permitting Britain to use 
Libyan territories and facilities for a fee. Above 
all, however, Libya for most of this time had no na­
tional air carrier since one was only formed in 1 965 . 
The return of the same position with the Soviet Union's 
air carrier comes under different circumstances, where, 
while Libya's pre-Independence history and its contem­
porary poor economic state resulted in the continuity 
of the British presence and thus the air transport side 
of it. The Soviet Union's use of Libya as a facility 
to link with West African countries - with full traffic 
rights - was permitted by a free choice on the part of 
the Libyan Government.
Airspace and Political cornsiderations
Libya's national air carrier has become the centre of 
the air transport scene in Libya since its formation in 
1965. The bilateral and multilateral air service 
agreements signed with the various governments have in­
dicated the general principle that half the traffic to 
and from Libya should be the share of Libya's national 
airline. In the meantime, this airline has been at the 
centre of Libya's political relations. The Libyan
445
airline’s network was small and weak on the eve of the 
1 9 69 Revolution, having a fleet of only three 
Caravelles and two hired F27's from ATI (an Italian 
operator). The airline operated its international 
routes to cover London, Geneva, Paris, Rome, Malta and 
Athens. In the Middle East only Beirut and Cairo were 
on the network and Tunisia featured as the only North 
African destination. There is no evidence that Libya's 
national air carrier's flights were banned from operat­
ing into any foreign territory or that any foreign air­
line was banned from operating to Libya as a result of 
political conflict. (London's Gatwick Airport was 
used, then only after 1 969 the services were moved to 
Heathrow after pressure was put on the British CAA 
threatening that the British operator would only be al­
lowed to land in Benghazi instead of Tripoli unless the 
change took place). The only time that flights using 
Libyan air space were interrupted was in the context 
of O A U 's 1963 Resolution which stated among other 
measures against South Africa and Portugal that African 
States ought to observe as seen from the text: 1...(b)
closing African ports and airports to (South Africa and 
Portugal] ships and planes; (c) forbidding the planes 
of these two countries to overfly the territories of 
all African states'.^  It is since the 1969 Revolution
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and particularly after the increase in revenues from 
oil that trends in air-transport development has become 
closely associated with political shift and change.
Within two weeks of 1 September 1969, all flights
returned to normal schedules. In the early 1970's the
policy towards foreign operators was aimed at tv/o
principles. The first concerned Arab air carriers
where these were encouraged to operate to and through
Libya with rationed fifth freedom flights. The second
was that other foreign carriers would basically be
restricted to third and fourth freedoms, while fifth
freedoms would be granted only if reciprocity was in
the interest of the national Libyan air carrier and
4 5made such an exchange advantageous. J 
Air links with fellow Arab states:
Rationed open skies policy. Beginning and Failure.
The policy towards the Arab air carriers resulted in 
spectacular trends. By 1975 a semi-open skies policy 
developed in many parts of the Arab world. KUWAIT 
AIRWAYS, EGYPTAIR, TUNISAIR, SAUDIA, AIR ALGERIE, SUDAN 
AIRWAYS, and SYRIAN ARAB AIRLINES operated between 
Tripoli and Cairo and served Tunis, Algiers, Casablanca
447
and Jeddah enjoying fifth freedom traffic rights with a 
restriction of two weekly services on any sector unless 
its origin was from its own base and was governed by 
bilateral agreement between the concerned government 
authorities. The problems with this area of coopera­
tion started with the Sahara conflict in 1975 when Al­
geria and Morocco banned each others’ flights between 
their capitals. In 1976, Sudan closed its airspace to 
Libyan aircraft after allegations of Libyan involvement 
in a coup d'etat against President Numeiry.^ The set­
backs continued with the closure of Syria's airspace, 
albeit briefly, to Libyan aircraft after Syria's as­
sault on the Palestinian camps in Lebanon in late 1976 
which produced a solidarity conference with the Pales­
tinian people producing among others, a resolution to 
boycott Syrian aircraft which was immediately imple­
mented by the seizure of a Syrian B727 for a few 
hours at Tripoli Airport which was only allowed to 
depart without its load of passengers after the inter­
vention of the Syrian Ambassador and the Libyan Direc­
tor General of Civil Aviation.^
The events disrupting the air transport scene c u l ­
minated in the total ban on flights between Egypt and 
Libya after Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977.
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Libya's quarrels with Tunisia have more recently kept
the airlines of these two countries from operating an 
4air link. ° Libya's air isolation as a consequence of 
her quarrels with Arab countries did not just work to 
interrupt the bilateral air links with the Arab 
countries with whom these quarrels occurred, but also 
transformed the Arab air links with the North African 
region as a whole.
Table 5.4 shows the change in the number of operators 
on the Arab sectors involving North African destina­
tions operated with fifth freedom traffic rights as 
they were in 1976 and as they became in 1986.
The decline in the number of operators and the total 
disappearance of operations from certain sectors, 
particularly those involving Beirut and Benghazi, and 
the dominance of third and fourth freedom operations is 
indicative of the decline in the strength in multi­
lateral Arab air links. Libya, however, by losing its 
position as a middle link between the Arab Middle East 
and countries of the Maghreb is isolated from its 
neighbours and its position has changed from that of 
being the most frequent destination of the Arab air 
carriers to that of a country having the weakest links
449
TABLE 5.4
NORTH AFRICAN LIBYAN* ARAB AIR LINKS 
___________1976. 1986_____________
SECTOR OPERATORS & TOTAL WEEKLY OPERATORS
1976 1986
CASABLANCA/ALGIERS SAUDIA
EGYPTAIR
ROYAL AIR MAROC** 
AIR ALGERIE**
TUNISAIR SAUDIA
LIBYAN ARAB
KUWAIT AIRWAYS
SYRIAN ARAB (6) (3)
ALGIERS/TUNIS ROYAL AIR MAROC
AIR ALGERIE
TUNISAIR
EGYPTAIR
SAUDIA
SYRIAN ARAB
KUWAIT AIRWAYS (8)
KUWAIT AIRWAYS 
TUNISAIR 
SYRIAN ARAB 
AIR ALGERIE
(4)
TUNIS/TRIPOLI ROYAL AIR MAROC 
AIR ALGERIE 
TUNISAIR 
LIBYAN ARAB 
EGYPTAIR 
SAUDIA 
SYRIAN ARAB 
KUWAIT AIRWAYS (8)
AIR ALGERIE 
KUWAIT AIRWAYS
(2)
TRIPOLI/CAIRO AIR ALGERIE 
TUNISAIR 
KUWAIT AIRWAYS 
LIBYAN ARAB 
EGYPTAIR
AL YEMDA (S.YEMEN) 
SUDAN AIRWAYS 
ROYAL AIR MAROC (8) (0)
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TABLE 5.4(Cont.)
SECTOR OPERATORS St TOTAL WEEKLY OPERATORS
1976 1986
TUNIS/BENGHAZI TUNISAIR (1) (0)
BENCHAZI/CAIRO EGYPTAIR 
LIBYAN ARAB (2) (0)
TRIPOLI/BEIRUT SAUDIA
AIR ALGERIE (2) (0)
TRIPOLI/DAMASCUS SYRIAN ARAB 
LIBYAN ARAB (2)
SYRIAN ARAB 
LIBYAN ARAB (2)
BENGHAZI/BEIRUT MIDDLE EAST 
LIBYAN ARAB (2) (0)
BENGHAZI/DAMASCUS SYRIAN ARAB 
LIBYAN ARAB (2) (0)
BENGHAZI/AMMAN ALIA
LIBYAN ARAB (2) (0)
TRIPOLI /AMMAN
(0)
ALIA
LIBYAN ARAB (2)
CAIRO/KHARTOUM LIBYAN ARAB 
EGYPTAIR 
SUDAN AIR (3)
EGYPTAIR 
SUDAN AIR
(2)
CAIRO/JEDDAH LIBYAN ARAB 
AIR ALGERIE 
SAUDIA 
TUNISAIR 
EGYPTAIR (5)
EGYPTAIR
SAUDIA
(2)
Cumulative Total (51) (19)
* Hiis table includes services involving Libyan Arab Airlines 
operations or Arab Carriers operations involving Libyan routes. 
Direct Links avoinding Libyan destinations particularly evident 
since the closure of air corridors between Libya and Egypt 
following Camp David accord in 1979.
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TABLE 504(Cont.)
** This service was not operated by Royal Air Maroc and 
Air Algerie for the 10 years 1975-1985.
Source: Sectors and Operators accumulated frcm ABC International
Airways Guide July 1976 and December 1986
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with immediate neighbours. Libya's air links with her 
immediate Arab and African neighbours are restricted to 
two (this has become three after the resumption of air 
links with Tunisia), operated by a single weekly 
service, namely to Sudan where a service was resumed, 
after nine years of interruption, in 1985 and Algiers. 
The long distance to Khartoum and Algiers from Tripoli, 
and the very low level of service frequency puts Libya, 
in terms of its national air carrier operations, in a 
situation of isolation characteristic of an island sur­
rounded by distant neighbours.
Effect of Libya's isolation
The effect of this isolation is significant in a number 
of ways. Firstly, medium and short range aircraft, 
which always formed the criteria for the national 
airline's fleet composition, are no longer fully 
suitable for operations to the Arab world. In November 
1977 a medium-range aircraft leased by the national air 
carrier to operate the pilgrim flights crashed near Al 
Baydah on its way home, killing most passengers on 
board because the aircraft ran out of fuel before it 
could land in Benghazi^ after following a route avoid­
ing Sudanese and Egyptian air space since the former
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had been closed to Libyan aircraft since 1976 and the 
latter after the border clash of July 1977. This inci­
dent emphasised the security and safety risks involved 
in closing air space to civil air traffic.
Secondly, flying circular rather than straight routes 
is more costly, including the waste of fuel and crew 
time, as well as an increase in the utilisation of the 
aircraft resulting in higher trip costs and increased 
maintenance requirements per sector. Thirdly, closed 
air spaces increase risks in case of emergencies as has 
been proven by the accident of the chartered pilgrim 
f1ight in 1977.
The island theory crystallises Libya's need for long- 
range aircraft to operate a network avoiding closed air 
spaces. In fact, this situation has now extended 
beyond the Arab world since Britain suspended the ad­
ministration of the Air Services Agreement (signed be­
tween the two countries in 1 9 72) as of 1 November 
1986.50 LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES cargo flights to Ireland
now fly 45 additional minutes to avoid British air
51space on each leg of the journey.
Increased quarrels with neighbours and resorting to
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closure of air space in the face of civil aircraft has
grave consequences for Libya's national air carrier
which faces considerable problems in obtaining the
right type of equipment which would be suitable for
operating long-haul journeys. Such aircraft are not
5 7only denied to Libya at present, but even if avail­
able they would prove too large for the kind of traffic
C ~i
on most of the Libyan airline s network. Other
countries facing similar measures of isolation have
overcome this problem by using long-range aircraft,
S 4whatever the size of their traffic.
Libya's political relations with her neighbours have 
caused a decline in her international network, par­
ticularly in the Arab world. They have also prevented 
Libya from being a positive factor in enhancing Arab 
air integration and, above all, created a situation of 
isolation in which Libya has become a political 
island. On the domestic scene, however, the concentra­
tion of demographic, economic and agricultural ac­
tivities is generally characterised by being in the 
form of islands separated by a sea of empty stretches 
of land, but above all the Gulf of Surt which divides 
the bulk of the population and their economic area in 
two.
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Demographic distribution as a resnilt of physical fac­
tors and the domestic airtransport system:
Based on 3.6 million inhabitants occupying the 
country's area of 1,775,500 kilometres , the density 
of population in Libya is 2,027 per square kilometre. 
The cities of Tripoli and Benghazi are the largest ur­
ban concentrations in the country. The National Atlas 
of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah shows 
that the ten largest urban centres are as shown in 
Table 5.5.
With the exception of Sabhah, all these urban centres 
are in the coastal area. With the exception of 
Ajdabyah, Surt (11,600) and Sabhah, no urban centres 
exceed 6,300 inhabitants exist south of the 32° 
parallel, and the great majority of urban centres and 
settlement is concentrated in two lots - one centred on 
Tripoli filling the Jefara Plain and the Mountain of 
Nefusa and the other on Benghazi filling the Ben­
ghazi Plain and the northern regions of the Green 
Mountain. These two blocks contain most of Libya's 
population. The surface link between the two blocks is 
through the coastal road where the distance between
456
TABLE 5.5
TOP TEN LARGEST POPULATION CENTRES IN LIBYA (1977)
1. TRIPOLI 642200
2. BENGHAZI 270500
3. MISRATAH 44800
4. AZZAWIYAH 42000
5. DARNAH 36000
6. AL BAYDAH 34500
7. AJDABYAH 33700
8. TUBRUQ 33400
9. SABHAH 32200
10. AL MARJ 25800
Source: The National Atlas of the Libyan Arab Socialist
Jamahiriyah pp84-85 
Ministry of Planning 1977
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Misratah and Ajdabyaha of over 500 kilometres runs 
through a desert environment. These two blocks may be 
seen as two oases within the island divided by the Gulf 
of Surt.
Elazzabi (1981),^ suggested that: '..the road network
in Libya was and remained (1975) the most adequate form 
of surface transport. From the aspect of internal 
traffic, air and maritime transport occupy second and 
third position respectively. In the past ten years, 
road and air transport have been coordinated to meet 
Libya's transport requirements. Maritime transport did 
not evolve in spite of the ease of connecting Tripoli 
and Benghazi by sea. However, air and maritime 
transport may in the future become increasingly 
competitive'.-^ The operation of 93 flights weekly be­
tween Tripoli and Benghazi in 1986 connecting Tubruq, 
Darnah and Al Baydah directly with Tripoli by air and 
Benghazi with Misratah suggests that air transport has 
already advanced to a great degree to occupy a dominant 
position. Marine transport and railways are still un­
changed from the 1975 position.
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Ttoe Gmlf of Suurfc
The concentration of population in the regions sur­
rounding Tripoli and Benghazi north of the 32 degrees 
parallel and the separation of these two agglomerations 
by the Gulf of Surt is significant to aviation, for 
this Gulf extends deep into the Sahara at the southern 
most point of the Mediterranean so that the water mass 
meets this desert where the environment is so harsh 
that throughout history it has worked as a deterrent 
to massive human settlement on the shores of the Gulf 
of Surt. Interaction between these two regions has 
grown particularly since Independence and air routes 
have developed so that the capacity of air services of­
fered between Tripoli and Benghazi formed 67.23 per 
cent of the total domestic air network (see Figure 
5.4). Flights between Tripoli and Benghazi as well as 
all flights from central regions towards Benghazi must 
fly over the Gulf of Surt in direct route operations.
Figure 5.4 demonstrates the relationship of the domes­
tic air corridors to the Gulf of Surt. All direct 
routes to the major economic and political centres must 
cross this Gulf. The water mass is a divider of the 
two main regions of the country and also of the
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important political centre of Sabhah and more recently 
Hun, Libya's proposed new political and administrative 
centre. Libya declared the Gulf of Surt internal 
Libyan waters, on the basis that it is an historic 
bay, in 1 9 7 3.®”^
Since that date, fourteen states have objected to 
Libya's declaration®® and military hostilities in the 
Gulf of Surt have increased and it has become neces­
sary for aircraft which flew the shortest route to fol­
low a longer route to avoid the military activities in 
the zone as contained in notams issued to airmen 
operating in the area.
Joffe (1987) argued that: '...specific economic and
geographic factors ...... make the bay in question [the
Gulf of Surt} within the overall economy and the geog­
raphy of the State concerned [Libya].' Joffe presented 
his arguments using a quotation from D. O'Connell's 
work, Tine lefcerrnatiioimal ILaw of tine Sea, 1984 (p.424)
which stated that: '...bays which were vital to the
security or economic needs of states...' formed his­
toric bays. The evidence provided to support the 
Libyan claim to the Gulf of Surt must thus include the 
argument that the Gulf of Surt is vital to the domestic
461
air routes and operations.
Nodes of strategic importamce on the domestic network;
The advancement in transport between Tripoli and Ben­
ghazi has been a factor of increased interaction be­
tween populations of these two areas, particularly for 
administrative reasons combined with population growth. 
Kezeiri (1 9 8 6 ) ^  noticed that: '...the polarisation of
population concentration upon the two cities and other 
intermediate towns' ought to be considered along with 
his evidence of the: '...high rate of population growth
experienced by the small towns in L i b y a 1 as a c o n ­
sequence of oil revenues since 1960 but particularly 
since 1970, as a consequence of government policies.^ 
Of the small towns considered by Kezeiri, four fall on 
the LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES' contemporary network, these 
are Ghadames with (3,950 inhabitants), Ghat (3,700), 
Kufrah (6,300) and Hun (5,400).61 These towns by no 
means represent important urban settlements for they 
rank seventeenth (Kufrah), twenty-sixth (Hun), thirty- 
second (Ghadames) and thirty-fifth (Ghat) amongst the 
thirty seven urban centres studied. All these four 
towns are connected by an air link from strategic 
considerations: Ghadames is on the corner of Libya's
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borders with Tunisia and Algeria; Ghat is near the 
caravan routes leading to Algeria and Niger and a ter­
ritory disputed with Algeria; and Kufrah is closest to 
the Egyptian, Sudanese and Chadian borders. Hun's air 
link is recent and stems from its location at the 
centre of the tribal region to which the elite who 
govern Libya belong. The designs of creating an ad­
ministrative capital in this region have finally become 
public and been declared in Colonel Qadhafi's speech in
rr o
which he announced plans to depopulate Tripoli.
Implications of moving tlae state" s administrative 
centre from Tripoli
The implications of creating a major urban centre in
HUn63 in terms of air transport would be significant.
The current flow of air traffic is focused on Tripoli.
The continued intensification of this flow is a
consequence of the increasing importance of Tripoli as
a central administrative centre of the country. It was
fi 4after 1969 that Tripoli became Libya's de facto0 
capital, with all central organisations concentrated 
there. The economic transformation following the 
doctrines of the Green Book, which discriminated 
against the private sector, transformed Tripoli func-
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tions into a restricted role of a major port and an 
administrative centre. With demoting Tripoli to port 
status, the flow of air traffic from adminsitrative 
origins would thus have to be diverted to the new ad­
ministrative centre in the Jofra^~* Region and Tripoli 
itself to become an area of traffic generation.
Figure 5.5 demonstrates the location of Jofra (Hun) in 
relation to the population concentrations in and around 
Tripoli and in and around Benghazi and the other 
centres served by domestic regular air services. In 
view of the hypothesis that air traffic to Tripoli is 
mainly generated by Tripoli's role as a central ad­
ministrative entity, in addition to its being Libya's 
only international gateway, the proposals to remove 
Tripoli's role as an administrative centre create an 
opportunity to make an attempt at analysing the con­
sequences to the air scene in Libya of such a move.
Air-transport versus road transport
The hypotheses presented here are based on distance and 
demographic factors. Moving the administrative centre 
to Hun does not propose decentralisation of the ad­
ministrative function of Tripoli - it proposes shifting
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it. Consequently the population concentrated on the 
north-east of the country will have the choice of 
whether to travel to the new administrative centre by 
road or by air. Figure 5.6 shows that the route that 
needs be followed by road from the main populated areas 
to Hun is no shorter than that currently used between 
Benghazi and Tripoli. There is one difference, 
however, the sector from Bugrain to Tripoli falls in 
the climatically moderate zone of northern Libya and 
runs through the populated coast. By contrast, 
travelling south from Bugrain to Hun the road runs 
through the more arid desert zone with no significant 
settlement between these two points. A considerable 
advantage in flying by air between Tripoli and Ben­
ghazi would obviously be that of avoiding the 500 
kilometre drive between Ajdabyah and Misratah because 
of the desert environment and thinness of human settle­
ment near this stretch of the road - travelling to Hun 
by road increases such a disadvantage enormously. The 
shorter distance by air between Benghazi and Hun (329 
miles) compared to that of Tripoli and Benghazi (418 
miles) will work to increase further the advantage of 
travelling by air. Linking Al Baydah, Tubruq and Dar- 
nah with Hun would bring the same advantages as those 
of Benghazi-Hun air link. The closeness of Sabah to
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Hun may less markedly encourage travel by air, but 
links with Sabhah may become likely since Sabhah would 
be the largest urban centre closest to Hun. (This link 
has actually been introduced since April 1987 although 
this service has previously been operated and proven 
commercially non-viable and subsequently cancelled). 
The distance between Tripoli and Misratah by road is 
200 kilometres. Flying an air service to this destina­
tion proved unpopular since distance between Tripoli 
and Tripoli Airport plus the distance from Misratah 
Airport to Misratah town counted for almost one third 
of the distance by road from Tripoli to Misratah. The 
formalities at the airport and the limited services 
operated make travel by road a more practical option. 
The distance from Misratah to Hun exceeds 450 
kilometres. With the desert conditions surrounding the 
road to Hun and the considerable length of the journey, 
an air service would certainly become inevitable. 
Kufrah's relative nearness to Hun compared to Tripoli 
will encourage linking it to the proposed capital. 
(This link has eventually been implemented as of 1 
April 1987). Since Ghadames1 link with Tripoli is 
basically of an administrative nature, such operations 
would shift to Hun. The link with Tripoli will prob­
ably continue for it is Ghadames' nearest port.
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TEne Greatest Impact: new traffic from Tripoli
The effects on the domestic Libyan air transport net­
work of shifting Libya's administrative centre to the 
proposed location in Jofra shall be greatest where the 
largest demographic concentration in the country - that 
centred on Tripoli - is linked with the new administra­
tive capital. The population of this area accounts 
roughly for half the country's population. Should the 
practices adopted in centralising the administration in 
Tripoli be repeated in Hun, it must be assumed that it 
is now the turn of inhabitants of this region to travel 
to the new administrative centre to perform those ad­
ministrative tasks for which the population of other 
parts of the country previously travelled to Tripoli. 
Previously inhabitants in this region went about their 
administrative needs travelling on the roads through a 
largely completed road network. The fact that the in­
habitants of this region make up half the country's en­
tire population is simply going to generate the need 
for double the number of people to travel by air as 
that currently carried between Benghazi and Tripoli for 
administrative reasons. The distance between Tripoli 
and Hun by road is 650 kilometres. The harsh nature of
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the area through which the surface transport links with 
Hun travel would not encourage travel by road.
The consequences to the air transport scene of this 
particular aspect will be enormous not only in the 
added volume of air traffic but also in the cost of im­
plementing an additional air bridge of this nature. 
Firstly it would mean creating additional airport 
facilities at Hun, capable of handling at least double 
the current domestic traffic at Tripoli Airport which 
in 1982 totalled 1.2 million passengers or an airport 
facility as large as Tripoli's present airport. 
Tripoli Airport itself will handle besides its current 
traffic levels the new traffic from Tripoli to Hun 
which would be as large as what it currently handles, 
plus the residue of traffic that is to remain as this 
stems from non-administrative reasons. Should this 
airport remain Libya's only international gateway, 
international traffic originating in, or destined for, 
the new administrative centre will need to be added to 
present domestic traffic in transit on international 
f1ights.
Moving Libya's administrative centre to Hun will add 
additional distance and thus cost to Libya's interna-
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tional traffic. It will certainly increase to a large 
degree the volume in domestic air traffic where addi­
tional aircraft will be required. The move of the ad­
ministrative capital to Hun, in air transport terms, 
will ultimately mean: additional expenditure on
aircraft purchase, doubling the quantity of fuel cur­
rently used on domestic flights, additional investment 
in the civil aviation infrastructure, an increase in 
the personnel numbers and subsidies to an already 
heavily-subsidised air-transport system. Ultimately, an 
additional financial burden to society and government.
Conclmsioim
The colonisation of North Africa detached this region 
from the Sudanic Sahel and interrupted the long-running 
interaction between the societies not only in its 
north/south direction but also among those falling 
within the super-imposed administrative and inter­
colonial divisions. The caravan trade routes which 
were predominant until the arrival of the colonial 
powers faded away. Among the transport means develop­
ing contemporary with the arrival of the Italians was 
the aeroplane which was used for military purposes for 
the first time in human history in Italy's military
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operations against the indigeneous populations of 
Libya. The developments in this vehicle of transport 
qualified for world-wide acceptance as advantageous to 
development efforts as the aeroplane facilitates the 
transport of humans and materials quickly and over­
comes most physical barriers. The isolation of Libya 
by virtue of its colonisation by the Italians and its 
being surrounded by territories controlled by other 
colonial powers directed the country's external inter­
action towards the Italian metropole which quickly 
linked Libya with an air service. The Fascist policy 
of 'demographic colonisation' brought regular air serv­
ices to the Libyan coastal areas where Italian settle­
ment occurred.
With the defeat of the Italians in World War II, 
Libya's isolation from its neighbours was broken, in 
spite of the fact that that was for foreign purposes, 
and Libya turned into a strategic hub for aircraft 
operating between Europe on the one hand and West, 
South and East Africa on the other.
This strategic position was lost since developments in 
air space technology brought long-range aircraft, 
causing intermediate supply posts like Libya's airports
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to lose their importance. The developments in the dis­
covery of oil as of the late 1 950's substituted for 
the decline seen at the Libyan airports because of the 
advancements in longer-range aircraft. Airline opera­
tions have begun to take place from local economic, so­
cial and political conditions. Libya's links until 
1969 with her neighbours were few - but at no time have 
her policies contributed to interrupting air links with 
any of them.
Since 1969, a two-tier civil aviation policy has 
developed to encourage Arab air services to operate 
through Libya, which had a positive influence on Arab 
air networks in general. Bilateral links with non- 
Arab countries were controlled through bilateral agree­
ments aimed at a reciprocal exchange of interests. 
Since 1975, however, suspension of services and closure 
of air space has begun to be used in political quar­
rels among certain Arab countries. Libya appears to 
have been involved more intensly than any other Arab 
state in such extreme policies to the extent that vital 
operations, such as those to the pilgrimage of Mecca, 
had to follow longer routes causing an additional 
economic burden and at times proving an operational 
risk. Libya's contemporary quarrels with her neigh­
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bours work as an isolating agent showing the effects of 
being an island to the extent that, while the country's 
national air carrier required medium-range aircraft to 
operate its international network, certain of the 
remaining routes operated now require long-range 
aircraft in order to avoid closed air space.
The shrinkage of Libya's international operations 
through isloation and decline in economic fortunes 
since the drop in oil revenues as of the early 1980's, 
is contrasted by a return of the importance of Libya as 
an intermediate point between operations from Eastern 
Europe and countries in West Africa. The relationship 
between Libya and the USSR put AEROFLOT in the advan­
tageous position of operating with full traffic rights 
to a considerable number of West African destinations 
without a reciprocal advantage to LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES.
The isolated 'island' of Libya is composed of a number 
of demographic and economic islands. The vast distance 
and the desert environment that separate these islands 
work to encourage travel by air. The recent proposals 
to depopulate Libya's most populous island, Tripoli, 
demoting it from its administrative role, for reloca­
tion of such a centre in the Jofra Region, will in­
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evitably lead to enormous changes in the domestic air 
network. Such a proposal must raise concern that its 
implementation will mean a more expensive air transport 
system but, above all, the question of how Libya is 
going to face the necessity of re-equipping and en­
larging the fleet of the national air carrier becomes 
more urgent than ever.
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CHAPTER 6: LIBYA'S AIK TRANSPORT AID THE USA:
DOMINANCE, POLITICS AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
Introduction
A country like Libya is involved in the aerospace scene 
from the consumer end. It is not involved in manufac­
turing any aircraft components, nor is it in the busi­
ness of establishing the basis of an aircraft industry 
as is the case in some developing countries and whose 
ambitions are either concerned with some degree of 
security independence, as is distinctively the case of 
Israel, or with securing foreign exchange from 
aerospace industry sales, as is the case with Brazil. 
Naturally these two examples have a grey area between 
both motives. All Libya is involved in is purchasing 
aerospace products to run an Air Force and air defence 
system, and equipment and aircraft to operate an air 
transport system. The first two areas are outside the 
scope of this thesis.
In conventional circumstances, airlines buy aircraft 
from the aerospace industry which constantly aim to 
perfect as well as compete to maximise the adaptability 
of the product to economic, operational and environmen-
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tal preferences and requirements. In air transport, 
the aircraft is the backbone of airline operations. 
Without it there would be no need for the rest of the 
supporting infrastructure like airports and naviga­
tional aids, or the regulatory and specialised bodies, 
either international like ICAO3 , IATA, 4 or local such
as the various national aeronautical authorities and 
regional organisations.
The business of airlines is basically about putting 
commercial aircraft into use on routes for commercial 
reasons. At the direction of the government, this may 
take place from political considerations. The combina­
tion of these two objectives is commonplace. 'The 
[airline]5 industry is not like any other industry in 
the world. It has only one product to sell, ...The 
product is an ephemeral item - the hire, for a limited 
amount of time, of an airline seat. In that respect it 
is not too different from a bus ride or a taxi ride. 
The difference is in the network of legal and statuary 
constraints which hem in the operator".5 When the 
degree of political involvement in the business of an 
airline extends to the point at which the most fun­
damental tool for its operations - the aircraft - 
is drawn into the centre of political rows and becomes
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part of Super-power politics, Fligfint I nterma tiomal 1 s 
statement on the airline industry, as far as the 
specific airline under consideration in this thesis is 
concerned, is dwarfed in comparison.
I iA A  * s  d i f f i c u l t i e s  i n  o b t a i n !  mg c r a f t
The Libyan national air carrier faces tremendous 
problems in obtaining aircraft. The following state­
ment quoted from Tbe Independent, a British newspaper, 
throws light on the extent of this problem. 'Two ex- 
BRITISH CALEDONIAN AIRWAYS Airbus jets which Libya 
obtained in violation of United States economic sanc­
tions are in danger of becoming white elephants 1 .  ^
This statement refers to a part of the Libyan efforts 
over eight years to purchase commercial aircraft in an 
atmosphere of American determination to prevent US 
technology reaching Libya in compliance with US legis­
lation which decreed sanctions against Libya. The 
Americans have applied some extra-territorial dimension 
to their laws so that technology of US origin and which 
forms part of non-US industry, even partially so, may 
not reach the punished country. The question of 
Libya's difficulty in obtaining aircraft is not so 
much a matter of the extra-territorial nature of US
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legislation as of the American dominance and control 
of and over the aerospace industry world-wide, and the 
inability of the Eastern Bloc countries to be reliable 
and credible competitors or to provide readily - 
available substitutes for Western civil aviation 
products. This chapter is about the problems that sur­
round Libya's national air carrier's aircraft fleet 
requirements and the dimensions and implications of US 
sanctions for Libya's vital air transport system. It 
looks at the aspect of fleet and network development in 
more recent times and the implications of this aspect 
of politics.
The convention is that: '...[t]he two major assets of
D
an airline are its routes and its aircraft'. Deciding 
to operate a route or a group of routes and making the 
aircraft available for such operations takes place 
against a background involving: market demand, govern­
ment policies and regulations, financial resources, 
aircraft and spares availability from manufacturers or 
other entities at the time of decision and in the fu­
ture and their suitability for the particular kind of 
route, areas of operation and type of traffic. The aim 
ought always be based on strategies that will achieve a 
host of objectives which ought collectively to ensure
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a desired optimum of economically and technically effi­
cient operation.
TItoe carrrier's early fleet
In the haste to establish a Libyan flag carrier and the 
desire to see it off the ground, the management of the 
Libyan national air carrier purchased two readily 
available Caravelles in 1965. These were then followed 
by a third which was specifically built for the airline 
by SUD-AVIATION in France and was delivered in 1 968 . 
By that time, it was apparent that the national air 
carrier which achieved a 33 per cent increase in traf­
fic in 1967 over 1966^ had considerable space for 
expansion. The recommendations made by the Director
General of Civil Aviation on the composition of Libya's
1 nnational air carrier's fleet demonstrate that the
government was concerned that the airline's management
ought to have ordered much larger aircraft than the 
11Caravelles which were achieving 96 per cent load
19 13factors.  ^ The recommendations by TWA which carried
out a survey of the Libyan national carrier on behalf
of the Libyan Government went on to suggest a category
of jet aircraft with a capacity that was roughly met by
two types: the Trident II and the Boeing 727-200, the
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first manufactured in Britain and the latter in the 
1 4USA.  ^ The department of Civil Aviation team assessing
T W A ' s report indicated that the change required in
LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES 1s fleet structure and composition
as suggested by TWA was not a result of following an
1 sad; verbum procedure to devise a fleet plan.
Plans for future development
The six recommendations put forward by the Department 
of Civil Aviation concerned devising a long term plan 
that would take into consideration the development in 
the network, equipment standardisation, commonality of 
equipment chosen with, as it may suggest, regional 
operators, yet adaptable to domestic operations and 
capable of handling ad hoc traffic, particularly the 
Had} operations. As to how the airline wanted to 
proceed with its fleet development, this has not been 
documented. The whole argument, however, was inter­
rupted at its peak by the 1969 Revolution.
After September 1969, the plan to purchase additional 
aircraft was revived and the decision was to purchase 
two B727-200 aeroplanes that Boeing built for an 
American carrier who declined to exercise an option to
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buy them. ^  These were delivered to LIBYAN ARAB AIR­
LINES in 1971. The Trident lost its political argument 
for it was at the time following the decision to pur­
chase aircraft from the USA that the British Aerospace
1 7missile and defence contract was cancelled. The
decision to buy these two aircraft, however, does not 
appear to have come about {in late 1 9 70) from some- 
fleet plan or a specific requirement study, but from. 
Boeing's effort to sell two ready aircraft to a cus­
tomer who needed them urgently to face growing demand 
from traffic between Libya and Egypt in the wake of in­
tensified political relations between the two countries 
since the Revolution of 1969. Since these two aircraft 
entered into LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES' service, Boeing and 
the airline have been looking at ways of standardising 
LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINE's fleet using Boeing aircraft, the 
obstacle was that the three Caravelles operating 
alongside the Boeings were still fresh in the accounts 
books.
Post-Revolution OS-Libyan relations
The cancellation of the British Aerospace missile con­
tract and the end to the British military presence 
and facilities, followed by the nationalisation of
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British Petroleum operations in Libya in 1971, was in 
contrast to the purchase of US equipment and the con­
tinued presence of the American oil companies. Thus, 
while the purchase of Boeing 727's against competition 
from the British Hawker Sidley's Trident III, repre­
sented the right technical and commercial decision 
collectively the evidence points to a good start for 
Libya's relations with the United States, despite the 
politics involving the evacuation of the American bases 
in the country.
Fleet update following the imtrodmetion off popular 
committees
The question of fleet update became urgent once more 
after the catastrophe of the shooting down of one of 
the two Boeing 727 ' s by Israeli jets on 21 February 
19 7 3^® while the aircraft strayed over Sinai due to a 
combination of poor weather conditions, the malfunction 
of ground navigation aids in Egypt and the pi l o t ’s
1 Q
laxity. y Shortly after the shooting down of this 
aircraft, the airline, like all organisations in the 
country, began to be governed by popular committees. 
This practically brought the airline to a halt but
p 0
for day-to-day matters. Only in 1974 had the impor-
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71tance of fleet update begun to be recognised. This
updating was based on a new strategy which included a 
take-over of the oil field air services operations from 
foreign operators and the centralisation of all domes­
tic air transport in the hands of LIBYAN ARAB 
AIRLINES'.
Regional fleet "Commonality"
An important element in fleet planning is the concept 
of commonality. Operating a homogeneous fleet of 
aircraft is advantageous in that it standardises main­
tenance procedures and stores and makes possible an op­
timal operational advantage. It maximises the use of 
human resources and minimises training effort. For a 
large airline, the optimum point of fleet standard­
isation might indicate that standardisation does not 
have to go to the extent that only one type of aircraft 
or one type of engine composes the fleet or their power 
plants for the principles of economies of scale to 
prevail. For small airlines, the aspect of com­
monality is more significant. These airlines' scale of 
operations is smaller and in maintaining their aircraft 
they usually depend on other operators in the region 
they serve. Unless their equipment is common with
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other operators in the wider region, difficulties might 
arise in terms of the dispersal of stores and person­
nel thoughout the region it serves; and thus astronomi­
cal operational costs and management problems do arise.
There is evidence that regional equipment commonality 
was being realised. Table 6.1 shows the dates by 
which Boeing 727-200 had entered into the service of 
the four airlines of the Maghreb, including Libya. 
Commonality of aircraft operated in the North African 
region paid some practical and political dividends 
after the loss of Libyan Airlines' B727's over Sinai. 
Air Algerie rushed a replacement by one of its Boeing 
72 7' s complete with crews to support LIBYAN ARAB 
AIRLINES' operations for a month until a replacement 
was provided from the fleet of AIR FRANCE; and later 
in 1975, when AIR FRANCE crews manning the B727-200 
went on strike - which was illegal in Libya - LIBYAN 
ARAB AIRLINES returned the crews immediately to AIR 
FRANCE after ROYAL AIR MAROC - probably seeking support 
over the events to come in the Western Sahara 
promptly despatched a team of Boeing 727-200 crews. 
They included flight instructors who completed the 
training of Libyan pilots and left a few months later 
only after LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES' operations department
495
TABLE 6.1
SCHEDULE OF FIRST BOEING 727-200’ s INCORPORATED 
INTO THE FLEETS OF AIRLINES OF NORTH AFRICA 1970-1973
Date of Delivery
AIRLINE 1970 1971 1972 1973
1. AIR ALGERIE
2. LIBYAN ARAB
1.12.70(1)
1.12.70(1)
1.2.71(1)
1.7.71(1)
3. R. AIR MAROC 1. 5.70(1) 1. 5.73(1)
4. TUNIS AIR 1.2.72(1) 1. 6.73(1)
1.12.73(1)
( ) Indicate number of aircraft delivered
Source: A Ccmplete History of Ccmnercial Aircraft Fleets.
Avmark, pp26, 346, 457, 557. 1982
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was able to operate Independently.
D e c i s i o n  t o  buny a d d i t i o n a l  B o e i n g s
By January 1975, a document produced by Boeing was 
presented to LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES who had already 
decided in 1974 to purchase three B727-200's and 6 Fok- 
ker F27's; the Boeings were intended to replace the 
three Caravelles and the F27's to take over the opera­
tions that support the oil industry. The decision 
stemmed from the judgement that there was an immediate 
need for such aircraft and this decision did not form 
part of a long term plan that had implementation 
dates tagged to it. The summary of the fleet plan
produced by Boeing is incorporated into Figure 5.1.
Eventually, by the time Boeing completed the fleet plan
proposals, a new law decreed that as of 2 January 1975,
LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES would become a joint stock company
2 7totally owned by the Libyan Government and that the 
LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES Corporation should be liquidated.
The management of the newly-formed company made two 
decisions. The first, to decline to accept the three 
Caravelles as a transferred asset and to continue to
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operate them until the B727-200 ordered in 1974 arrived 
in 1975. The other, from a criterion of standardising 
the jet fleet, to order two additional B 7 27's for 
delivery in 1976. Once more the airline had taken the 
decision to buy aircraft on an ad hoc basis and from 
judgemental procedures. The only plan that was avail­
able for long term fleet planning appeared to be that 
proposed by Boeing for 1975-1985. The placement of an 
order for two Boeing 727-200's for delivery in 1976 was 
inconsistent with Boeing's proposals, even in the short 
term, in that a different number of Boeing 727-200's 
was ordered from that which Boeing suggested; 
furthermore, Boeing's proposal that the airline needed 
B737-200's by 1976 was considered as an unnecessary 
disturbance to the functional fleet standardisation 
criterion. In fact, until 1978, expanding LIBYAN ARAB 
AIRLINES' Boeing fleet was based not so much on long 
term plans but on a constant watch of traffic growth in 
response to previous pruchases and the need to continue 
to face the rapidly-growing demand, however the 
policies in fleet acquisition were followed. By 1978 
that Libya's national airline fleet was standardised on 
two types: the Boeing 727-200 of which there were ten
and Fokker F27's of which eight were in the fleet.^ 
Since 1978, however, there appeared to be no coherent
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development in the national airline's equipment, at
least on the jet side.
Dominance of US mamufacturers
For almost a decade, the aircraft fleet of LIBYAN ARAB 
AIRLINES, and indeed those of the Maghreb Region's 
other airlines, appeared to be dominated by aircraft 
from the US manufacturer - Boeing. The question is, 
was such a phenomenon the result of choice or the 
outcome of a less market-orientated situation? So as 
to consider the answer to such a question, Todd and 
Simpson (1986) explained (emphasising American world 
dominance) that by 1977 European-made medium-range 
aircraft like the BAC 111 and the Caravelles failed not 
only to penetrate the US market of short and medium- 
range aircraft but also to prevail in the European 
markets in the face of competition from Boeing's B727's 
and Macdonell Douglas' DC9's. The commanding lead of 
the North American carriers among world airlines put 
the American aircraft manufacturers in a semi- 
monopolistic position - the exception which prevented a 
total monopoly was the sale of 34 Airbuses [by 1 977] 
to various airlines and the existence of a Russian ver- 
sion [in 1986] in the phase of development. To this
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must be added Russian equipment like the TU 154.
Thus it was not just LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES or the air­
lines of the Maghreb Region which depended on American 
equipment. It was all airlines of the world outside 
the Soviet Bloc who found theselves choosing between 
aircraft manufactured by Boeing, Douglas or Lockheed, 
all of which are American. The choice was only based
on the closeness of these aircraft to these airlines'
specific operational and economic requirements.
Air traffic growtfin, need for additioimal aircraft arc 
political constraimis
The Libyan Government earned augmenting sums from oil 
exports. Oil exports in 1970 were 482.6 million Libyan 
dinars, increasing more than three-fold in 1975 to
I,510.3 million and reaching 6,785.2 million in 1980 
or over fourteen times as much as ten years earlier.
Between 1970 and 1980, Libya's earnings from oil
totalled 23,501.2 million Libyan dinars of which
II,182.9 million dinars were eventually spent on
development projects.^ The development projects de­
pended on foreign labour who even from neighbouring 
countries travelled to Libya by air causing LIBYAN ARAB
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AIRLINES and other services to the country to operate 
with high load factors all year round and leading to 
continuous growth in traffic.
The oil boom reflected on the airline's traffic growth 
which, by implication, created a need for additional 
aircraft. Libya’s national air carrier's aircraft ac­
quisition began to face problems after 1978. In that 
year, the delivery of the last two Boeing 727-200's 
sold to Libya was delayed for a time until the Libyan 
Government had signed The Hague International Conven­
tion on Hijacking and assured the US Government that 
the aircraft would not be used in military operations 
in reconfirmation of the export licence rules.^ In 
early 1979 it was announced that Boeing had received an 
order from LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES for three Boeing 74 7 
Jumbo jets. The announcement meant a qualitative and 
quantative addition to the composition of the airline 
and promised substantial changes in the airline's net­
work with an imperative to upgrade the airline's tech­
nical infrastructure. The hopes for keeping up the
image of the airline grew with the approval of the sale
7 9by the State Department but quickly shaken when it 
was permanently reversed in May 1 979 in reaction to 
Libya’s utilisation of its national air carrier's
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aircraft in transporting a few hundred troops to Uganda 
to support Uganda's then government in its fight 
against the invading Tanzanians and in evacuating the 
wounded after the fight and Idi Amin's fall . ^  The ar­
gument was that the B74 7's would have become a 
strategic logistical support for Libya's armed forces. 
Libya's national carrier's fleet requirement problems 
began here. If the US door was closed against the 
provision of aircraft for Libya's air transport system 
at a time when demand was increasing and with a duty
to maintain a fair share of a still rapidly-growing 
71market, the lack of equipment would create an ex­
tremely problematic situation for the airline's 
management. This situation would mean an insecure 
network, income and personnel development.
Jumbo plans
The notion that the airline needed to incorporate jum­
bos in its fleet came into being in 1974. The Airline 
Analysis produced by Boeing for LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES in 
1975 suggested that B747-SP's ought to enter the 
airline's service from mid-1 978 so that by 1 985, the 
end of the study period, LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES would 
have been operating four such aircraft. The network
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that implied a requirement for extra long range 
aircraft like the 747-SP was a single route connecting 
Benghazi with New York0 The four long range routes in 
the study were: Benghazi-Lagos; Tripoli-Karachi;
•3 9
Benghazi-Karachi and Benghazi-Nairobi.  ^ There was no 
evidence at the time, except for a possible connection 
between Tripoli and New York, with the oil industry 
taken into consideration that such aircraft had 
suitable routes or traffic to justify such a sophisti­
cated operation. By 1978, however, the developments in 
the country's economy saw increasing traffic from Korea 
as well as from South East Asia so that from a traffic 
point of view, a Boeing 747 operation might have become 
justified and the Boeings ordered by the Libyan carrier 
could be, at least partially, economically justified. 
The development in traffic to South Korea and South 
East Asia was not an input in the Boeing proposals of 
1 975 a n d ^  Boeing's assumption that LIBYAN ARAB AIR­
LINES could have used Boeing 747's in 1978, since 1974, 
was a mere coincidence.
The hypothetical networks proposed by Boeing to promote 
the sale of the extra long range jumbos did not go 
beyond creating the notion that at some point the air­
line would find the traffic and routes to operate such
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aircraft. The 1978 order of Boeing 747's, however, was 
not a follow-up from Boeing's analysis of 1975. The 
reverse of the convention in fleet planning seems to 
have occurred this time. Boeing and LIBYAN ARAB AIR­
LINES worked jointly in July 1 979 ^  (after the US ad­
ministration reversed their approval for the sale of 
three Boeing 747's in May 1 979) and a fleet plan was 
produced to justify the need for the aircraft which had 
already been ordered. The network proposal implied a 
development of the ordered aircraft in 1980 to operate 
dense European routes; London, Frankfurt, Athens and 
Damascus, Jeddah and onward to Karachi - and the Far- 
Eastern route to Seoul through Kuwait, Teheran and
finally Hong Kong. Across the Atlantic the only des-
8 5tination proposed was to have been Havana. J The in­
corporation of Teheran and Havana into the proposed 
network was clearly a politically undiplomatic sug­
gestion to put forward within a study that was supposed 
to help reverse an export ban at a time when Washington 
was at odds with Teheran and obviously Havana and, 
above all, Tripoli. The study proposed additional 
aircraft of this type for operations from 1 982 to New 
York and an increase in the frequencies rather than ad- 
ding destinations from 1 985. All attempts to per­
suade the US Government of LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES' need
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for the Boeing 747’s failed. The aircraft built for 
LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES were subsequently leased and later 
sold to VARIG, the Brazilian airline.^
LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES' fleet acquisition has so far been 
characterised by proposals from aircraft manufacturers 
to purchase equipment through fleet plans calculated - 
outside the airline's control - from data inputs 
provided by the airline - which mainly emphasised the 
manufacturers' sales criteria. Eventually the airline 
bought aircraft from short term forecasts of traffic 
development based on recent pre-decision traffic data 
from some judgemental method in forecasting traffic 
that served to support a functional policy of fleet
O Q
planning and implementation. The turning down of
Libya's request for aircraft left the airline without a 
clear view of how to go about developing its aircraft 
fleet due to a lack of alternative resources. The 
airline's attempts to secure aircraft subsequent to 
this position demonstrate considerable confusion as to 
what alternatives did exist.
US sanctions
In 1981 the national air carrier entered into an ex­
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tremely complex set of arrangements and its requirement 
for aircraft became a test case for the effectiveness 
of American legislation so as to prove the extent of 
American control over aerospace technology world-wide. 
It was also a tool to further political ends. On the 
other, the European aerospace industry learned to ex­
perience American control caused by America's par­
ticipation in European technology. Overall, however, 
it demonstrated to the US aircraft manufacturers (at 
least until the time of writing) that using unilateral 
sanctions against a certain country through stopping 
the supply of aircraft and parts does not by necessity 
mean the loss of business to competitors outside the 
United States.
Restrictions on the export of commercial aircraft or 
components from the US are imposed through the Export 
Ad uni mi strati on Act which has the function of placing 
control over the export of American goods, technology 
and data for political and nati o n a l  security 
purposes.^ Its extra-territorial extent stems from 
the element of controlling end-users of US technology 
so that US technology exported to friendly countries 
may only be transferred to third parties after US con­
sent is obtained.40 The view that US aircraft manufac-
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turers control 80 per cent of the non-communist commer-
4 1cial aircraft market and that this situation is 
likely to continue at least into the 1980's and beyond 
due to advantageous domestic demand of which the US is 
the largest single source;^ coupled with the fact that 
the remaining 20 per cent of the commercial aircraft 
manufactured outside the USA - and outside the Soviet 
Bloc - contain substantial American components, such as 
the engines, or the avionics or sections of the 
airframe...etc . , or even the design - helps to extend 
the effectiveness of the US Export Administration Act 
and its amendments to global proportions over all 
aircraft manufacture outside the Soviet Bloc. Because 
this legislation is made to further foreign policy, a 
situation of political monopoly becomes evident as a 
consequence of American participation in European 
technology, and the control such legislation has over 
technology and data of US origin. The evidence put 
forward through the study of the Libyan air transport 
system shows that US policy objectives have a paramount 
control over European policy.
Sanctions against other nations
Various countries have been exposed to sanctions: South
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Africa was, and still is, under sanctions from various 
international organisations and individual governments 
due to her policy of apartheid; Rhodesia was also 
sanctioned in response to its UDI (Unilateral Declara­
tion of Independence) in 1965; the United States im­
posed sanctions on all communist countries, and Presi­
dent Nixon's visit to China in the early 1970's created 
an interesting battle between European and American 
aerospace manufacturers as signs of improved relations 
appeared. Currently the United States imposes sanc­
tions from the cause described in US politics as 
'international terrorism' on Syria, South Yemen, Libya, 
Cuba and Iran. The strictest of all are those on Libya 
and C u b a . ^  In respect of air transport, South Africa 
does not seem to have restrictions on her commercial 
aircraft supply. China in response to US restrictions 
looked to the aircraft industry in Europe and purchased 
a substantial fleet of Tridents from Britain's Hawker 
Sidley who p r o d u c e d  this a ircraft from non-US 
technology.^ Syria recently bought Russian-made TU 
154M's for her national airline. South Yemen appears 
to have her restrictions not extending so far as to 
prevent the sale of two Boeing B73 7's in 1984.^  
Cuba's natural socialist choice of Russian-made 
aircraft solved its air transport problem. It is Libya
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which seemed openly to question whether its advan­
tageous economic position with Western Europe was a 
sufficient pretext for Europe's ability to find a way 
around the American sanctions at the expense of 
American airframe manufacturers. Airbus Industrie 
European Consortium appeared to find such an attempt 
useful in that if it fell through, a new client would 
have been found. If it did not, it would still bring 
to life the test of the extra-territorial powers of US 
legislation. Above all, however, this battle would 
alert the European governments to, amongst other 
things, the need to support Airbus in its development 
programmes and on the other hand to alert other 
governments to the benefits of preventing a total US 
commercial aircraft manufacturing monopoly.
Airbus - the false escape
So as to support these two views it could be argued 
that it was known to the airline's management and ob­
viously to the Libyan Government, when they signed a 
contract with Airbus Industrie to supply ten Airbus 
aircraft in 1981, the aircraft power plants, among a 
host of other components, were American. There was no 
evidence of a possible and practical alternative to the
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US content of the aircraft. The position as far as 
Airbus was concerned was obviously of similar clarity, 
if not stronger. In order for Airbus to perform such a 
contract, permission from the American Administration 
was imperative. It would have been a gross miscalcula­
tion to believe that the American Government would have 
allowed its actions against Libya to work in favour of 
the European rivals of the American a i rframe 
manufacturers.
As for the strategy adopted by the Libyan Government in 
respect of this subject, it was proved wrong. By the 
time the delivery of the aircraft contracted for supply 
by Airbus was due, it had become evident that the US 
administration had stepped up the sanctions against 
Libya so that the delivery of aircraft components and 
parts became extremely restricted. The relations be­
tween Libya and the USA had worsened to the point of 
direct military engagement when a dog fight between US 
and Libyan aircraft left a Libyan casualty of two 
Soviet-made war planes in August 1981 over the Gulf of 
Surt. By v i r t u e  of the O f f i c e  of E x p o r t
Administration's final ruling, ^  prohibiting the ex­
port of parts through bulk licence,^ the collective 
purchase of aircraft parts was banned and each item
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required by Libya's national air carrier had to be con­
sidered on its own merit. The summary of this rule is 
quoted here for it explains that the American restric­
tions on supplying aircraft parts extended not only to 
Libyan-owned aircraft but also to those chartered or 
leased to Libya (including American-owned craft0 ). The 
ruling reads: '....this rule prohibits the use of bulk
licences for the provision of aircraft parts and acces­
sories to aircraft owned, operated or controlled by, or 
under charter or lease to Libya or any of its 
nationals. Exports of these commodities may now be 
made only pursuant to an individual, validated licence 
issued on a case by case basis'. Subsequently even 
such limited supply which was aimed at keeping the 
B727-200's in operation, in spite of the extremely com­
plicated procedure, just to ease Boeing's growing argu­
ment that US policies were working to unilaterally dis­
arm Boeing in battles for a fair share from the world
aircraft market against a background of unfair com-
4 rpetition from the European Airbus Consortium, ° by ex­
posing Boeing as an unreliable supplier. But with fur­
ther deterioration in US-Libyan relations, the Presi­
dent of the US, by virtue of exercising his powers as 
privileged by Section 6 of the Export Administration 
Act 1979, expanded export controls to Libya so that
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'Libya [is] placed in country groups with a validated 
export licence now required for all technical data and 
commodities except:
1. Medicine and medical supplies.
2. Food and other agricultural commodities.
3. Items permitted under certain special purpose 
general licences (including technical data freely 
available to the public).
4. The export to Libya of non-strategic, foreign-
produced direct products of US origin technical
d a t a , ^  a s  0 f  1 2 March 1982.
Boeing's attempts to overcome US legislation
The efforts by Boeing to persuade the US administration 
to reverse their policies towards exports to Libya 
continued, despite the continued tightening of export 
controls. In a clear supposition that Airbus had 
finally been unable to fulfil its commitment to LIBYAN 
ARAB AIRLINES, and at the airline's request, Boeing
51 3
submitted an application for the sale of five Boeing 
B767-200’s, six Boeing B737-200's and a single Boeing 
B747-SP in VIP configuration in November 1982 for a 
value of 597.5 million US dollars, extending the ag­
gregate of this sale and after-sale service until 1991
Sftto 1.2 billion dollars. This, however, appears to
have been Boeing's last attempt to sell aircraft to 
51Libya directly.
The continued efforts by Boeing to persuade the 
American Government to allow the sale of aircraft to 
Libya and Airbus' acceptance of signing a contract that 
it knew before-hand that it could not fulfil, stems 
from a desperate position in aircraft production at a 
time when world economic recession since 1980 had kept 
airlines away from buying new equipment, particularly 
the category required by Libya. In 1 979, the year of 
Libya's initial order of Boeing 747's, as many as 324 
wide-body aircraft were sold. Of these, 120 were Air­
bus A300's. The following years, the decline in sales 
was evident so that in 1982 only 6 Airbus A300's were
sold and all American airframe manufacturers collec-
5 2tively sold only 13.
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Libyan Airbus and tJhie psychology of sales in the Middle 
East
Table 6.2 shows that until 1985 there were 35 Airbus
aircraft in Arab countries of the Middle East and North
Africa. All these aircraft were sold after 1980 when
many governments in the Middle East believed that the 
American Government had shown that political disputes 
with her could extend to threatening the vital aspects 
of the economy and indeed the state, for as Wolfe
(1963) stated: 'The political state and the media of
transportation stand in a reciprocal relation to each 
other; the state needs transportation, and transporta-
C "3
tion needs the state ; and in countries where air 
transport is so vital, the importance of this 
reciprocity is even greater.
The most significant sales of Airbus aircraft in the 
Arab world are those to Egypt, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. 
These three airlines have had to solve some Boeing con­
cern over such purchases. Kuwait had to swap three of 
the Airbus A31 0 1s for three of the Boeing version of an 
Airbus, the B767.54 Egypt had to order three B767's
instead of maintaining a standard fleet of Airbuses
5 5whose manufacturer offered to assemble them in Egypt.
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TABLE 6.2
DEVTUOPMENT IN AIRBUS SALES IN IKE 
ARAB WORLD 1973 - 1985
1973-1979 00 o 00 M 00 to ‘83 '84 ’85 Total
1. ALGERIA 0 2 2
2. EGYPT 0 2 1 2 3 8
3. KUWAIT 0 3 8 11
4. SAUDI ARABIA 0 2 8 10
5. TUNISIA 0 1 1 2
6. U.A. EMIRATES 0 2 2
TOTAL 0 2 1 3 3 6 20 35
Source: Accumulated frccn Airliner Production List, 
pp27-42, Aviation Data Centre - 1986.
1986
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Saudia ordered ten Boeing 747's in 1 9 85,^^ but equipped
them with British power plants so as to create a
balance between a European Airbus with American engines
and an American Boeing with British engines. bore
recently ALIA, the Jordanian airline, decided that it,
too, preferred the European option. Six Airbus A310's
are due for delivery in 1 987-1 990 , and 6 A320's were
S 7also on order in 1986. These purchases from Boeinc
subsequent to acquisitions from Airbus all have an ele­
ment of sacrifice on equipment standardisation . 
However, attempts to escape the American domination of 
these countries' fleets - the proven technical and 
economic viability of the Airbus put aside - and the
counter-attempts by Boeing to stop Airbus's infiltra­
tion are clearly evident from the trends in the
development of aircraft fleets in the Arab Middle East.
Whether Airbus knowingly and deliberately used the 
psychological effects of the Libyan case on Arab air­
lines to show its willingness to provide in a 
demonstration of Europe's flexible policies may not be 
excluded, nor can the hypothesis that the Libyan case 
has brought the principle of diverse supply source into 
the Arab airlines fleets. Had the battles between
Boeing and Airbus in the Arab world been coincidental 
to the Libyan case, such a coincidence would be highly
517
except iona1.
Libyan precautionary aircraft acquisitions:
The escalation in US sanctions against Libya and the 
effect of these on the Libyan air transport system, 
particularly since 1979 when demand for air transport 
was growing at high rates, prompted some precautionary 
reaction from the Libyan Government. Between 1979 and 
1983, Libya bought eighteen aircraft of the type Boeing 
B707 and Macdonnell Douglas DC8.^^ That all these 
aircraft were not bought by the national carrier is 
immaterial, for while airlines like UNITED AFRICAN AIR­
LINES (later named JAMAHIRIYAH AIRLINES) did not use 
these aircraft extensively either on an ad hoc or 
regular scheduled service, they appeared to represent a 
reserve for the national air carrier in case the traf­
fic continued to grow at the then prevailing rates. By 
1986, however, only five of these aircraft had come un­
der the control of the national air carrier after all 
Libyan air operators but the national airline were 
liquidated. The thirteen remaining aircraft have
r
either been cannibalised or sold. The nervousness of 
the Libyan Government over air transport capacity is 
justified. The development in traffic between 1981 and
51 8
1985 on LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES' network is shown in Table
6,3 and Table 6.4 shows the airline's share of Libya's 
international passenger air traffic.
The total number of passengers carried by LIBYAN' ARAL 
AIRLINES on its network showed a substantial increase 
of 32 per cent in 1981 over 1 980. The 1 982 passenger 
traffic was 18 per cent greater than that of 1981. In 
1 983 , the increase in the totals slowed to only 2.6 
per cent. The trends of decline began in 1984. Total 
passengers carried in 1984 was 14.25 per cent less 
than a year earlier. The slight increase in 1 985 of 
4.19 per cent over 1984 may by no means indicate a 
recovery when prevailing economic conditions - which 
point to negative changes - are taken into 
consideration. Table 6.3 shows a significant increase 
in 1981 over 1980 equal to 32 per cent which is consis­
tent with the over-all growth throughout the network. 
Since 1981, however, the mean deviation in interna­
tional traffic was 1.25 per cent.61 The same table 
shows that the significant increase in 1 982 over 1981 
was a consequence of the closure of Benghazi Airport to 
international traffic and thus international travel 
from Benghazi through Tripoli inflated the domestic 
travel figures and subsequently the grand totals.
51 9
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Table 6.4 demonstrates that LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES was 
successful in maintaining slightly less than a fair 
share of the market despite the equipment problem.
The demonstration that figures for domestic travel did 
not necessarily represent genuine development in demand 
for domestic travel is matched by interesting trends in 
the total international traffic for all operators to 
and from Libya. The domestic traffic sharp increase in 
1981 over 1 980 was superceded by a figure of 41 per 
cent for international traffic increases. While the 
Libyan national carrier's international traffic in­
creased by 32 per cent, it is to be noticed that for­
eign carriers experienced a much greater growth on the 
Libyan route. Since 1981, however, the growth in in­
t ern a t i o n a l  traffic has not been e x c e p t i o n a l l y  
impressive. Change in 1982 over 1981 was 3.5 per cent; 
1983 over 1982, 6.6 per cent; 1984 over 1983, -7.1 per 
cent and 1985 over 1984, 1.8 per cent. The average an­
nual increase in international traffic to and from. 
Libya between 1982 and 1985 was 1.25 per cent.
Decline in oil revenues and international traffic
The sharp decline in oil revenues after 1981 decreased
522
the c o un tr y 's  spending on d e v el op me nt  projects
substantially* Since these projects were being ex­
ecuted by foreign labour, how could the paradox be 
solved if there continued to be no immediate reflection 
on international traffic? To solve this paradox, 
Figure 6.2 has been produced. The trends in Figure 6.2 
demonstrate that in 1980 and 1981 the number of people 
entering the country by air was substantially higher 
than that of those leaving it. These trends have 
levelled off since 1982 so that by the end of 1985 the
total number of passengers leaving the country for the
collective 1982-1985 period exceeded those entering it 
by more than 64,000. In 1985 alone, however, the net 
was negative by almost 95,000. No figures are avail­
able yet for traffic in 1986. However, Figure 6.2 
demonstrates the end of the era of steady growth trends 
with a plateau forming for the period 1982-1985 where 
it must be anticipated that the number of departures 
will exceed the arrivals from the cumulative effects on 
the traffic generation base, on the one hand due to 
policies that restrict the travel of Libyans and on the 
other, as the result of a general decline in the num­
bers of foreign labour in consequence to the decline in 
the country's economic fortunes.
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Airbus Imdustrie"s alternative proposals
A recent proposal produced by a manufacturer of a fleet 
plan for LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES was that made by Airbus 
Industrie in April 1983.^2 jt was based on the steady 
growth trends which were consistent with the airline's 
forecasts for the period after 1 982.^3 The Airbus 
document went to say: 'A substantial traffic growth is
foreseen1 . ^  The effects of the fall in oil revenues 
do not seem to have been taken into consideration. The
plan proposed by Airbus suggested that the airline's
passenger traffic would increase from 1.8 million in 
1982 to 7.7 million in 1990 - 5 million of which would 
account for domestic traffic0 Naturally - Airbus 
proposed that 12 Air-buses, 4 of the present Boeing
727's and 10 F27's would do the job.
LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES' hopes of solving its equipment 
dilemma through purchasing new aircraft continued to 
persist even after hopes had been completely dashed 
that the US administration would let up its objections 
to the sale of American manufactured aircraft or of US 
manufactured engines required to power the Airbuses it 
ordered. By February 1 982 and for a few months
afterwards, Airbus proposed a host of solutions
525
including: purchasing three Airbuses from the receiver
of a British airline; transferring aircraft built for 
the Libyan airline to an Arab carrier then leasing them 
to Libya; or arranging short term leases fro;:, 
European airlines as intermediate solutions to the 
fleet problem. J Airbus, three months before the first 
aircraft was due for delivery, recognised that the: 'US
embargo on engines forbids delivery' and only: 
'...unpredictable political evolutions' would alter
f\ f\this situation.
Redecltion of the American components in Airbus
The true hopes of solving this dilemma, however, came 
after Airbus proposed that a more advanced version of 
the aircraft contracted, the AB300-600, could be 
powered by non-American engines - the Rolls Royce 
RB211-524D4 - where Airbus proposed that this would
form a: '...very good long term solution at addi­
tional cost to cover the development aspect of this 
venture. Besides the engine, it was noted that addi­
tional components were only manufactured in the US but 
could be developed by aerospace firms in France and 
Britain. The time cost of this development was indi­
cated to have been two and a half y e a r s . I t  is not
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clear, however, whether Rolls Royce's association with 
General Electric, the American engine manufacturers 
who were originally contracted to power the Libyan 
Airbuses, worked to stop the progress of a truly 
European aircraft, or whether the cause of the stop­
page of the project came from the deterioration in the 
diplomatic relations between Britain and Libya after 
the St. James' Square crises in April 1 984. By the
terms of a five year production share programme in
February 1 984 - the same period when the Airbus A300- 
600 with Rolls Royce engines was under consideration 
these two aero engine manufacturers would have to 
achieve 25 per cent of each others' programmes. ^9 
This stopped Rolls Royce's effort towards the project
for fear of it being used in the argument that was
7 0building up against US extra-territorial legislation 
at that time with the suggestion that the diminution 
of the US content in the Airbus A320 project was a con­
sequence of US prohibition of the sale of the ten Air­
buses to LAA. This was triggering off European
n a t i o n a l i s t i c  t r e n d s  t o w a r d s  high t e c h n o l o g y  
71development.
Eight years have elapsed since Libya was first denied 
US origin aircraft or technology incorporated in
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aircraft manufactured el sewhere. The effects of the US 
legislation and its extra-territorial claim created a 
situation where Libya's need of aircraft from the West­
ern industrial countries become inachievable solely as 
a result of US sanctions. The significance of American 
content in the commercial aircraft produced in the West 
made US manufacturers fears that sanctions meant busi­
ness going abroad, at least in the Libyan case, ease. 
They, of course, lost the business, but to no-one 
e l s e 's explicit advantage - in the short term, at 
least. In the meantime, LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES had to 
face a problem with unprecedented dimensions for any 
airline.
Effectiveness of sanctions
The problems of sanctions and the arguments for and 
against them always centred on the wisdom of their 
application. In this chapter, the aim is to examine 
the effects of the specific sanctions imposed by the US 
on the air transport system of a developing country 
like Libya. Many examples show that sanctions have not 
worked even when they were imposed on a universal 
scale. The case of Rhodesia's UDI in 1965 works as a 
perfect example. Britain and the United Nations im­
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posed sanctions on Rhodesia in 1965 which were supposed 
to affect its Air Force and air transport system. 
Rhodesia's geographic location within Southern Africa, 
South A f r i c a ’s rush to its aid, Portuguese support 
through Mozambique and Angola, together with British 
and other air firms worked to break these sanctions.^ 
A more recent example is that of North Korea, a com­
munist country, which managed to obtain eighty seven,
7500 MD MacDonnell Douglas Military helicopters. An
extreme example indeed.
Libya's national air carrier fleet was so diversified 
in 1986 that it included, B727's, B707's, F27's, F28's 
and Airbus A310’s. The Boeing 707's were bought from 
the ageing fleet around the world - their age made them 
outside the restrictions on technology transfer clauses 
incorporated in their original contracts. The F28's 
were purchased from Fokker in 1 98 4 and the US ad ­
ministration quickly ensured that no further deliveries 
were possible. The Airbuses were brought into the 
country in violation of US legislation through a series 
of transactions familiar to the process usually fol­
lowed to beat sanctions.74 These two aircraft had not
7 5been put into service at the time of writing. J From 
a fleet standardisation point of view, such diversity
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is laden with technical, operational, administrative 
and financial problems.
Problems dissuading L M  frcwn purchase of Eastern Bloc 
craft
The persistent fact in the development in the fleet of 
Libya's airline throughout the eight years since the US 
administration placed it under strict control so that 
no commercial aircraft manufactured in the West would 
reach it, is that the national airline did not purchase 
aircraft manufactured in the Eastern Bloc countries. 
There is the assumption that should Libya be in need of 
aircraft and unable to obtain them from the West, it 
ought to seek a substitute elsewhere. It appears, 
however, that a two point explanation can be put 
forward. The first point is that Libya was seeking 
wide-body commercial aircraft, whose matching develop­
ment in the Soviet Union (the I L 8 6 ) is by no means 
mature. Furthermore, no such aircraft operate outside 
of Russia's AEROFLOT, so far.^ The aircraft the Rus­
sians produce at the moment which is finding its way 
into some friendly countries is the TU 154 which is a 
Boeing 727-200 replica. This aircraft is by no means 
representative of the type of aircraft required. For
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Libya's network, medium-long range aircraft are 
required. The TU 154 is a short-medium range aircraft. 
The levelling off of traffic since 1 982 and the addi­
tion of three F281s in 1984 makes an addition of more 
aircraft types in this category undesirable, and, above 
all, it would intensify the fleet diversity which is 
already quite problematic. The second point is excep­
tionally important for the technical crews and en­
gineers of Libya's national air carrier have completed 
their training and qualification requirements in West­
ern institutes and on Western-produced aircraft, equip­
ment and instruments. It would be extremely wasteful 
and expensive to convert their training to Russian 
standards - take the question of manual language for 
instance or indeed, the training language - and the 
time such conversion requires. Furthermore, should the 
Libyans wish to standardise on Russian equipment, they 
would have to dispose of the Western equipment they 
currently have. Such a proposal is neither practical 
nor economical. It might be argued that some other 
airlines have obtained equipment from the Soviet Union
- these, it must be stated had no technically trained 
airline manpower of their own, nor are they exactly in 
the Libyan technical position of aircraft and manpower
- but whether they substitute Western aircraft manned
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by Western manpower for Russian aircraft supported by 
Russian manpower makes little difference,
European efforts to comba t. US doffnlmaimce. in aircraft 
manufacture and export
The air transport industry is characterised by con­
tinuous change. 'Its rate of technological change has 
been exceptional'.77 Since the 1960's there has been a 
gradual fade out of commercial airliners totally 
manufactured in Europe - gradually the US manufacturers 
have come to control the world's aircraft industry to 
the extent that no commercial aircraft was being built 
without substantial US origin of content or technology. 
To further its political objectives, the US used the 
Export Admiimisttration Act so as to appear to be making 
effective steps towards those countries who fall into 
disfavour. The extra-territorial extent of the US 
legislation put the USA’s sovereign allies and states 
whose technology integration with the USA has grown 
from strategic and economic considerations to the test.
I would argue that when B. Lathiere, President of Air-
bus Industrie, sa id: 'If we do not have a place in high
technology in Eu rope, we would be slaves to the
Americans and our children will be slaves... we must
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fight and fight...the (A300) is the bread and butter of 
the European aerospace worker' f ^  he considered Libya 
to be a suitable battle ground. The A320 developed by 
Airbus depends much less on American technology. The 
A340 might be as European as the A320 .”^
Most interestingly, however, is that since G E 1s agree­
ment with Rolls Royce which, it was argued earlier, 
could have been behind stopping the development of 
LAA' s 'Europeanised Airbus' in 1 984, was scrapped late 
in 1986, Rolls Royce and Airbus have been exploring the 
possibility of reviving the A300-600, not necessarily 
for the Libyans but as part of an undeclared European 
awareness that the US wishes to find ways of reducing 
Europe's 20 per cent share of the commercial aircraft 
world market. Commenting on the efforts made by US of­
ficials to convince their European allies to curtail 
subsidies into developing commercial aircraft in 
Europe, or else it might be fought in the US by impos­
ing tariffs on the export of European aerospace 
technology, European officials said: '...they regarded
this latest threat by the US administration as poten-
q rj
tially the most dangerous over the past d e c a d e ' . 
After all, it is questionable whether the US is totally 
following its restrictive policies against Libya solely
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from a point of principle. The US Export AdmiiLnisttra­
tion Act aimed at preventing technology from reaching 
communist countries. In 197 3, however, following 
President Nixon's visit, the US sold Boeing 707's to 
China when China was about to purchase the British- 
built Vickers VCIO's. The application of US legisla­
tion seems to harden to ensure a monopolistsic position 
and soften when ultimately it is discovered that break­
ing such a monopoly is in sight.
Conclnusiom
The most important assets of an airline are the routes 
and aircraft. The airline industry is so structured 
that the choice, numbers and phasing in and out of 
aircraft is a process that aims at an optimum balance 
of technical, economic and operational factors over 
time. These processes form a fleet plan that deter­
mines the prospects of the airline's immediate, medium 
and long term needs.
The process of fleet acquisition by Libya's national 
air carrier between 1 965 and 1 977 had been based on 
judgement methods which came in response to recent 
traffic development and sought to meet the medium term
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future requirement. The choice of aircraft was exer­
cised until that time from free choice of whatever was 
available in the aircraft market. The national 
carrier's fleet standardised on two types of aircraft 
which funtioned to satisfy the needs of the airline's 
expanding domestic and international networks.
The increase in revenues from oil caused a large aug­
mentation in expenditure on development projects. The 
arrival of labour from distant countries prompted the 
upgrading of the airline's network so that it required 
to operate larger aircraft on certain of its routes. 
The US found cause to believe that the B747 1 s it ap­
proved for sale in 1979 to Libya might form a strategic 
asset to the Libyan armed forces after Libya ventured 
in military operations in support of the Ugandan 
Government. The Libyans turned to Europe for aircraft. 
The European Consortium, Airbus, we argued, used the 
Libyan request to create the psychological effect 
within the airlines of the Arab world who overwhelm­
ingly operated US manufactured aircraft so that these 
became convinced that aircraft source diversification 
'is good'. On the other hand, Airbus used the Libyan 
case as a live example to demonstrate that US attitudes 
showed that it was about time that the American monopo­
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listic trends be reversed. The policy worked. Middle 
Eastern Arab airlines bought a significant number of 
Airbuses and the most promising of European aircraft is 
being manufactured with less American content. The 
1990's might see the American monopolistic position 
decline to the same level as the 1 960's, as the 
European consortium is geared to produce various 
aircraft categories in over-all and direct competition 
with US manufacturers.
By 1 990, there is a glimpse of hope that the existing 
competition between European and American aerospace 
firms will result in the emergence of a situation where 
aircraft may become available in the West and fall out­
side the long arm of America's Export Administration 
Act. Such a development ought to be celebrated by many 
airlines for reasons superceding those put forward by 
Pierre Condom of Interavia as he welcomed the revival 
of competition between Macdonell Douglas, Boeing and 
Airbus when he said: '...the airlines can only rejoice,
because they are the ones to benefit most from competi-
Q  *1
tion among the three major manufacturers'.
So far, Libya's national airline's fleet development 
has been distorted by the US sanctions. The US monop­
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oly over the aerospace industry caused its extra­
territorial legislation to work single-handedly to im­
pede the healthy development of an extremely vital 
service to the economy of Libya. The US alone made 
Libya's air transport network development dependent on 
Libya's political relations.with the US. The alterna­
tives open to Libya are laden with achievement 
abortion; for two decades Libya has been training her 
technical personnel on Western methods and equipment. 
Should Libya divert to aircraft made in the Soviet 
Bloc, more problems are going to be created than 
solved.
Libya is still paying dearly for her unpopularity with 
the United States. The unjustified financial cost, the 
damaged image and distortion suffered by Libya's na­
tional airline in routes and fleet development, are 
sacrifices as natural as are scars after every battle. 
More relevantly, however, Libya was just another arena 
for the fight between the US and European technological 
powers, for the end result is stronger European 
aerospace technology and a less dominant Boeing. Libya 
still has to wait until Europe produces a totally- 
European aircraft and the types that would suit a net­
work it finds adequate. More importantly, a Europe
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that is not as imperialistic as the USA needs to con­
tinue to prevail. If these two things do not
materialise in the near future, the difficult option of 
turning to the Soviet Bloc might have to be taken. Some 
African countries a re already consider!ng a mixed East-
o n
ern and Western fleet. The concern over American
technological imperialism is growing. Developing na­
tions and American manufacturers are paying the price. 
Europe's aircraft industry wishes to become more 
independent. The extent of the American market grows 
the pace. An opportunity is being given to the Soviet 
Bloc countries to expand the area of their aircraft in­
dustry market.
The easing of the dominant US monopolistic position 
is a positive matter for the airline industry on two 
grounds. Competition is always better for the con­
sumers than monopoly. The use of technological 
monolopy for political ends against a developing 
country is fatal. Thus the existence of competition 
between Europe and the US in aircraft manufacturing is 
useful to the airlines all over the world, and works as 
a retardant to Soviet Bloc civil aircraft manufacturing 
expansion - a fact which the present US policies and US 
monopoly work expressly to encourage.
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Sanctions in many cases are generally ineffective or 
counter-productive. Libya did not change its stand on 
foreign policy as a result of American sanctions. The 
US manufacturers lost business to European manufac­
turers particularly in the Middle East. True of 
course, the fact that Libya's air transport system suf­
fered and still suffers from uncertain development. 
The reverses in the country's economy as a whole in the 
1 980's as a result of the decline in oil revenues and 
unidentified internal policies - would have affected 
the national airline anyway. The greatest loss would 
however be the loss of investment in time and money in 
the human resources made over the past two decades.
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Industry, Croom Helm, 1986.
Table 1.4 lists the following developing countries to 
be involved in aircraft production either through 
licence deals, joint deals with industrialised 
countries or from indigenous design:
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2 . ibid, pp.14-18.
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Quotation from the editorial on the sale of BRITISH 
AIRWAYS to the Private Sector in 1987.
7. The Independent, article by A. George, 10 November 
1 986 .
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9. Department of Civil Aviation (Libya), Report on TWA 
Study of Kiogsdoor. of Libya Airlines, p.21 , (1968?).
10. ibid.
11. The Caravelles operated by the Libyan airline were 
configurated: 12 first - 69 economy seats.
12. The convention is that a load factor above 65 per 
cent per year implies that insufficient capacity is 
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13. The study made by TWA in 1 9 68 on behalf of the 
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performance of the national air carrier.
14. The recommendation by TWA and by the Director 
General of Civil Aviation spoke of a 138 seat trijet 
without specifying the models or types of aircraft 
proposed since there were then two different views as 
to what Libya ought to buy. The airline thought (and 
correctly), that the B727-200 was a better choice, 
since it had begun to dominate the medium range 
a i r c r a f t  in its category, both w o r l d - w i d e  and 
regionally. The Trident, however, was being supported 
on political grounds associated with the missile system 
and defence package Britain was negotiating with Libya 
at that time.
541
Airline preference from personal experience as the 
airline's manager in Italy during 1968-1969 with 
frequent discussions on the matter, particularly with 
the then Chairman, the late Hashem Elabbar.
- For the missile defence system question see J. 
Wright, Libya: A Modern History, Croom Helm, pp.106-
107, 1983.
15. Department of Civil Aviation (Libya), Report on 
TWA Study of Kiugdomt of Libya Airlines, p.22, (1968?).
The Civil Aviation report went on to say: (as
translated)
'Before any decision is taken as to what type of 
aircraft ought to be bought, the committee recommends 
that the following points be taken into account:-
1. The operations program for the coming five 
years is not enough [for fleet planning proposals] 
at least eight years [programs] are necessary, 
since the aircraft shall be used for this period 
at least. [Usually 5-15 years forecasting is 
required as suggested by Tanega (1982, p.131)].
2. Sector operations requirements, present and fu­
ture [presumably meaning network definition].
3. Standardisation and coordination of all types 
used to be as far as possible to facilitate and 
standardise maintenance, overhaul, tools and
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4. Selection of internationally known types of 
aircraft to follow developments and changes!0]. 
[Commonality with the region's airlines assumed 
[0] information on modifications and changes are 
part of any aircraft manufacturer's obligations 
towards operator clients].
5. Choose such aircraft that are suitable to the 
operational conditions of our airports par­
ticularly those of domestic air transport.
6. The ad hoc seasonal operations (e.g. the
pilgrim movement) and the size of this movement 
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continental airlines but not taken up, they were then 
sold to the Libyan airline in December 1 970 and
delivered in December 1970 and July 1971.
Aviation Data Centre, Airline Production List, p. 174,
1 986.
17. J. Wright, Libya: A Modern History, Croom Helm, 
p.1 42 , 1 983 .
Flight International, 20 August 1970, p.264 reported 
the Boeing 727-200 sale for almost US$14 million 
against competition from Hawker Sidley who were intend-
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p.162, 1983 (reprint).
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the decision. He was also a member of the purchase 
negotiations team. The orders were made in April 1974.
23. Law No 5, 1975.
Article (2) defined the objectives of the company as 
being to undertake domestic and international air 
transport and pledged that the government would: 
'...compensate the company for whatever losses or addi-
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tional expenses it incurs...for opening an air route or 
internal or external offices [from non-commercial 
reasons]... reduction of tariffs for a specific 
[category of traffic or route]..,and any laws or in­
structions affecting the facilities or the standard of 
service offered by the company to passengers, cargo or 
mail'. Such extensive privileges were not available to 
the liquidated organisation and thus showed the deter­
mination by the government that the airline should be 
supported to function in a flexible atmosphere.
24. During the period 1976-1977 the author was Chair­
man of the national carrier and directed fleet acquisi­
tion policies towards maintaining standardisation of 
equipment.
25. D. Todd and J. Simpson, The World Aircraft
Industry, pp.50-51, Croom Helm, 1986.
26. S. Ghanem, 'Changing Planning Policies in Libya' 
in Flamming and Development in Modern Libya, M.M.
Buru, S.M. Ghanem and K.S. McLachlan (Eds.), MENAS, 
Table 15.3, p.224, 1985.
27. In 1975, Boeing calculated Libyan aircraft
requirements as shown in Airline Analysis, 1975-1985, 
based on an annual growth of 13.5%. Previous growth
was much greater as could be seen from figures pub­
lished by IKTTERAV1A.
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1971: Passenger/km 269,901,000 change over 1970 +56% 
Passenger 259,386 " " " +36%
1972: Passenger/km 352,306,000 change over 1971 +31%
Passenger 327,242 " " " +26%
{Source: for 1971 - JNTERAVIA September 1 972, and for
19 72 INTERAVIA November 1973)
28. J.K. Cooley, Libyan Sandstorm - The Complete Ac­
count of Qaddafi's Revolution, Sidgwick & Jackson, 
pp.252-253, 1983.
State & Commerce Department took the decision on 2 
November 19 78.
29. ibid, p.254.
30. ibid, p.256.
31. Throughout 1981 LIBYAN ARAB AIRLINES maintained a
market share of 50.1 per cent versus other national 
carriers operating. Internal Statistical Report: OTT
84, 13 April 1981 .
32. Boeing, LIBYAM ARAB AIKLH&ES. Airline Analysis,
1975-1985.
Study Network summary is reproduced below:
From Tripoli direct to: From Benghazi direct to:
KARACHI KARACHI
ENTEBBE NAIROBI
CASABLANCA* ENTEBBE
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ALGIERS* FORTLAMY
GENEVA* LAGOS
PARIS* KHARTOUM
LONDON* CAIRO*
TUNIS* AMMAN*
BELGRADE* DAMASCUS*
ROME* BEIRUT*
NICOSIA*
ATHENS*
From Sabhah direct to: ISTANBUL*
FORTLAMY (Njamena)* BUCHAREST
WAR SAW*
BELGRADE*
FRANKFURT
GENEVA
MILAN
ROME*
MADRID
MALTA
CASABLANCA 
ALGIERS 
TUNIS 
NEW YORK
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^indicates that the service actually operated at one
time or another during the period of LIBYAN ARAB
AIRLINES 1s network development up to 1 987 .
(See Boeing study for proposed network).
33. In 1986 four direct services operated between
Tripoli and Karachi and two between Tripoli and Seoul.
34. Boeing, Preliminary Fleet Plann Analysis (198(3- 
1985)) , Introduction, p.1. September 1 979.
35. Traffic to Havana from Tripoli averaged as follows 
on Cuban flights between Tripoli and Havana - (as 
reported in Libyan Airlines statistical report).
1980 5 passengers
1982 a total of 416 passengers travelled from
Tripoli and 509 from Havana in 6 odd 
flights.
1983 a total of 5 flights were operated -
Tripoli-Havana carrying a total of 671
passengers - Havana-Tripoli only 34 pas­
sengers were carried.
1984-1985 no flights between Tripoli and Havana
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were operated.
Boeing's judgement on the immediate need for flights 
between Tripoli and Havana was evidently unjustified on 
commercial grounds.
36. ibid.
37. Aviation Data Centre, Airline Production List 
1986, p.257, 1986.
38. Judgemental forecasts are educated guesses that 
come from experienced professionals and are useful par­
ticularly when trends are historically changing from 
sudden changes and the future appears to be less cer­
tain in the long run.
A. Wells, Air Transportation: A Management Perspective,
Wadsworth, California, pp.273-276, 1984.
39. See Section 7 of the Export Administration Act, 
1979 on Foreign Policy Control criteria.
40. A sample of the wording used in commercial 
aircraft contracts is reproduced here from a contract 
signed between the Export Import Bank and a Norwegian 
civil aircraft operator where even the use of aircraft, 
let alone their sale, is restricted:
'C. Negative covenants - Borrower .....
(9) Use of Aircraft. Permit the aircraft (a) to be
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principally used in a communist country (as defined in 
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APPENDIX 2
**********
Re : Chapter 1
1. Diagrammatic representation of traffic rights
Source : Jonsson C, International aviation and the
politics of regime change, Frances Pinter, London, 
Figure 2, p.33, 1987
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APPENDIX 3
**********
Re : Chapter 3
1. Outline of the transportation planning process
Source : Fredrick Harris, Martin and Voortrees,
Transportation Planning Study, p.19, 1985
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APPENDIX 4
**********
Re : Chapter 3
1. Basic structure of the transportation model
Source : Fredrick Harris, Martin and Voortrees, Libyan
Transportation Planning Study, p.25, 1985
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APPENDIX 5
**********
Re : Chapter 3
1. Outline of the domestic air passenger 
processes.
2. Outline of the international air passenger 
processes.
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APPENDIX 6
**********
Re : Chapter 6
1. Prepared statement of Lionel Olmer, Under-Secretary 
for International Trade Administration, before the 
Subcommittee on International Economic Policy & Trade 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 
USA, April 5, 1983
2. US Customs Service document; Ref Ex-4-0:1:0 JAM, 2 4 
March 1982
3. Extract from Eximp Bank contract with Norwegian air 
company with reference of negative covenants - borrower, 
p p . 1 9 ,  2 0  & 21 .
4. US Department of Commerce document, Document 
Reference : 15 CRF Parts 373, 376 and 390. Re :
Prohibition of Bulk Licensing for Libya, September 18, 
1 981 .
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PREPARED STATEMENT OF L IO N E L  OLMER 
UNDER SECRETARY 
FOR I N T E R N A T I O N A L  TRADE A D M I N I S T R A T I O N  
BEFORE TH E SUBCOMMITTEE ON 
I N T E R N A T I O N A L  ECONOMIC P O L IC Y  AND TRADE  
C O M M I T f E E  ON FOREIGN A F F A I R S  
HOUSE OF R EP R E S E N T A TI VE S  *
* ' •  y A P R I L  5 ,  1 9 8 3
I A PP R E C IA T E  THE O P P O R T U N I T Y  TO D IS C U SS  WITH T H I S  
SUBCOMMITTEE THE R E A U T H O R I Z A T I O N  OF THE EXPORT A D M I N I S T R A T I O N  
A C T .  MY TES T IM O N Y  W I L L  COVER T .E A D M I N I S T R A T I O N  B I L L  AND 
VAR IO US  ASPECTS OF TH E  C H A I R M A N ' S  L E G I S L A T I V E  PROPOSALS.
THE EXPORT A D M I N I S T R A T I O N  ACT HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF  
E X T E N S I V E  R EV IE W  W I T H I N  T H E  E XE C U T IV E  BRANCH, AND THE SUBJECT  
OF C ON SIDER ABLE D I S C U S S I O N  AMONG THE E X E C U T I V E  BRANCH, THE  
B U S IN E S S  COMMUNITY AND T H E  GENERAL P U B L I C .  IN COOPERATION  
W IT H  THE P R E S I D E N T ' S  EXPORT C O U N C IL ,  WE HAVE HELD S I X  P U B L IC  
HEARINGS AROUND T H E  C O U NT RY .  I HAVE PERSONALLY MET W IT H  
B U S IN E S S  LEADERS IN  T H I S  COUNTRY AND ABROAD, W I T H  FOREIGN  
GOVERNMENT O F F I C I A L S ,  AND W I T H  R EP R ES E N TA TI VE S  OF THE .
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LEADING TRADE A S S O C I A T I O N S  IN ORDER TO D IS CU SS  THESE ISSUES  
WI TH  THEM.
IN A D D I T I O N  TO WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED FROM THESE D I S C U S S I O N S ,
WE HAVE HAD THE B E N E F I T  OF MANY YEARS EXPE RI EN C E IN 
A D M I N I S T E R I N G  AND ENFORCING EXPORT CONTROLS TO DETERMINE  
R E V I S I O N S  AND M O D I F I C A T I O N S  WHICH NOW MAY BE DESIRA BLE  OR 
NECESSARY.
EXPORT CONTROLS USUALLY PRESENT COMPETING P O L IC Y  IN TER EST S.
ON THE ONE HAND, THERE IS  A V I T A L  NEED TO IMPROVE OUR 
C O M P E T I T I V E N E S S  IN WORLD TRA DE .  T H I S  REQUIRES AGGRESSIVE  
MARKETING AND ACCESS TO WORLDWIDE SALES O P P O R T U N I T I E S .  WE 
MUST BE IN T E R N A T IO N A L L Y  C O M P E T I T I V E  IN ORDER TO EXPAND OUR 
EMPLOYMENT BASE AND TO PAY FOR THE GOODS WE WANT AND N EE D .T O  
I M P O R T . . . I T  HARDLY NEEDS R EP E AT IN G BEFORE T H I S  COMMITTEE AND 
' E S P E C I A L L Y  BEFORE CHAIRMAN BONKER, WHOSE EFFORTS TO IMPROVE 
OUR N A T I O N ' S  EXPORT POSTURE HAVE BEEN STE LLAR ,  THAT OUR 
N ATIONAL S E C U R I T Y  IS  IN E X T R IC A B L Y  L IN KE D  TO THE HEALTH OF OUR 
ECONOMY. ECONOMIC STRENGTH PROVIDES THE FOUNDATION FOR OUR 
L E A D E R S H I P - R E S P O N S I B I L I T I E S  IN THE WORLD.
ON THE OTHER HAND,  THE IMPORTANCE OF EXPORTS CANNOT OBSCURE,  
MUCH LESS OVERSHADOW, THE NEED TO PROTECT OUR NAT IONA L  
S E C U R I T Y .  T H E  TRANSFER OF S E N S I T I V E  WESTERN TECHNOLOGY AND 
EQUIPMENT TO THE S O V I E T  UNI ON HAS HAD A D IR E C T  IMPACT ON THE  
GROWTH OF S O V I E T  M I L I T A R Y  C A P A B I L I T I E S ,  E S P E C I A L L Y  OVER THE
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PAST TEN YEARS. IT HAS ACCELERATED THE INTRODUCTION OF NEW AND 
MORE SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS TO THE SOVIET ARSENAL, THUS 
REQUIRING THE WEST TO SPEND MORE ON DEFENSE. PERHAPS EVEN MORE 
IMPORTANT, IT CAN CREATE VULNERABILITIES ON OUR SIDE THAT COULD 
HAVE TRAGIC RESULTS.
THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES SIMPLY MUST CURTAIL THE FLOW OF 
STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGY TO THE SOVIET UNION. THIS ADMINISTRATION 
VIEWS THIS AS A VERY HIGH PRIORITY. CLEARLY, EXPORT CONTROLS 
KAY IMPOSE ECONOMIC COSTS TO BUSINESS FIRMS. BUT THESE ARE 
SOMETIMES NECESSARY C O STS. WHILE THERE MAY BE DISAGREEMENT 
REGARDING WHICH ITEMS ARE OF STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE, I DO NOT 
BELIEVE THERE IS ANY DISAGREEMENT REGARDING THE NEED FOR 
NATIONAL SECURITY EXPORT CONTROLS. THE PUBLIC DISCUSSIONS I 
MENTIONED EARLIER DEMONSTRATED THIS BEYOND ANY DOUBT. 
NEVERTHELESS,- WE MUST ENSURE THAT NATIONAL SECURITY EXPORT 
CONTROLS ARE CONFINED TO THOSE ITEMS NECESSARY TO PROTECT THE 
NATIONAL INTEREST WITHOUT UNDULY INTERFERING IN THE FREE FLOW 
OF COMMERCE.
MR. CHAIRMAN, THESE ARE OFTEN DIFFICULT JUDGMENTS. THERE IS 
OFTEN DIVERSITY OF OPINION AS TO THE APPROPRIATE INSTANCES IN 
WHICH TO IMPOSE EXPORT CONTROLS AND AS TO WHETHER WE ARE 
ADMINISTERING THEM EFFECTIVELY AND EFFICIENTLY. THE
618
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ADMINISTRATION'S BILL, I BELIEVE, STRIKES THE APPROPRIATE 
BALANCE FOR DETERMINING WHEN EXPORT CONTROLS SHOULD BE IMPOSED; 
LET ME EXPLAIN HOW THIS BILL ACHIEVES THIS BALANCE.
NATIONAL SECURITY CONTROLS
THIS ADMINISTRATION MAINTAINS THAT EXPORT CONTROLS FOR NATIONAL 
SECURITY REASONS ARE NECESSARY TO THE SAFETY OF OUR NATION.
THIS BILL REFLECTS THIS BELIEF, BUT AT THE SAME TIME, IT 
REFLECTS AN INTENTION TO MINIMIZE THE ECONOMIC COSTS IMPOSED ON 
OUR BUSINESS FIRMS.
WHEREAS THE PRESENT ACT EMPHASIZES THE IMPORTANCE OF EXPORT 
PROMOTION, THE ADMINISTRATION BILL PROPOSES CHANGES IN THE 
SECTION ON FINDINGS AND POLICY DECLARATIONS WHICH CLARIFY THAT 
EXPORTS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF OVERALL U.S. 
INTERESTS. WHEREAS THE PRESENT ACT APPEARS TO PLACE GREATER 
EMPHASIS ON EXPORTS, THE ADMINISTRATION BILL HIGHLIGHTS THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF FAILING TO PREVENT OR DELAY THE TRANSFER OF 
MILITARILY SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY. THESE CHANGES BETTER DESCRIBE 
THE ECONOMIC AND SECURITY OBJECTIVES OF THE ACT.
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THE REAGAN A D M I N I S T R A T I O N  I S  COMM ITTED TO IMPROVING THE
E F F E C T I V E N E S S  OF EXPORT CONTROLS ON S T R A T E G I C A L L Y  IMPORTANT
TECHNOLOGY.  OUR A I M  IS  TO T I G H T E N  S TR A TE G I C  CONTROLS AT THE
TOP OF THE TECHNOLOGY SPECTRUM AND REDUCE CONTROLS AT THE
LOWER END. AT THE SAME T I M E ,  WE INT EN D  TO REDUCE IN A*
S U I T A B L E  MANNER THE CONTROL OF C E R T A I N  PRODUCTS OF THAT  
TECHNOLOGY.
MR. C HAI RMAN,  E F F E C T I V E  AND F A I R  ENFORCEMENT OF THE EXPORT OF 
C R I T I C A L  C O M M O D IT IE S  AND TECHNOLOGY REQ UI RE S M U LTI LA TER A L  
C OO PERA TIO N.  A C C O R D IN G LY ,  T H I S  A D M I N I S T R A T I O N  IS COMMITTED  
TO STRE NGTHE NING AND IMPR OV IN G THE E F F E C T I V E N E S S  OF COCOM.  
T H I S  B I L L  REFLECTS THAT COMM ITME NT.  FOR EXAMPLE, ONE OF THE  
P R O V I S I O N S  IN  THE P O L I C Y  S E C T I O N  MANDATES B IL A T E R A L  AND 
M U L T I L A T E R A L  N E G O T I A T I O N S  TO E L I M I N A T E ,  WHEREVER P O S S IB L E ,
THE FOR EIGN  A V A I L A B I L I T Y  OF COMPARABLE GOODS AND TECHNOLOGY.  
-WE R EC O G N IZ E  THAT T H E  U N I T E D  STA TES  I S  NOT A UNIQUE SOURCE OF  
SU PPLY  FOR MANY C O M M O D IT IE S  AND TECHNOLOGY AND THAT THE  
TARGET COUNTRY MAY OFTEN O B T A I N  COMPARABLE PRODUCTS 
ELSEWHERE.  THE B I L L  ALSO ST R ESS ES THE IMPORTANCE OF 
N E G O T I A T I O N S  W IT H  OTHER COCOM N A T IO N S  TO IMPROVE THE 
I N T E R N A T I O N A L  CONTROL L I S T ,  TO STRENGTHEN ENFORCEMENT AND 
C O O P E R A T IO N ,  TO UPGRADE TH E COCOM S E C R E T A R I A T ,  AND TO P R O V I D E  
S U F F I C I E N T  FUNDING. FOR I T S  A C T I V I T I E S .  THE COMMITMENT . 
R EF L E C T E D  IN  T H I S  B I L L  TO STRENGTHEN COCOM W I L L  M I N I M I Z E  THE  
P O S S I B I L I T I E S  FOR D I V E R S I O N .  MOREOVER, ONLY CONTROLS THA T
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ARE MULTILATERAL A VO ID  P LA C IN G  AN UNFAIR BURDEN ON U . S .  
BUSINESSE S.  THE COMMITMENT TOWARD STRENGTHENING COCOM HAS 
BEEN MANIFEST IN A D M I N I S T R A T I O N  P O L IC Y .
OUR B I L L  ALSO CONTAINS P R O V I S I O N S  RE Q UI RI NG  N E G O T I A T I O N S ,  NOT 
ONLY WITH OUR COCOM PARTNERS, BUT ALSO WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS 
TO REMOVE FOREIGN A V A I L A B I L I T Y .
IN A D D I T I O N ,  WE INTEND TO PLACE GREATER EFFORTS THAN HAS BEEN 
THE CASE IN THE PAST ON THE VERY SERIOUS PROBLEM OF D I V E R S I O N  
OF ITEMS FROM T H I R D  CO UNTRIES THAT ARE NOT P A R T IE S  TO CONTROL 
AGREEMENTS. WE W I L L  CONDUCT B IL ATE RAL  N EG OT IA T IO NS  WITH THE 
INTENT OF CONCLUDING AGREEMENTS WITH SUCH CO U NT RI ES.
AS ANOTHER MEANS OF REDUCING THE FLOW OF S E N S I T I V E  GOODS AND 
TECHNOLOGY TO THE S O V I E T  U N I O N ,  OUR B I L L  ALSO AUTHORIZES  THE  
PRESIDENT TO CONTROL THE TRANSFER OF GOODS OR TECHNOLOGY 
W I T H I N  THE U N I TE D  STATES TO EMBASSIES AND A F F I L I A T E S  OF 
COUNTRIES TO W H I C H ' EXPORTS OF SUCH ITEMS ARE CONTROLLED.
WITH REGARD TO THE C H A IR M A N 'S  EFFORTS TO DECREASE THE BURDEN 
OF EXPORT L I C E N S I N G  FOR WEST/WEST TRADE A C T I V I T I E S ,  WE SHARE 
.THE SAME GOALS. UNLESS WE CAN BETTER D I F F E R E N T I A T E  BETWEEN
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•EXPORTS THAT R A I S E  N A T I O N A L  S EC U RI TY  CONCERNS FROM THOSE THAT
DO NOT, 'THE EXPORT CONTROL L I C E N S I N G  SYSTEM W I L L  BECOME
UNMANAGEABLE. WE MUST F I N D  WAYS TO EASE R E S T R I C T I O N S  ON
C E R T A I N  WEST/WEST TRA NSFERS SO THAT WE MAY FOCUS OUR
A T T E N T IO N  ON THOSE EXPORTS THAT POSE THE GREATEST R I S K  TO OUR
NAT IO NA L S E C U R I T Y .  AT TH E  SAME T I M E ,  AS I M E N T I O N E D ,  WE MUST
T I G H T E N  OUR M U L T I L A T E R A L  ENFORCEMENT T O  P R E V E N T - T H E  D I V E R S I O N
OF THESE S E N S I T I V E  ITEMS T O ' T H E  S O V I E T  U N IO N .— ” FOR T H I S
1
REASON, WE MUST OPPOSE THE P R O V I S I O N  C O N TA IN E D  IN  H . R .  1 5 6 6  
THAT REQUIRE S TH E  SECRETARY OF COMMERCE TO REMOVE THE EXPORT  
CONTROLS ON ANY U N I L A T E R A L L Y  CONTROLLED ITEMS FOR WHICH ALL  
EXPORT L IC E N S E  A P P L I C A T I O N S  HAVE BEEN APPROVED DUR IN G ANY ONE 
YEAR P E R IO D .  T H I S  MANDATORY DECONTROL WOULD H IN D E R  OUR 
EFFORTS TO PREVENT D I V E R S I O N .
WE ARE E X A M I N I N G  C A R EF U LL Y  THE CONCEPT OF A C OM PR EHE NSI VE  
-O PER ATIONS L I C E N S E  PROPOSED. IN  H . R .  1 5 6 6 .  HOWEVER, WE HAVE 
NOT YET D EC ID E D  ON T H E  S P E C I F I C  L I C E N S I N G  MECHANISM TO .REDUCE 
THE BURDEN OF TR A N S FE R S  BETWEEN U . S .  COMP ANI ES AND T H E I R  
S U B S I D I A R I E S .  W H I L E  WE B E L ! E V E  YOUR' IDBA* HAS M E R I T ,  WE DO 
NOT B E L I E V E  TH A T  ADD ITIONAL~*L~1CENSING MECHANISMS SHOULD BE 
S T A T U T O R IL Y  MANDATE D.  WE MUST CAREFULLY EVA LUATE A L T E R ­
N A T IV E S  SO THA T T H E  L I C E N S I N G  SYSTEM WE F A S H IO N  DOES NOT HAVE 
UNFORESEEN R A M I F I C A T I O N S .  MOREOVER, WE NEED T H E  F L E X I B I L I T Y  
TO M O D I FY  AND R E V I S E  ANY L I C E N S I N G  SYSTEM ONCE I N  O P E R A T I O N .  
IN ANY CASE ,  E X I S T I N G  STATUTORY A U T H O R I T Y  ENABLES T H E  ■
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SECRETARY OF COMMERCE TO ESTABLISH.SUCH A LICENSING PROCEDURE. 
AS A POINT OF INTEREST, IN CONNECTION WITH OUR IMPLEMENTATION 
OF THE MILITARILY CRITICAL TECHNOLOGY LIST, WE ARE NOW 
PREPARING PROPOSALS TO IMPLEMENT A LICENSING SYSTEM TO 
FACILITATE TRANSFERS BETWEEN U.S. COMPANIES AND TEEIR OVERSEAS 
SUBSIDIARIES.
KITE RESPECT TO YOUR LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL CONCERNING 
MICRO-PROCESSORS, THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT HAS PROPOSED TO THE 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE THE TYPES OF EQUIPMENT INCORPORATING 
MICRO-PROCESSORS WHICH WE BELIEVE SHOULD BE DECONTROLLED. 
CURRENTLY, SCIENTIFIC AND ANALYTICAL INSTRUMENTS WHICH CONTAIN 
MICRO-PROCESSORS REQUIRE A VALIDATED LICENSE, IRRESPECTIVE OF 
THEIR STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE. WE AGREE TEAT THIS CONTROL IS 
UNNECESSARILY BROAD," AND NEEDS TO BE STREAMLINED. WE' 
ANTICIPATE A RESPONSE FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SHORTLY.
FOREIGN POLICY CONTROLS
FOREIGN POLICY CONTROLS ARE IMPOSED AGAINST NATIONS WHICH 
VIOLATE INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTED NORMS OF CONDUCT. THESE 
CONTROLS HAVE NOT ONLY BEEN IMPOSED IN THE EAST-WEST CONTEXT, 
BUT IN MANY OTHER SITUATIONS AS WELL. EACH OF THESE CONTROLS 
HAS BEEN TAILORED TO THE SPECIFIC SITUATION AND HAS BEEN 
DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE IMPORTANT FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES.
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FOR. EXAMPLE, TO SCREEN OUT EXPORTS THAT COULD AID IN VIOLATIONS 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS, WE REQUIRE A VALIDATED EXPORT LICENSE ON CRIME 
CONTROL AND DETECTION EQUIPMENT TO ALL COUNTRIES EXCEPT NATO, 
JAPAN, AUSTRALIA, AND NEW ZEALAND. TO DISTANCE U.S. COMMERICAL 
ENTITIES FROM THE PRACTICE OF APARTHEID, WE CONTROL EXPORTS ON 
ARMS AND THE EQUIPMENT TO MAKE THEM, AND ON U.S. ORIGIN ITEMS 
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY, NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION, AND ' 
CRIME CONTROL POLICIES. TO COMBAT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, WE 
CONTROL EXPORTS TO SYRIA, YEMEN, LIBYA, AND CUBA, THE LATTER 
TWO OF WHICH ARE ALSO SUBJECT TO OTHER MORE RESTRICTIVE 
CONTROLS.
WHILE MUCH CRITICISM HAS BEEN LEVELED AGAINST THE EFFECTIVENESS 
OF FOREIGN POLICY CONTROLS, THEY REMAIN AN INSTRUMENT THE 
PRESIDENT CAN USE TO EXERCISE U.S. INFLUENCE BY A MEANS SHORT 
OF MILITARY ACTION. THE SUCCESS OF SANCTIONS SHOULD NOT BE 
MEASURED SIMPLY IN TERMS OF IMMEDIATE MODIFICATION OF THE 
UNDESIRABLE BEHAVIOR BY THE TARGETED COUNTRY. RATHER, FOREIGN 
POLICY CONTROLS ARE ALSO DIRECTED TOWARD OTHER SIGNIFICANT 
OBJECTIVES, INCLUDING:
(I) DETERRING FUTURE ACTIONS BY THE TARGET COUNTRY AND 
DETERRING OTHER COUNTRIES FROM ACTING IN A MANNER 
SIMILAR TO THE TARGET COUNTRY.
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, (2) ALLOWING THE PRESIDENT TO MOBILIZE INTERNATIONAL
SUPPORT AGAINST THE BEHAVIOR OF THE TARGET COUNTRY.
(3) EXTRACTING AN ECONOMIC COST FROM THE TARGETED COUNTRY 
AS A RESULT OF ITS UNDESIRABLE BEHAVIOR.
(4) EXPRESSING POLITICAL DISAPPROVAL AT THE UNDESIRABLE 
ACTIONS OF THE TARGET COUNTRY, AND INDICATING THE WILL 
OF THE U.S. THROUGH NON-MILITARY MEANS.
FOREIGN POLICY CONTROLS HAVE RECEIVED A LOT OF ATTENTION 
RECENTLY. THIS ADMINISTRATION IS SENSITIVE TO THE CONCERNS OF 
THE BUSINESS COMMUNITY ON THIS ISSUE. WE RECOGNIZE THAT THE 
IMPOSITION OF FOREIGN POLICY CONTROLS, WHICH ARE OFTEN IN 
RESPONSE TO INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS, KAY BE UNPREDICTABLE. 
THESE SANCTIONS SOMETIMES INCUR ECONOMIC COSTS AND KAY UNDERMINE 
THE REPUTATION OF U.S. FIRMS AS RELIABLE SUPPLIERS. THE 
ADMINISTRATION BILL'-CONTAINS A'POLICY STATEMENT THAT MAKES 
CLEAR THAT WE MUST"HINIMIZE TEE IMPACT OF THESE CONTROLS ON 
EXISTING CONTRACTS'AND O N 'BUSINE~SS“ ACTIVITIES IN ALLIED OR 
OTHER FRIENDLY COUNTRIES7*
IN RECOGNITION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS ISSUE, THE 
ADMINISTRATION ALSO PROPOSES TO PROTECT THE SANCTITY OF 
CONTRACTS IN EXISTENCE AT THE TIME THE PRESIDENT IMPOSES EXPORT 
CONTROLS FOR REASONS OF FOREIGN POLICY. IN POINT OF. FACT, THE 
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OFTEN PROTECTS PRE-EXISTING CONTRACTS FROM 
FORE.IGN POLICY CONTROLS. NEVERTHELESS, THIS PROVISION, WE 
BELIEVE, REPRESENTS OUR COMMITMENT TO MINIMIZE THE BURDEN ON 
BUSINESS-FIRMS ARISING FROM THE IMPOSITION OF FOREIGN POLICY 
CONTROLS.
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SPECIFICALLY, OCR BILL WOULD PROTECT EXISTING SALES CONTRACTS, 
THE TERMS OF WHICH REQUIRE DELIVERY WITHIN 270 DAYS FROM THE 
IMPOSITION OF CONTROLS, UNLESS THE PRESIDENT DETERMINES THAT 
THE OVERRIDING NATIONAL INTEREST REQUIRES THAT SUCH EXPORTS BE
p r o h i b i t e d '.
AT TIMES, THE FOREIGN POLICY INTERESTS OF THIS COUNTRY DEMAND 
CERTAIN ACTIONS, EVEN THOUGH THERE KAY BE SIGNIFICANT 
CORRESPONDING COSTS. THE PRESIDENT MUST HAVE THE FLEXIBILITY 
AND THE AUTHORITY TO RESPOND RAPIDLY TO UNACCEPTABLE 
INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR. THUS, THE ADMINISTRATION WOULD OPPOSE 
ANY FURTHER CHANGES TO TEE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT IN THIS 
RESPECT.
NOR CAN WE SUPPORT THE PROPOSAL CONTAINED IN H.R. 1565 OF 
PROVIDING INSURANCE' FOR BUSINESS LOSSES INCURRED AS A RESULT OF 
THE IMPOSITION OF FOREIGN POLICY CONTROLS,: - THIS PROPOSAL WOULD 
BE EXTREMELY DIFFI CULT~TO'ADMT nT s T E R E C R E A T I N G  A FERTILE FIELD 
FOR LITIGATION”
SHORT SUPPLY CONTROLS
THE ADMINISTRATION'S BILL PROPOSES TO ELIMINATE CONTROLS 
IMPOSED ON THE EXPORT O F ^ H e r't AIN" SPECIFIC COMMODITIES, WHILE
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r e t a i n i n g  t h e  b a s i c  a u t h o r i t y  f o r  t h e i m p o s i t i o n  o f  s h o r t
SUPPLY CONTROLS AND THE CRUDE OIL WAIVER PROVISIONS THAT PERMIT
THE PRESIDENT TO EXPORT CRUDE OTL TO MEET INTERNATIONAL U.S.
SUPPLY OBLIGATIONS. HR. CHAIRMAN,'WE BELIEVE THAT.THE 
PRESIDENT SHOULD HAVE THE LATITUDE AND FLEXIBILITY TO DETERMINE 
THE NEED FOR SBORT SUPPY CONTROLS AS THEY OCCUR AND TO REMOVE 
THEM WEEN THE NATIONAL INTEREST DOES. NOT REQUIRE EXPORT 
LIMITATIONS. IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE TEAT ALTHOUGH WE ARE 
DELETING THE SPECIFIC PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE EXPORT OF 
ALASKAN CRUDE OIL FROM THE E A A , IT REMAINS CONTROLLED BY OTHER 
STATUTES.
ANTI BOYCOTT P R OVISIONS
THE ADMINISTRATION BILL DOES NOT PROPOSE ANY CHANGES TO THE 
CURRENT ANTIBOYCOTT PROVISIONS OF THE EAA. MANY BELIEVE THERE 
ARE INCONSISTENCIES- AND OVERLAP BETWEEN THE RIBICOFF AMENDMENT, 
WHICH IMPOSES TAX~"piNALTIES ON THOSE^COMPANIES WHICH COMPLY 
WITH FOREIGN BOYCOTTS T AND THE EAA. WE"* BELIEVE THERE MUST BE A 
GREATER CONSENSUS~Be’fWEEN~ ALL INTERESTED PARTIES BEFORE A 
LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION CAN BE ACHIEVED.
LICENSING PROCEDURES
THE INTERAGENCY LICENSING PROCEDURES HAVE BEEN CONTINUOUSLY 
IMPROVED SINCE THE ADVENT OF THIS ADMINISTRATION.
627
- 13 -
NEVERTHELESS, WE INTEND TO STREAMLINE THIS PROCESS EVEN FURTHER 
AND HAVE PROPOSED SHORTER TIME PERIODS FOR PROCESSING THOSE 
APPLICATIONS THAT ARE HANDLED SOLELY WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF 
COMMERCE. WE HOPE TO REDUCE THE INTERAGENCY TIME PERIOD AS 
WELL/ AND -WILL‘BE WORKING''WITH'OTEER DEPARTMENTS TO EFFECT THIS
ENFORCEMENT-----------  t
FINALLY, MR. CHAIRMAN, WE PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO STRENGTHEN 
SIGNIFICANTLY ENFORCEMENT OF THE ACT. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS IS 
CRITICAL TO STEM THE UNLAWFUL FLOW OF CRITICAL GOODS AND 
TECHNOLOGY TO THE SOVIET UNION. WE PROPOSE TO ESTABLISH NEW 
STATUTORY CRIMES FOR CONSPIRING TO AND ATTEMPTING TO VIOLATE 
TEE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT. THIS WOULD PROVIDE CLEAR 
STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO PREVENT AN UNLAWFUL' EXPORT BEFORE IT 
OCCURS.
THE ADMINISTRATION BILL’CONTAINS A NEW CRIMINAL FORFEITURE 
PROVISION. THE ADDITION OF THIS PROVISION-WILL EQUIP 
PROSECUTORS WITH'"A "VALUABLE71 TOOL*"TO ‘ REACH THE- PROCEEDS OF 
ILLEGAL TRANSACTIONS. THE~ADMINISTRATION BILL FURTHER 
AUTHORIZES THE PRESIDENT TO PROHIBIT OFFENDERS OF THE NATIONAL 
SECURITY PROVISIONS OF THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT FROM 
EXPORTING THEIR GOODS OR TECHNOLOGY INTO THE UNITED STATES.
THIS PROVISION PROVIDES A STRONG NEW PENALTY TO DETER EXPORT 
CONTROL VIOLATIONS.
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THIS SUBCOMMITTEE HAS ASKED ME TO PROVIDE IT IN THIS TESTIMONY 
WITH INFORMATION REGARDING OUR FY ’84 BUDGET REQUEST. THIS 
INFORMATION IS AS FOLLOWS:
(1) FOR CARRYING OUT THE PURPOSES OF THE EAA, WE" HAVE 
REQUESTED FOR FY *84 TEE SUM OF $11,610', 000 r OF WHICH 
£4,973,000 SHALL BE AVAILABLE ONLY FOR ENFORCEMENT,
AND £6,637,000 SHALL BE AVAILABLE FOR ALL OTHER 
ACTIVITIES UNDER THE EAA.
(2) FOR EXPORT PROMOTION PROGRAMS, WE HAVE REQUESTED 
£100,458,000. EXPORT PROMOTION PROGRAMS ARE THOSE 
ACTIVITIES OF THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE DESIGNED TO 
STIMULATE OR ASSIST U.S. BUSINESSES IN MARKETING THEIR 
GOODS AND SERVICES ABROAD COMPETITIVELY WITH BUSINESS 
FROM OTHER COUNTRIES.
MR. CHAIRMAN, I THANK YOU FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO APPEAR BEFORE 
THIS SUBCOMMITTEE TO DISCUSS THESE ISSUES. WE LOOK FORWARD TO 
WORKING WITH YOUR COMMITTEE TO SEE TO THE PASSAGE INTO LAW OF A 
HEW EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT WHICH WILL BEST SERVE THE 
INTERESTS OF OUR COUNTRY.
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j q  • Customhouse Brokers, Exporters, Fi-eigbt Forwarders, and
* Others Concerned
SUBJECT*
* Expanded Foreign Policy Controls Affecting Exports to Libya
The Deoartnent of Corr.erce, Office of Ex •port Administration, has 
issued the following regulatory chances regarding, exports to Libya. Tne 
changes axe effective els of March 12. 1982. ~
Pursuant to the authority granted by Section 6 of the Export Adnin- 
'istration Act of 1979» the President has determined that foreign policy 
controls affecting exports to Libya should be expanded. Libya has been 
placed in~ country groups with a validated export license now required 
for all technical data and commodities except:
1. Medicine and medical supplies;
2. Food and other agricultural commodities;
3* JJ-ers Permitted under certain special purpose general 
licenses (includinr technical data freelv available to 
the -public) ; and
4. The export to Libya of non-strateric ‘foreign-nroduced direct 
products of U.S. origin technical data.
This rule placed a validated license requirement on certain commodi­
ties and technical data that previously could be exported under a general 
license. In addition, it prohibits the use of distribution licenses for 
Libya. Therefore, shipments of commodities or technical data removed 
from general licenses or distribution licenses as a result of changes set 
forth in this rule, that were on dock for lading, on licnters laden 
aboard exporting carriers, or in transit to a port pursuant to actual 
orders for export prior to 8:00 a.m.. March 12~ 1982. may be exported
nriT TO. I I O O N M  c o m m i s s i o n !  op Customs, us. c u s t o m h o u s e  h i w  yorr. h i w  toir iod<i
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under the existing applicable license provision up to and including Kerch 
.£6, 1952. Any such shipments not laden aboard the exporting carrier on or 
before March 26, 39S2, require an individual validated license lor export.
Any questions regarding this document should be directed to Office of 
Operations, Inspection and Control, Kew York Region, Attention J. Kodica 
- (ij66-4500).
6. s f ' & .•Hennas T. Snyder/ Regional Commissioner of -CusIoes
Distribution-. 406 
405 
410
r *
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(an J  Boeing if  any portion o f ihe Euct.p Financing is outstanding) or 
the Gunrnntois may reasonably request.
C . Kegative Covenants—Borrower. The Borrower covenants and 
agrees that until all amounts owing under this Agreement and the Notes 
have been paid in full, it w ill not, without the prior written consent o f 
Exim bank (and  the Guarantors so long as the Guarantors remain under any 
J actual or contingent liability towards Eximbank or Boeing hereunder or the
I Borrov.cr ;cmains under any actual or cm itirgen’ liability to the Guarantors
i under the Guarantee Facility Agreem ent), such consent not to be ur.reason-
I ably withheld:
j  ( i ) nncumnrar.ces. Create, assume, permit or suffer to exist ar.y
» Encum.i ..trees on an) ot its properties or revenues, whether now owned
| or here, fie; acquired, cvcept for ( a ) the Encumbrances discio. ed in the
t financial statements spec died in paragraph A ( 6 )  o f this Anic.'e IV  or
|  othcrv. i;c Jisclused ir. writing to Eximbank prior to the da tv o f this
| Agreement. ( b )  liens fo: taxes ar.d hens arising by operation o f law in
p fc.vot o f mechanics. materialmen and the like for obligations which are
| not then due or which the Borrower is then contC'tmg :n good faith, ( r )
j any Encumbrances on non-aircraft properties hereafter acquired, if  such
* Encumbrances were in existence thereon prior to such acquisition or
i were created tltereon at the time o f purchase so!el> to secure the
* j . m d v ;  price thereof, g u "  ; i. d that :h.-up: : . \  :ir.< uv. o f  t... d.-.-t
* secured by such 1: not* ram nr.ee > shah not. a , o f December 51 o f each
I yea*, exceed ?5Cc o f the aj-g',eg-*,c purei.es? pnee o f me properties so
S secured, (c  ) any Encumbrances .•:* secure debt incurred t . the ordinary
> coumc o f business which is pa)able over a term not in excess o f one
* year, provided that such debt ts net mcurted for the purchase o f
* aticraft. f.xed assets or the shades or obligation? o f tne subsidiaries o f
| the Borrower, ( e ) n o r.-/ ircraft leases in the ordinary course o f bubncss.
t ( f ) mortgages on eacli o f the three Cueing 737-J'd: aircraft te-.'-tered :n
j the K o rx e iia n  Civil A " o v ! i  Rep.star as L N -S U K . L N -S L H  and L N -
r  r t - r  / '  e. . t . - . . .  : -  r . .  ~ f  . v ,  . - . - i
i  , V v- 1 J>C i J t L  .> . » I l i t  I U \ V.»l v • 1 kl t L w U u iw . J U  ^ u . N J d l i t  I Cf
Clause 35 ( E ) o f the Guarantee Facility Agreement, ( h )  fieet mortgage 
or. ti e four Fol.ker F-3S aircraft registered it; the Norw egian C vil 
Aircraft Regi.ter as 1 N-Si.-C. L N -S IW . L N -S L N  ar.d I .N -5 V C . ( i )  
first priority mortgages or. each of the three Boeing 73“ aircralt 
registered in the Norwegian Civil Aircraft R cgw yr as L N -S U D . E N ­
SUE and i N -S i 'M . ( i )  seconj p-.ior.ty mortgare on the Boeing 737 
aircraft istered m the Norwegian C-v.l A-rcraft Register as L N -  
] S U M , 11.1 m.-ngege on real estate G NF.. U 7, 1 N R . 314 in Stjoerd.il
i
i
\
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municipality and (1) the First Mortgages and the Second Mortgages cn 
the Items;
( 2 )  Secured Interest. Create or permit the creation (except as 
required by Exim bank under the terms o f subparagraph ( B ) (  1 ) ( c)  o f  
Article V I or except as required by the Guarantors under the terms o f  
subparagraph ( B ) ( 1 ) ( d )  o f Article V I )  o f any additional mortgage, 
pledge, lien, or other encumbrance, on any o f the Items;
( 3 )  Pio Rata Prepayment. Prepay any obligation for borrowed 
money or fo: the deferred purchase price o f property or services 
rccc:\cd un’css. cor.curr-?r :!y them vbh. it notifies Enimbank o f its 
intention to make such a prepayment, and. if  Eximbank so requests in 
writing, prepays the Financings in an amount having the same propor­
tion to the aggregate principal amount outstanding under ail the 
Financings as the amount o f the prepayment o f that obligation has to 
the principal amount outstanding o f that obligation;
( 4 )  Merger, Consolidation and Sale. Merge or consolid-te with 
any other entity, or sell, least, transfer or otherwise dispose o f all or 
substantially all o f its properties., or enter into any agreement to do any 
o f t.'ic foregoing:
( 5 )  Purchase or Roden; :ior of Shares. Purch?«c or redeem, or 
permit any subsidiary to puichase. any shares o f the Borrower's capital 
stock unless such purchase oi redemption is effected solely from the 
proceeds o f and within a rea<°rable time after the issuance to third 
parties by the Borrower or the subsidiary o f capua! stock whicn is in 
addition to the capita! stock o f the Borrower or the subsidiary , as the 
case may be. outstanding on the date o f this Agreement:
( 6 )  A c q u is itio n  Lis,. M aterial!) alter the acquisition list furnished 
pursuant to the provision: o f subparagraph A ( 5 )  of Article V;
( 7 )  Purchase Contracts. Assign its rights or obligations unde*- any 
contract f«-»r the purchase o f the Items (the “ Purchase Contract” ), or 
modify in any substantial way or cancel the Purcnase Contract;
( 8 )  Change in Business. M ake any substantial change in the scope 
or natuic o f its business or operations;
v *  ( 9 )  Use of Aircraft. Permit the Aircraft ( a )  to be principally used 
in a Communist country (as defined in Section 6 2 0 (f) o f the Forcgn  
Assistance Act o f 1961', as am ended) ot (D )  to be used in any nation
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■ which engaces ir. armed contuet, declared or otherwise, with a r r .M
' forces o f the United States or ( c) ;o be used in any area excluded under
| insurance policies required to be maintained hereundcr;|or
( 10)  Lease, Sale and Parting with Possession of the Items Sell, 
lease, permit the sub-leasing, convey, transfer, part with possession or 
operational control or otherwise dispose o f the Aircraft or any other 
Item comprised within the licms. P R O V ID F D  H O W E N E R  T H A T  the 
foregoing shall not apply to ( a )  leases or sub-leases to a subsidiary of 
the Borrower, ( b )  any' one time only lea^e or sub-lease o f an Aircraft 
for 2 term not in excess oi 24 months which does not permit the use o f  
that Aircraft in the United States and which does not otherwise violate 
any o f the other provisions o f this Agreement; or (c )  charters o f an 
Aircraft on a time, mileage or tnp basis for so-called “ charter flights 
where that Aircraft remains in the continuous operational control ot the 
Borrower; and P R O V ID E D  T H A T  the Borrower may pan wi th posses­
sion or operational control o f an Aircraft or other item comprised in the 
Items under so-called "interchange" or “ pooling" agreements, or 
similar agreements customary in the airline industry required in the 
ordinary course o f business which w ill not cause the Borrower to be in 
breach o f any provisions o f this Agreement or the First M ongagcs or 
which contemplates or requires the transfer of title to an .*\ircru!t or any 
) other Item  comprised within the Item* to a person other than the
Borrower; (and provided further that the Aircraft shall at all times be 
insured in accordance with the equiremcnts o f paragraph ( B )  ( 6 )  o f  
this Article IN ');
D . Spcciol Representations. Warranties and Covenants— Borrower. 
The Borrower represents, warrants and covenants that:
( 1 )  Employment. It has not employed, does not em ploy and w ill 
not employ ( a ) as an agent or attorney in connection with the Financing 
anv person who as an employee ot Eximbank had panic.pated person­
ally and substantially in the Financing or ( b ) as an agent or attorney to 
appear personally in connection with the Financing any person w ho had 
been an employee o f Eximbank. within one year o f being employed by 
the Borrower and had official responsibility for the Financing at any­
time during the last year o f that person’s employ ment by Eximbank; 
and
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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
International Trade Administration 
i
15 CFR Part* 373, 376 and 390
Use oC U.S.-Origin Parts for Servicing Libyan Aircraft Restricted
Office of Export Administration 
International Trade Administration 
Commerce
ACTION; Final Rule
SUMMARY:
This rule prohibits the use of bulk licenses for the provision of 
aircraft parts and accessories to aircraft ovnefl, operated, or 
controlled by, or under charter or lease to Libya ox; any of it« 
nationals. Exports of these commodities may now be made only 
pursuant to an Individual validated license issued on a case-by-ease 
basis. This prohibition is necessary to enable closer monitoring of 
U.S.-origin parts used to maintain aircraft that may be used in 
support of Libyan military intervention In neighboring countries.
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EFFECTIVE DATE: (Date of Publication)
FOR FURTHER information CONTACT: Archie Andrews, Director,
Exporter^ Service Staff, Office of Export Administration, D. S. 
Department of Commerce, Washington, D,C. 20230 (Telephone: (202) 
377-5247 or 377-4811).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATIONS 
Substance of Regulation
■This rule prevents the use of various special privilege bulk 
licensing arrangements for the supply of parts and equipment to 
Libyan aircraft without a case-by-case review by the Department of 
Commerce. The commodities covered by this order are presently 
controlled for national security reasons. The order Included In 
this announcement will permit the Department to monitor on a 
case-by-case basis the supply of U.S. parts for the servicing of 
aircraft that may be used in military Intervention by Libya in 
neighboring countries while assessing the necessity for imposing 
foreign policy controls. An exporter desiring to supply parts or 
equipment for an aircraft owned, operated, controlled, chartered or 
leased by Libya or any of its nationals may apply for an individual 
validated license or reexport authorization.
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Kulemaklng Requirements
In connection vi th various rulemaking requirements, the Office of 
Export Administration has determined that:
1. Under Section 13(a) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 
(Pub. L. 96-72, 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 cjt sag. )("the Act"), this rule 
is exempt from the public participation In rulemaking procedures of 
the Administrative Procedure Act.
2. This rule does not impose a burden under the Paperwork deduction 
Act of 1980, 44 U.S.C* 3501 et set?.
3. This rule Involves a "foreign affairs" function of the United 
States and, therefore, is exempt from the requirements of Executive 
Order 12291 (46 TR 13193, February 19, 1981), "Federal Regulation,"
4. This rule Is not subject to the requirements of the Regulatory 
'Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C.# 601 ejt sea.
Section 13(a) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (Pub. L. 
96-72, 50 U.S.C. app. 2401 e t scg.) ("the Act") exempts regulations 
promulgated under the Act from the public participation in 
rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act.
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Section 13(b) of the Act, which expresses the intent of Congress 
that where practicable "regulations imposing controls on exports* be 
publishers in proposed form. Is not applicable because this 
regulation does not impose new controls on exports. Therefore, this 
regulation is Issued in final form. Although there is no formal 
comment period, public comments on this regulation are welcome on a 
continuing basis .
Accordingly, Parts 373, 376 and 390 of the Export Administration 
Regulatl ons (15 CPR Parts 368 _et seg.) are amended as follows:
1. Section 373. 2 Is amended by revising paragraphs (b)(5) and 
(b)(6) and adding a nev? paragraph (b)(7), reading as follows:
5 3 7 3 . 2
Project License
(b) * * *
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(5) The cccmodities are electronic# mechanical, or other devices 
as described in 5376.13(a)# primarily useful for surreptitious 
interception of vire or oral communications;
»
(6) The conmoMties axe listed in a Supplement to Part 377 as
being under short supply controls; or
(7) The commodities are aircraft parts and accessories covered
by 5390.7.
« * t * *
2. Section 373. 3 is amended by rerising para'graphs (b)(3) and
(b)(4) and adding a new paragraph (b)(5)# reading as follows;
S373.3
Distribution License
t
* * * * *
/
(b) * * *
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(3) Electronic, mechanical, or other devices, as described in- 
5376.13(a), primarily useful for surreptitious interception of wire 
or oral communi cationsj
(4) Ccrunodities listed in a Supplement to Part 377 as being 
under short supply controls; and
/
(5) Aircraft parts and accessories covered by §390.7.
* * * * *
3, Section 373. 7 is amended by revising paragraphs (b)(5) and 
(b) (C) and adding a nev? paragraph (b) (7) reading as follows*
$373 ,7
Service Supply (5L) Procedure 
* * * * *
(b) * * *
(5) Ccnunodities listed in Supplement No. 1 to this Part 373 ;
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(5) Parts to service any equipment owned, controlled or used by 
or for a military or police entity in the Republic of South Africa 
or Kemlblaj end
(7) 'Aircraft parts and accessories covered by 5350,7.
4. Section 373 . 8 Is amended by revising paragraph (c)(1) to read as 
follows*
5373.8
Aircraft and Vessel Repair 
Station Procedure
(c) * *  *■
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(1) Restricted to certain aircraft and vessels. A foreign importer 
is authorized to use U.S.-origin parts in the repair, maintenance, 
or servicing or any civil aircraft or vessel, provided the aircraft 
or vessel is not. registered in, or not owned or controlled by, or 
not chartered or leased to, a Group P, 0, S, W, Y, or Z country, 
Afghanistan or £.Ibva, or any national thereof.
* * * * *
5. Section 376. B is amended by revising paragraphs (b)(1)(H) and 
(b) (1) (ill) to read as follows:
5376.8
Aircraft and Equipment, Parts,
Accessories, and Components Therefor
* + \ . * • * *
(b) * * *
a) * * *
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(1) * * *
(ii) The commodities vlll not be supplied for use on any 
aircraft registered in, or owned or controlled by, or chartered or 
leased to, a Group P, Q, S, W, Y or 2 country, Afghanistan or Libya, 
or any national thereof; and
(iii) The commodities will not be supplied for use on any 
aircraft located in a Group F, Q, S, W, Y or Z country, Afghanistan 
or Libya.
* * * * *
6. Part 390 is amended by adding a new Section 390,7 reading as 
f ollcws:
S390. 7
General Order Preventing the Use of Bulk Licenses for Aircraft 
Controlled by Libya
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•Sffective pate of Publication) bulk licenses described in Part 373 
may not be used to provide aircraft parts and accessories (Export 
Control Commodity Numbers 1460, 4460, 14B5, 1501(a), (b)(1) and
(c) (1)) to aircraft owned, operated, or controlled by, or under 
charter or lease to Libya or any of Its nationals.
AUTHORITY; Sections 3, 13 and IS, Pub. L. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503, 50 
U.S.C* app. §2401 £t scg.j Executive Order No. 12214 (45 PE 29783, 
Kay 6, 1980); Department Organization Order 10-3 (45 FR 6141, 
January 25, 1980); International Trade Administration Organization 
and Function Order 41-1 (45 FR 11862, February 22, 1980) and 41-4 
(45 FR 65003 , October 1, 1980).
' 5FP 1 8 Wfif
W i l l ia m  V. Skidm ore
Director, Office of Export Administration 
Internationa^ Trade Administration
